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Abstract 
This thesis traces the use and abuse of genealogy, from Friedrich Nietzsche to 
Edward Said. After elucidating Nietzsche and Michel Foucault’s coherent 
configuration of the genealogical method in their own philosophical projects, it 
critically deconstructs and rejects the claim that the post-colonial thinker in 
Edward Said’s book ‘Orientalism’ is a genealogy in a similar sense to Nietzsche 
and Foucault. The rejection of Said’s texts and Orientalism’s status as a 
genealogical history is premised on a critical analysis of Said’s misreading and 
negation of key Nietzschean and Foucauldian concepts such as power, discourse 
and the body. Following a rejection of the post-colonial appropriation of 
genealogy, this thesis concludes by suggesting some revisions for a more 
coherent deployment of genealogy in post-colonial theory through a closer 
reading of the relationship between the body and power, with regard to the 
question of subjectification.   
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 Part 1: The Use of Genealogy 
Introduction  
Thesis problem 
A general definition of post-colonial theory states that it, “…deals with the effects of 
colonialism or colonization on culture and societies”.1 Post-colonial theorists not only survey 
the effects of colonization on those that were formerly colonized, but provide active critiques 
of the residue, or rather continuation of colonial domination as it figures itself in the present 
social, political and economic lives of the ‘Others’ of  colonial Europe. If we take these 
descriptions as accurate, post-colonial critique would not only attempt to deconstruct colonial 
truth claims, but also provide those who were silenced by colonial violence with the capacity 
to speak for and represent themselves.2 While the first post-colonial theorist to covet the 
name ‘post-colonial’ was Gayatri Spivak in 1990,3 the movement has a far longer ancestry. 
Edward Said is considered one of the forefathers of post-colonial theory because of the 
impact of his first major work, Orientalism. In the course of the reception of the book, it has 
become commonplace in postcolonial theory to accept Said’s  text as embodying a coherent 
critical method-- called genealogy-- that allows the theorist to unmask, through an historical 
analysis, relationships of power and domination in colonial and post-colonial societies that 
were previously considered natural.4 To provide some context; genealogy, a method created 
by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche, is a particular brand of historical philosophy 
whose mode of deconstructive analysis of traditional truth claims depends on a particular 
relation between concepts. In this thesis, I argue that the only inheritor and practitioner of a 
truly Nietzschean version of genealogy is Michel Foucault. Omitting the differences between 
the two thinkers for now, with regard to the manner in which they deploy their concepts 
differently as Nietzschean philosophers or genealogists, both have conceptualised power as a 
positive system in the sense that it engenders a reality that is perspectivally apprehended by 
human beings to be true, and therefore produces and determines subjective forms of 
                                                          
1 Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffins and Helen Tiffin, Post-colonial Studies: The Key Concepts, (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 186 
2 Gayatri Chakraborty Spivak, Outside the Teaching Machine (London: Routledge, 1993), 35 
3  Ashcroft, Griffins and Tiffin, Post-colonial Studies, 186 
4 These are a list of thinkers in the post-colonial academy who still consider Edward Said a genealogist, William 
Hart, ‘Edward Said and the Religious effects of Culture’ , (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 69; 
See Spanos, ‘Edward Said: A Legacy,  45; and  Rehnuhma Sazzad, ‘Hatoum, Said and Foucault  : Resistance 
through revealing the Power/Knowledge Nexus’, in , Post-colonial Text, Vol 4, No 2 (2008);  See also, Robert 
Young, ‘White Mythologies’, (Routledge, New York, 2004), 169 
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experience.5 The historical study of how power produces different forms of subjects outside 
the intentional control of human beings is what, in Nietzschean terms, is called a genealogical 
history or genealogy. 
One has to dispense with the constituent subject, to get rid of the subject itself, that's to say, to arrive at 
an analysis which can account for the constitution of the subject within a historical framework. And 
this is what I would call genealogy. 6  
While the intellectual and political relations between Marxism, Freudian psychoanalysis and 
post-colonial theory have been acknowledged,7 the relationship between few contemporary 
thinkers have traced the relationship between Nietzsche, Foucault and the use of Said’s work 
in any depth or with a critical eye.8 This thesis attempts to rectify some of these oversights 
and makes the claim that the relationship between these thinkers and concepts is far from 
contiguous and clear. In fact, the use of genealogy as found in Edward Said’s work 
constitutes a break in the genealogical method that was bequeathed to us through Nietzsche 
and Foucault. My argument is that Said’s Orientalism is not a genealogy. Its status as a model 
of genealogy is rather an abuse of the very Nietzschean concepts that designate the 
ontological and historiographical context of a genealogical study. I also claim that this misuse 
of genealogy is a hindrance to the advancement of critique in post-colonial theory. Contrary 
to claims that  Orientalism was a successful genealogy, I argue that Said’s revisions of 
Nietzsche and Foucault’s methods lacked not only a correct application of genealogy, but an 
inner coherence that both rob it of critical import, which I consider Nietzsche and Foucault’s 
genealogies to hold.  Indeed, Orientalism was ineffective from the standpoint of those 
genealogies. Its status as a work of literary criticism must be brought under question because 
Said continued to be afflicted by the problem of an East-West binary, which he claims to 
overcome in Orientalism.9 I argue that if Said’s text becomes an authorative standard for 
genealogical history, then post-colonial theory will continue to misuse certain forms of 
inquiry, not knowing that they are ineffective and incoherent.  I suggest a far more traditional 
application of Nietzsche and Foucault’s insights which could benefit post-colonial studies.  
                                                          
5  Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, Translated by  Alan Sheridan ( London: 
Penguin Books, 1991), 27-28 
6 Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, in, Michel Foucault:  ‘Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other 
Writings: 1972-1977, (eds) Colin Gordon ( New York, Pantheon, 1980),  117 
7  For Marx See, Neil Lazarus and Rashmi Varma, Marxism and Post-colonial Studies, in , Critical Companion 
to Contemporary Marxism, (eds) Jacques Bidet and Stathis Kouvelakis, (Boston: Brill, 2008), 309 ; For Freud 
see Mrinalini.  Greedharry, Postcolonial Theory and Psychoanalysis: from Uneasy Engagements to Effective 
Critique,(  London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008),  
8 Paul Bove, Mendacious innocents, or, the modern genealogist as conscientious intellectual: Nietzsche, 
Foucault, Said  Boundary Vol 2 , (1981);  Hart, Said and the Religious Effects of Culture, 115-142 
9 Edward Said, Orientalism: Western conceptions of the Orient, (London: Penguin Books, 1978), 25 
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Genealogy, Methodology, Concepts 
For Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, the beginning of each philosophy commences with the 
creation of a set of concepts.10 These concepts correlate, co-ordinate and dissect with one 
another, responding to a conjunction of specific problems implicated in the lived experience 
of the philosopher.11 Nietzsche introduced power, the will to nothingness, the will to truth, 
force (both active and reactive), ressentiment, and bad conscience, as concepts that perform 
specific operations in relation to the diagnostic problems he had beset for himself as a critical 
cultural physician of natural values at the end of the nineteenth century. He created these for 
the purpose of revaluating the state of Western values and socio-political relations. These 
problems, which afflicted Nietzsche’s philosophical experience, were beset by a particular 
attitude that had facilitated the direction of philosophical investigations of the time. 
According to Michel Foucault, philosophers after Immanuel Kant were concerned with or 
gripped by the question of who we are; a question directed at the very constitution of the 
rational human agents at the birth of the modern period.12 According to Foucault, Kant was 
concerned with the present moment as means by which human beings could reflect and 
transform themselves as humans beings encompassed with a practical rational agency and 
freedom.13 Foucault is correct in his analysis of the temporal moment in Nietzsche; genealogy 
is not simply a method that looks to the past. Nietzsche’s method, embodying the Kantian 
attitude, is designed to diagnose the present for the purpose of engendering radical change in 
the future-- it is a transformative method. 
In this thesis, I will show that despite Foucault’s alterations to genealogy, the fundamental 
relationship between a history of power and the production of objective concepts, which 
allows one to trace a historically-produced subjectivity, still holds an inner coherence. Thus, 
my argument is that Foucault reframed Nietzsche’s conceptual armature in such a manner 
that he was able to deploy genealogy effectively in accordance with several concepts that 
demarcated his own archaeological historiography and the political problems that afflicted 
the European populace of which he considered himself to be a part.  In this thesis, my first 
task is to provide a descriptive analysis of how Nietzsche and Foucault have developed 
genealogy as a critical historical methodology in their own distinct ways as histories of 
                                                          
10 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, What is Philosophy?, Translated by Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell  
(New York: Columbia University Press; 1994), 40 
11 Ibid 18 
12 Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment, in, The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York, 
Pantheon Books, 1984), 34 
13 Ibid 
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subjectivity for the purposes of inciting personal and social transformation. Nietzsche, for 
example, is not a genealogist of the subject, but of the intersubjective will of a cultural 
populace. Foucault does not look at one subject, but many human beings who are produced as 
individualized subjects through the historical operations of two apparatuses in modern 
society, imprisonment and the confessional.14  
Thesis Plan  
In Chapter 1, I explain how genealogy is used as a historical method by Nietzsche in relation 
to his philosophical project, and how this is centralized in his clarificatory text, On the 
Genealogy of Morals. In Chapter 2, I describe the different genealogical approach of 
Foucault and demonstrate how he remains within a somewhat revised, yet Nietzschean, 
understanding of genealogy. 
In Chapter 3, I turn to the use of genealogy in postcolonial theory. This chapter will have two 
purposes. First, to demonstrate the methodological difference between what I will call a 
Nietzschean genealogical project and a postcolonial project as found in the work of Edward 
Said. Secondly, I hope to suggest ways in which genealogy can be re-applied to the 
postcolonial field which repair Said’s potentially crucial errors. While his title as genealogist 
is accepted uncritically amongst certain post-colonial theorists, I will show that Said’s 
analytic deployment of concepts does not correlate to a coherent use of the genealogical 
method as an historical process that leads to the constitution of the present. Said’s conception 
of power is derived from Karl Marx, and more specifically; Antonio Gramsci. On a 
Nietzschean account, it is a repressive form of power, which does not operate as producing 
truthful relations that determine subjectivity.15 Without this conceptual pre-requisite, I argue 
that Said cannot account for how the present is constituted through a process of power 
relations. Said’s text does not adequately study the constitution of a subject or provide 
grounds for any form of subjectification, which is the central concern of his genealogy. 
Lastly, Said’s text, like Nietzsche and Foucault’s genealogies, was conceived as a work 
intended to induce a transformation in the writer; to attain a consciousness critical enough to 
overcome the obstacle at the heart of his work: the East/West binary division of reality. If his 
revisions to the genealogical method allowed him to overcome the racist binary division of 
                                                          
14Michel Foucault, Confessions of the Flesh, in, Michel Foucault:  ‘Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and 
Other Writings: 1972-1977( New York, Pantheon, 1980),  194-196 
15 David Couzens Hoy, Power Repression,  Progress: Foucault, Lukes and the Frankfurt School,  in, Foucault: 
A critical Reader, edited by David Couzens Hoy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 125-131 
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reality that he so despises, then it would be indisputable that his method had coherence, even 
if it was not a genealogy. However, Said’s project fails on his own terms because he is unable 
to overcome the East/ West binary that characterizes the racist colonial perspective of the 
Orientalist scholar. Said’s revisions to the genealogical method are unsuccessful. Since this is 
the case, there are no grounds for post-colonial theory to claim that Said’s revisions are 
acceptable under the name of genealogy. On this basis, I will conclude with a set of 
recommendations for future work in post-colonial studies to practice genealogy coherently.  
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Chapter 1: Nietzsche and the Birth of Genealogy                           
Introduction 
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche was born on the 15th of October 1844 in Rocken, situated in 
Saxony, a province in the former Kingdom of Prussia.16 Of all Nietzsche’s texts, most 
commentators agree that On the Genealogy of Morals is his most important contribution to 
philosophy as a whole.17  Not only has genealogy been essential in understanding Nietzsche’s 
own work, but as a particular form of historiographical practice, genealogy has acquired the 
status of a critical method in the wider academic field, most notably in post-structural and 
post-colonial studies.  Despite this consensus, I argue that genealogy has been poorly 
understood in post-colonial studies. I will demonstrate in subsequent chapters that a modified 
form of critique, particularly in Said’s post-colonial genealogy, transforms Nietzsche’s 
method in pivotal ways, resulting in a historiographical method which rejects Nietzschean 
foundations. That is; the ontology developed by Nietzsche and the Nietzschean ontological 
analytics developed and deployed effectively in two genealogical studies by Foucault.  After 
looking at the failure of Said’s post-colonial genealogy, I suggest that future genealogists 
would do well with a closer application of Nietzsche and Foucault’s insights. In order to 
understand the transformation of Nietzsche’s genealogy in postcolonial thought, I will first 
rehearse Nietzsche’s critical genealogical method and detail the process by which he seeks to 
overcome traditional metaphysics and its association with a Platonic cosmology.  
The Kantian Question in Nietzschean Genealogy 
According to Todd May, the traditional practice of genealogy was a historical method by 
which one could, “trace one’s ancestors, to follow backwards (or forwards) the kinship lines 
that yield oneself, one’s siblings, one’s children”.18 Nietzsche did not use genealogy in this 
manner. The sense and the direction he took genealogy is revolutionary. From his very first 
books Nietzsche was concerned with who we are. That is, how we have become who we are 
through an historical process.  This is the central concern in his genealogy.  
                                                          
16 Walter Kaufmann, Nietzsche, Philosopher, Psychologist, Anti-Christ, (Princeton University Press: New 
Jersey, 1974), 22 
17 Keith Ansell Pearson, Chapter Nine: On the Genealogy of Morality’, in,  Introductions to Nietzsche, edited by 
Robert Pippin( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,2012), 199 ; Gilles Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, 
Translated by Hugh Tomlinson, ( The Athlone Press: London; 1983),  3 
18 Todd May, The Philosophy of Foucault( Chesham, Acumen, 2006) , 63 
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According to the French theorist Michel Foucault, a concern for the present arises with Kant.  
Kant asked the question, ‘Was ist Aufklärung?’ That is, what is our own actuality, what is happening 
around us, what is our present? It seems to me that philosophy acquired a new dimension here. 
Moreover, it opened up a certain task that philosophy had ignored or didn't know even existed 
beforehand, and that is to tell us who we are, what our present is, what that is, today.19 
According to Foucault, Kant’s paper is special because it is the first piece of philosophy to 
“reflect on the present” in a new manner.20 Unlike his earlier writings, Kant does not relate 
the present moment to a teleological process. Instead, he focuses on the present moment 
alone.21  For Foucault, he does not describe who we are in terms of any teleological or 
ontological metaphysic. Rather, he thinks about who we are in negative terms-- in terms of a 
way out.22 For Kant, the present state of who we are is a “self-incurred minority”, which “is 
the incapacity to use one’s intelligence without the guidance of another”.23  One can 
overcome the status of minority and attain enlightenment, or maturity through the free use of 
one’s public reason.24 Public reason and freedom are not defined ontologically. Kant’s 
position in “What is Enlightenment?” is thus indicative of a straightforward liberal approach.  
According to Andrius Bielskis, it is commonplace for liberal thinkers after Descartes to adopt 
a deontological approach to the human subject. In order to validate their views on self-
determination, Bielskis claims, modern thinkers rebel against the notion of a teleological 
cosmic order in order to avoid the notion that the will may be determined by laws of nature.25 
It is thus possible to understand the philosophical reasons regarding what Andrew Bowie 
calls the tension between Kant’s strictly teleological notions of history, as well as the ability 
for subjects to use their freedom in historically situated circumstances such as modernity.26 
 
 
                                                          
19 Michel Foucault, What our Present is, in, The Politics of Truth, edited by Sylvere Lotringer, (Los Angeles, 
Semiotexte, 2007),  129-130 
20 Michel Foucault, What is Enlightenment, in, The Foucault Reader, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York, 
Pantheon Books, 1984), 34 
21 Ibid 34 
22 Ibid 34 
23 Immanuel Kant, On The Question: What is Enlightenment?, in, Basic Writings of Kant, ed. Allen W. Wood 
(New York: Modern Library, 2001), 135 
24 Ibid 136 
25 Andrius Bilskies, Towards a Post-modern understanding of the Political: From Genealogy to Hermeneutics, 
(Hampshire, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 8 
26 Andrew Bowie, Introduction to German Philosophy: From Kant to Habermas, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2003), 33-34 
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Nietzsche’s Genealogy: A Contextual Introduction  
According to Foucault, the Kantian attitude towards who we are is also Nietzsche’s 
question.27 Yet Nietzsche’s genealogical response to this question is in no way liberal or 
democratic.28 This is important because Nietzsche, unlike Kant or Hegel, is not concerned 
with revising the present moment within the framework of hegemonic cultural valuations. He 
considers his project a critique of his age, of current values.29 Like Kant, Nietzsche’s 
reflection towards the present moment was one in which a collectivity could transform 
themselves through a critical engagement with the present moment. As a genealogist, 
Nietzsche is concerned with bringing our values as determinants of who we are under radical 
critique. In his early work, Nietzsche never considers who we are in metaphysical or 
ontological terms. In his more mature work--most importantly his genealogy-- he addresses 
who we are, or “we [the] knowers” in terms of an ontological (or rather cosmological) system 
that undergirds his philosophy of value. Nietzsche’s ontological system, “the will to power”, 
is the means by which he attempts to radically revise the nature of philosophy, away from 
neo-Platonic dualistic ontologies that have determined philosophical debates about human 
values in terms of the best or good life, since Plato. Nietzsche’s genealogy played a 
functional diagnostic role in his work in relation to his general project, “the revaluation of all 
values”, a project where he tried to set the ground for a revaluation of Western, Platonic 
values, as a means of transformation.30 This subversive project relies on an ontological vision 
of the natural world and the will to power that destabilizes all forms of valuation that 
considers human beings as transcendent and objectively true. In Nietzsche’s philosophy, one 
cannot account for present existence and his historical portrayal of human values without the 
productive ontological force of the will to power. In this Chapter, when I present Nietzsche’s 
genealogy, I will first pay close attention to his ontological system and the relation it has to 
his deconstructive philosophy of value as cultural physician. It is incredibly important to 
understand Nietzsche’s entire historical philosophy of value, because it is a pre-requisite to an 
understanding of his genealogy, since he wrote On the Genealogy of Morals as a clarification 
of his prior work. After explicating how Nietzsche uses genealogy, I will attend to how 
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Nietzsche uses it before concluding the chapter with the role genealogy has played in relation 
to Nietzsche’s overall project, which is the revaluation of all values.  
Section 1: Nietzsche’s Ontology/ Cosmology of Valuing Life  
Section 2: Nietzsche’s Concerns in the Genealogy 
Section 3: The role Nietzsche’s Genealogy plays in relation to the Revaluation of Values 
Section 1: Nietzsche’s cosmology/ontology of Values  
Naturalism: Aesthetic and Psychological  
For the better part of nearly two decades, Friedrich Nietzsche has been referred to as a 
naturalist by contemporary philosophers.31 Brian Leiter has claimed that Nietzsche’s 
naturalism leads him into philosophical communion with thinkers who stress a relationship 
between a natural vision of the world, and the corresponding methodological presets of 
modern scientific epistemology. Despite the affinities between naturalism and modern 
science, I strongly suggest that Nietzsche did not endorse a form of methodological scientific 
naturalism congruent with the deployment of naturalized methodologies in the work of Hume 
and Leibniz, as argued by Leiter.32 I do agree that, central to Nietzsche’s naturalistic vision of 
the world, unlike that of neo-Platonic religious traditions, he does not propose that human 
beings have a divine origin, but are the result of a natural process.33 For Nietzsche, human 
beings were born from the torturous process in which they left the natural world and entered 
into a social network of relations, creating an internal sphere of experience called bad 
conscience.  
These semi-animals well adapted to the wilderness, to war, to prowling to adventure: suddenly all their 
instincts were disvalued and ‘suspended’…In this new world they no longer possessed their former 
guides, their regulating, unconscious and infallible drives… All instincts that do not discharge 
themselves outwardly turn inward-this is what I call the internalization of man: thus he developed what 
was later called his ; soul‘.  The entire inner world, originally as thin as if it were stretched between 
two membranes, expanded and extended itself, acquired breadth, depth and height, in the same measure 
                                                          
31 Ashley Woodward, Understanding Nietzscheanism , (Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2011), 209-210 ; Brian 
Leiter, Nietzsche On Morality, (London: Routledge, 2002), 2-3; Christopher Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and 
Interpretation, ( Berkeley, University of California Press, 1999), 3; Christa Davis Acampora, Naturalism and 
Nietzsche’s Moral Psychology, in, A Companion to Nietzsche, edited by Keith Ansell Pearson, (Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishing, 2006),  314 
32 Leiter, Nietzsche On Morality, 6 
33 Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the prejudices of Morality, Translated by R.J 
Hollingdale(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1997), 32 (aphorism 49) 
10 
 
that outward discharge was inhibited… All those instincts of wild free prowling man turned backwards 
against man himself. Hostility, cruelty, joy in persecuting, in attacking, in change, destruction-all this 
turned against the possessors of such instincts: that is the origin of the ’bad conscience’.34 
Nietzsche regards “bad conscience” as the primary human condition, as, “man’s suffering of 
man, of himself-the result of a forcible sundering from his animal past”.35 It is this condition, 
the internal life of man that is at the centre of Nietzsche’s naturalistic “animal psychology”.36 
The reason Nietzsche is opposed to the mechanical models of modern natural science is that 
they are unable to make sense of the existence of human suffering (what Richard Schacht has 
been calling sensibility) and how the ‘”creation of meaning” is related to human suffering.37 
Nonetheless, Nietzsche’s naturalism, however idiosyncratic it may be, excludes him from 
conforming to a theological stance that a single will is the metaphysical essence of the 
world.38 Instead of the Schopenauerian dictum that he used to formulate his position on 
human suffering in The Birth of Tragedy, in his mature period he views such an internal 
experience, or “bad conscience”, as being effectuated within a “higher organic system”,39 
what he calls the will to power.     
This world: a monster of energy, without beginning, without end; a firm, iron magnitude of force that 
does not grow bigger or smaller, that does not expend itself but only transforms itself… This world is 
the will to power-and nothing besides! And you yourselves are also this will to power-and nothing 
besides!40 
The Becoming of the Body and the Will to Power as Naturalized Suffering   
What is essential to Nietzsche’s psychological understanding of human “bad conscience” is 
that it manifests in different conditions of life that are biological, cultural and historical.41 He 
is a historical philosopher of the body.42  In Nietzsche’s thought, at one level our drives refer 
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to our brute animal desires,43 but at another, more important level, it is our drives that 
engender meaning through imposing a set of metaphorical interpretations.44 As we move over 
to how Nietzsche asserts a new understanding of the human animal, as opposed to the 
Aristotelian conception of the human being as a rational animal, it will become apparent that 
in his thinking, meaning systems have relations to historically-situated bodies that have been 
produced through power relations. As a result, the relation between his psychological and 
aesthetic naturalism becomes clearer. First, Nietzsche opposed the Enlightenment 
understanding of the human subject as an autonomous rational consciousness. “The subject is 
only a fiction: the ego of which one speaks when one censures egoism does not exist at all”.45  
We are easily fooled, Nietzsche tells us, when we consider our intellect sovereign to, and able 
to control our drives.46  He does not afford consciousness the capacity of freedom over 
natural laws that it has been given since Descartes.47 Consciousness for Nietzsche is a natural 
organ like any other, but it is weak organ48 and one that has developed late in human history, 
for the purposes of communication and security for weaker human beings.49 Instead of reason 
ordering the drives or desires like in Plato, conscious thought is produced through relations 
between the drives.50 Nietzsche is not claiming that we are completely unconscious. When, 
under the normative framework of rational conscious subjectivity, we presuppose that our 
mind is rightfully contending with a particular violent drive. This presupposition actually 
alludes to the fact that one drive is complaining about the interpretive desiring faculties of 
another.51 Our bodies are a composition of a set of conflicting drives that all seek domination 
over one another,52 with one drive normally seeking to order the unity of the others.53 We are 
therefore never free from our desires, which always inform the way we act.   
But anyone who considers the basic drives of man to see to what extent they may have been at play just 
here as inspiring spirits (or demons and kobolds) will find that all of them have done philosophy at 
some time-and that every single one of them would like only too well to represent just itself as the 
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ultimate purpose of existence and the legitimate master of all the other drives. For every drive wants to 
be master.54 
So for Nietzsche, a drive is more than just a vicious upwelling of desire, it constitutes ”a  
disposition that manifests itself by informing an agent’s perception… generating an 
evaluative orientation… and thereby bringing… about that the agent’s action, conscious 
reflection, and thought takes place in the service of a goal of which the agent is ignorant.”55 
Nietzsche claims that the systems of meaning we create in terms of our religious myths, the 
knowledge we produce and the way we come to value some practices more than others are a 
result of a particular configuration of these drives.56 Moreover, the bodily drives we have do 
not have an ahistorical essential relation to human nature.57 Drives develop and disintegrate 
in accordance with historical processes, going through various modifications in accordance 
with regimes of cultural “breeding and taming”.58 While human beings may suffer as 
sensuous beings, the manner in which they do and the manner in which they come to terms 
by creating systems of meaning both depend on the historically and culturally specific 
constitution of our bodily drives. This is how Nietzsche’s aesthetic naturalism in his 
psychology of natural human bodily forms and metaphorical art is produced in accordance 
with a healthy relation between the ways the drives function. According to Sarah Kofman,  
Metaphor is the proper insofar [as] it is a unique appropriation of the world… But the proper does not 
belong to a specific social class… the proper describes a certain structure of the soul, a specific 
hierarchy between the drives, a certain relation of forces.59 
 For Nietzsche, the supposedly objective system of meaning created by each culture is a set of 
metaphors which designate the cultural experiences of a particular type of bad conscience. It 
is only through the intense complexities of human life, the desire to live,60 communicate, and 
the creation of memory that the metaphorical nature of human meaning is forgotten. The 
body’s history is a process of becoming, and as it changes so does the relationship between 
suffering and meaning. Nietzsche’s ontology of becoming is the dynamic flux of all things: 
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nothing from human values to the human body, remain constant61. On this point, Brian 
Lightbody correctly argues that,  
The body’s structures are only quasi-real; they are neither permanent nor absolute because other 
constructions of power are actively interpreting the body according to their respective agendas/needs.62 
The philosophical concept that Nietzsche uses to explain the becoming of the human body, in 
all its different psychological and ontological manifestations and of life in general, is his 
organic system-- the will to power.  It is the notion of the will to power that allows Nietzsche 
to conceptualize the development and growth of the human body in a manner that is external 
to positivist conceptions of the biological body.   
All psychology so far has got stuck in moral prejudices and fears; it has not dared to descend into the 
depths. To understand it as morphology and the doctrine of the development of the will to power, as I 
do.63 
The Will to Power and Becoming: A critique of Western Ontology 
When Nietzsche uses the term power, he is not referring to a position of power, or even a 
subject, which, as a neutral substratum, wills or desires more power.64 Contrary to the 
Marxist vision of power that encapsulated political theory until Foucault, Nietzsche does not 
conceive of  the will to power as a political theory, in which one collectively oppresses 
another through various forms of structural violence, but rather as a natural reality that is 
“psychological, aesthetic and political”.65 Moreover, as a conception of ontological 
naturalization, the will to power must be read as a critique of the mechanical models that 
constitute Western historical philosophy and science. Nietzsche conceives of power as a 
”power relationship between two forces”.66 For Nietzsche, each organic body is a 
manifestation of natural or genetic forces.67It is by means of the movements of each body68 
that forces are exerted upon one another in a constant rearrangement of changing, conflicting 
relations.69 Force, or indeed the will to power, exists to overcome what resists it.70 What 
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Nietzsche is fundamentally trying to achieve with the will to power is to conceptualize 
chaotic violent processes of organic change in motion without anything being moved through 
a cause and effect relation.71 Nietzsche thus promotes a nominalism that prioritizes manifest 
change in the form of a non-perceivable perception to the traditional Aristotelian relationship 
between subject, predicate and causation that have continued to influence empirical enquiry 
until the development of modern science.72 
The separation of doer and deed…73 Two successive states, the one ”cause’, the other ’effect’: this is 
false. The first has nothing to effect; the second has been effected by nothing74…It is mythology to 
think that forces obey a law…75 It is a question of struggle between two elements of unequal power: a 
new arrangement of forces is achieved according to the measure of power of each of them…76 The 
absolute establishment of power relations: the stronger becomes master of the weaker… 77 It is a 
question not of succession, but of interpenetration, a process in which the individual successive 
moments are not related to each other as cause and effect.78 
 For Aristotle, following Plato, rational inquiry or logic attends to the essence of things.79 
Reflecting critically on the latter’s theory of forms, the former claimed that the essence of an 
entity is its substance.80 Aristotle further argued that each entity, whether it is a rock or a 
human body, possesses a particular essence or substance, constituted by the essential 
attributes, or elements which inhere in that thing.81 In Aristotelian logic, each proposition is 
rational on the basis that it has a subject which pertains to the substance of a thing, and a 
predicate which corresponds to its attributes.82 So, a rational proposition, in Platonic 
philosophy for example, could claim that the human body is a source of appetite and desire. 83 
 In an Aristotelian reading of Plato’s conception of the body as an entity, appetites or desires 
are considered to be attributes that inhere, or are rather immanent to, the essential 
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substantiality of the body. Plato’s consequent conception of the body as an immoral prison of 
the rational capacities the soul in the attainment of the true knowledge of things84 fed into 
conceptions of the body in Christian theology.85 However, the Augustinian depiction of the 
body (substance) as an imprisoning source of carnality and sin (attributes), would give way to 
the modern biological conception of the body as a developmental, if not evolutionary, organic 
structure whose functions and needs were causatively premised on its adaptation (attributes) 
to a changing environment.86 Aristotelian philosophy on this very basis suggested that while 
substances may endure, their attributes change through relations of causation.87 Some of these 
attributes will prove to be historical accidents, not truly inhering in the essence of a being.88 
However, far from being a completely nominalist approach, Aristotle’s neo-Platonic thesis 
relies on a distinction that that there are always a set of elements what will continue to be 
essential to the thing. That is, each being has a potentiality to attain its substantial actuality.89 
This is of course the angle that Kant took in his metahistorical portrayal of rationality as the 
essence of man.90 For Foucault, in Nietzsche’s understanding of change, no entity has a stable 
essence. For Foucault, this determines the way Nietzsche rejects the notion of traditional 
history, on the basis that there are no a priori truths that serve as a grounding point for man’s 
relations with the world, including himself.  
Nothing in man-not even his body-is sufficiently stable to serve as the basis for self-recognition or for 
understanding other men. The traditional devices for constructing a comprehensive view of history and 
for retracing the past as a patient and continuous development must be systematically dismantled.91 
Nietzsche’s critique of the rationalist and theological positions, which he considers to have 
filtrated right down to the way we perceive things in the present, even determining our 
political relationships, is embodied in a refutation of modern Aristotelian categories, paying 
special attention to the manner in which the subject/predicate relation, under the guise of 
Christianity, has given birth to superstitions of the atomistic soul, or subject of knowledge as 
the ground of meaning and reason.92   In a critique of who we are, Nietzsche does not view 
the relationship between truth, reason, the subject, causation and God to be mere givens but 
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interpretive and evaluative constructs produced through conflicting relations of forces that 
determine sensibilities, or bad consciences. The way we perspectivally apprehend reality is 
mediated by a metaphorical linguistic structure, which through a historical process has 
hardened into supposedly rational concepts that we deem to be true.93 Nietzsche thus 
conceives of human beings as maintaining an active and passive relation to the creation of 
meaning, in which we are fundamentally affective beings.94 There are always limits to our 
knowledge, but these change in accordance with the changing configuration of our bodily 
drives over time. Nietzsche conceives that the rationalist tendency to permit otherwise is 
simply part of the mythological structure that rationality has taken since Plato, which has 
allowed a particular form of bad conscience to exist.95 As a genealogical physician of who we 
are, Nietzsche will come to diagnose this form of existence in its historical specificity. 
However, we can only understand Nietzsche’s move as a genealogist if we look at the 
relation between meaning, creation, value, becoming and the health of the willing body.  
Thus for Nietzsche, he cannot see flux of becoming. Through time our eyes have come to 
perceive causal relations between atomistic identities in consecutive moments in accordance 
with a presupposed linear sequence that has been inculcated through a historico-grammatical 
order.96 This is essential to Nietzsche’s anti-Cartesian epistemology and anti-Platonist 
ontology. He endorses a form of nominalism where we may create linguistic interpretations, 
but the human body and its consciousness are not autonomous, but operate in relation to the 
signs that constitute any linguistic formation.97 Moreover, the sensuous nature of 
apprehension as configured by the drives is prioritized over the calculative nature of rational 
consciousness. So what we as rational agents consider to be effects of a causal sequence, is 
actually our bodies standing in an interpretive relationship to a realm of metaphorical 
appearances that have hardened into a conceptual  schema of meaning  an accumulated 
chaotic process inculcated through the very nature of the will to power, overpowering and 
resistance, birth and death, and growth and disintegration.98 
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Suffering, Becoming and Myth 
The total character of the World, by contrast, is for all eternity chaos, not in a lack of necessity but of a 
lack of order, organization, form, beauty, wisdom and whatever else our aesthetic anthropomorphisms 
are called…Let us beware of attributing to it heartlessness or unreason or their opposites, it is neither 
perfect, nor beautiful, nor noble, nor does it want to become any of things; in no ways does it strive to 
imitate man.99 
 Nietzsche is at minimum the “perfect nihilist”.100 Nihilism means that there is no intrinsic 
meaning in the world, nor is there to the suffering that we experience in life.  In being a 
perfect nihilist, Nietzsche is attempting to invert what he considers to be the system of 
Platonism that has defined the philosophical tradition’s teleological distinction regarding the 
relationship between metaphysics, morality, reason and human history until Kant and 
Hegel.101  Nietzsche’s anti-Platonic philosophy is premised on a critique of absolutes on the 
basis of a historically specific critique. “Everything has evolved; there are no eternal facts, as 
there are likewise no eternal truths. Therefore historical philosophizing is henceforth 
necessary”.102 Roger Scruton describes the Platonic notion of truth which Nietzsche is 
opposed to:  
From Plato and the neo-Platonic tradition the medievals inherited a cosmology which justified both the 
belief in transcendent reality, and at the same time presented an elevated picture of our ability to gain 
access to it. Plato had argued that the truth of this world is not revealed to ordinary sense perception, 
but to reason alone; that [the] truths of reason are necessary, eternal, as we should a priori; that through 
the cultivation of reason man can come to understand himself, God, the world as things are, freed from 
the shadowy overcast of experience. The neo-Platonists developed the cosmology of Plato’s Timmaeus 
into a theory of creation, according to which the entire world emanates from the intellectual light of 
God’s self-contemplation.103  
Nietzsche, a young student of theology, would come to pronounce Christianity as, “Platonism 
for the people”.104 Nietzsche’s critique of the tradition hitherto is premised on a positive 
valuation of a transcendent realm in this dualistic vision, which denigrates the materiality of 
the sensuous world, the Platonic, “metaphysician’s faith in opposite values”.105 He is of 
course aware of the historical developments in the tradition. For Nietzsche, the Kantian 
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critique in particular was radical insofar as it denied human beings the capacity of attaining 
the absolute truth of reality.106 Kant critiqued the idea of an essential world of ready-made 
essences, theologically decreed, to which our minds had to conform.107  Kant instead changed 
the situation radically by rather claiming that the world of manifest data had to conform to the 
operations of our mind in order for us to make sense of the world through conceptual 
schemes.108 By searching for transcendental, or the conditions of possibility for the operations 
of reason, Kant was suggesting that that are certain rules pertaining to the ordering of our 
cognitive faculties, which place a limit on what any rational agent can know.109 Nietzsche 
considered the Kantian critique of the self-positing rational subject as the commencement of 
the deconstruction of the theological ground of philosophy.110 Kant claimed that since the 
rational subject does not have access to an absolute sphere of meaning, man cannot speculate 
on the nature of God, the universe or freedom.111  
Nietzsche praised Kant’s critique, but his philosophy gains direction from what he considers 
Kant’s conformism. 112 In this light, Kant still held that a noumenal realm existed, one that 
continued to affect and structure the realm of appearance, as well as our freedom as rational 
moral agents.113 Within this noumenal realm, Kant also left space for God and faith as 
something immune to rational criticism or speculative reason, which altogether constituted a 
Platonism to which Nietzsche’s entire philosophy is opposed.114 For Nietzsche, the will to 
power ontological system is a materialist vision of reality which rejects any form of the 
Kantian noumenal realm or any deeper reality underlying what we see.115 Nietzsche’s 
epistemological view that all human meaning is fundamentally a historical interpretation of a 
historically produced body,  or a ”system of forces” in a conflictual and affective relationship 
with other bodies offers a break from traditional rationalism. It also decentres the autonomy 
of the human agent by pointing out that meaning occurs through an unconscious relationship 
between the drives. Nietzsche’s historical focus on the relationship between the body and 
history led him to adopt a position which he knew, and affirmed to be an antithetical stance 
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on philosophy hitherto.  “History is nothing but the belief in the senses. Moral: denial of all 
that believes in the senses, of all the rest of mankind: all that is mere ’people’. Be a 
philosopher, be a mummy”.116Nietzsche’s historical philosophy of the body is subversively 
radical. It allows him to reject any vision of history, whether theological or scientific, because 
he believes such notions to be constructs of human interpretations that originate in historico-
physiological contexts. The idea that the world will redeem humans through an historical 
process is a human invention, to which Nietzsche considers the will to power to be oblivious. 
For Nietzsche, becoming is a pure chaos that follows no laws or regularity, but is a circularity 
of time,117 with no beginning or end.118   
In accordance with this chaotic flow that follows no systemic laws, Nietzsche promulgates a 
neo-Kantianism that only distinguishes an apparent realm of existence with no 
(Schopenauerian) substantive reality undergirding the suffering of a single human culture. In 
fact, Nietzsche goes so far as to claim that no culture has a stable essence. For Nietzsche, all 
meaning, qualities and values which human beings have come to consider as objective are the 
historically produced aesthetic creations of human beings.119 “Man designated himself as the 
creature that measures values, evaluates, and measures, as the valuating animal as such.”120  
Thus, there is no single objective truth or set of objective facts121 external to the fictional 
interpretive evaluations of humankind. For Nietzsche, there is thus only a realm of 
appearances in the form of metaphorical errors, which human beings require to live.122  
Appearance is an arranged and simplified world, at which our practical instincts have been at work; it 
is perfectly true for us; that is to say, we live , we are able to live in it: proof of its truth for us-the 
world, apart from our condition of living in it , the world that we have not reduced to our being, our 
logic and psychological prejudices , does not exist as a world in-itself:, it is essentially a world of 
relationships; under different conditions it has a differing aspect from every point.123 
Nietzsche, in contrast to the Platonic notion that there is an ahistorical true reality, believes 
that all reality is perspectival, and illusory. Nietzsche’s artistic metaphysics holds that all 
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meaning-- science and religion included-- are ultimately a set of aesthetic forms.124   In 
contrast to the Aristotelian and Platonic image of man as a rational being, he considers art to 
be man’s metaphysical activity proper;125 the creation of illusory systems that deceive as to 
our existence as natural beings that allow us to live a mortal existence. “Only as an aesthetic 
phenomenon is existence justified eternally”.126 Nietzsche thus changes philosophy’s 
disposition from a rational pursuit of metaphysical truth to a psychological analysis of human 
aesthetics that informs his entire mature philosophy and genealogical method. The essence of 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic naturalism, myth, or religion, is directly related to the horrors of human 
psychological life, suffering/bad conscience:  
It is only a horizon encompassed with myths that rounds off the unity of a social movement…The 
mythical figures have to be the visibly omnipresent genii, under the care of which the young soul 
grows to maturity.127 
Mythic Religion and the Cosmology of the Return  
 For Nietzsche, it is only through the aesthetic influence of myth that human beings have 
made sense of their lives collectively, articulating a lived horizon under which the individual 
can be freed from “random rovings”,128 as the course from youth to maturity is assured within 
a meaningful context. This religious focus is a direct repudiation of Kant’s notion of maturity. 
Nietzsche, in contrast to other Enlightenment notions, is claiming that religion provides a 
structure for human suffering that rationality cannot simply replace, or better. However, 
Nietzsche’s philosophy of religion that informs his critique of Christianity and modern 
rationalism in his genealogy is premised on his hierarchical framing of different religions in 
relation to his philosophy of value. What is important to understand about Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of value in his genealogy is how he differentiates his position on suffering from 
the myths of other religions.129 For Nietzsche there is no ultimate reality beyond the affective 
condition induced by cyclical becoming. Unlike what he sees to be an element similar to 
Schopenhauer and the non-pantheistic religions, (especially Western Platonism), because life, 
constituted as the will to power and the human suffering that comes with it is ”all there is”, it 
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is not something to be denigrated or negated but rather affirmed.130 This spirit of life 
affirmation in aesthetic myth is the ground of Nietzsche’s Dionysian religious spirit, which he 
artfully describes in the form of an ‘aesthetic natural cosmology’,131 called the eternal return. 
The return is the becoming or flux of the will to power. Martin Heidegger describes this 
relation aptly. If the will to power is the essence of what is for Nietzsche the eternal return, it 
is the endless existence or becoming of what is.132  The cosmology of the eternal return is 
embodied for Nietzsche by the affirmative spirit of his God Dionysus:  
What if some me day or night a demon were to steal into your loneliest loneliness and say to you: ’This 
life as you now live it and have lived it you will have to live once again and innumerable times again, 
and there will be nothing new in it, but every pain and every joy and every sigh and everything small 
and great in your life must return to you, all in the same succession and sequence-even this spider and 
this moonlight between the trees and even this moment and I myself. The eternal hourglass of time is 
turned over and over again with it, and you with it, speck of dust!’ Would you not throw yourself down 
and gnash your teeth and curse the demon who spoke thus? Or have you experienced a tremendous 
moment when you when would have answered him: ’You are a God and I have never heard anything 
more divine’.133 
Nietzsche’s religious impulse is oriented towards the deification of life, of the eternity of all 
that is.134 The eternal return is a life-affirming cosmology. If one can affirm life, Dionysus 
appears as a God. If one cannot, like the Western tradition that has devalued the world’s 
appearance in favour of a transcendent reality, then Dionysus appears as a demon. Nietzsche 
depicts Dionysus as the Greek God of intoxication, fertility and the decimation of personal 
boundaries in the The Birth of Tragedy135. More profoundly, Dionysus, as the symbol of 
fertility, expounds Nietzsche’s view that all growth, beauty (meaning), change and suffering 
are effectuated through a natural process.136 In Nietzsche’s religious philosophy Dionysian 
worship is constituted as a natural artistic spirit of creative life affirmation.137 Nietzsche’s 
Dionysian religion is thus not premised on a transcendent God, but a Dionysian faith in life, 
or amor fati, (Latin for, ‘a love of fate’), that takes the form of creative affirmation of all that 
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is, was and will be.138 To look into the terrors of existence and one’s own fate with love as a 
form of affirmation is what Nietzsche endorses as the Dionysian spirit.  
The most self-loving soul, in whom all things have their rise, their ebb and flow…, But this is the very 
idea of Dionysus…how can he who has the hardest and terrible grasp of reality and who has the most 
’abysmal thoughts’, nevertheless avoid conceiving these things as objections to existence, or even as 
objections to the eternal recurrence of existence?-how is it that on the contrary he finds reasons being 
himself the eternal affirmation of all things, ’the tremendous and unlimited saying of Yea and Amen’? 
…’into every abyss do I bear the benediction of my Yea to Life’…But this, once more, is precisely the 
idea of Dionysus.139 
Nietzsche’s Naturalization of Value: Affirmative Tragic Myth  
 Affirming life is not agreeing with all that is. Rather, it is accepting and glorifying the 
current state of things. For Nietzsche, one affirms by creating values.140 Nietzsche’s focal 
point for his theory of life-affirming values is his reading of pre-Socratic Greek tragedy. He 
considers this culture to have created the healthiest values.141 It is these values which 
Nietzsche wants to communicate to his readers for the revaluation of all values. Nietzsche’s 
philosophy of tragedy thus always stands in relation to his genealogical diagnosis, a point 
which I will clarify later in this chapter.  For Nietzsche, the tragic creation of value in these 
cultures was the province of the tragic poet.142 The tragic poet, embodying a fundamentally 
Dionysian spirit towards the contradictions of pre-Socratic Hellenic life, created artistic or 
Apollonian illusions, and individuated, apparent forms that attempt to redeem the harsh 
nature of human experience.143 Within the historical context that the ‘tragic’ Greeks lived in, 
their poets created values which beautified the historical contradictions which afflicted their 
very existence:  
Affirmation of life even in its strangest and sternest problems, the will to life rejoicing in its own 
inexhaustibility through the sacrifice of its highest types- that is what I called the called Dionysian, that 
is what I recognized as the bridge to the psychology of the tragic poet.144 
All values are for Nietzsche historical,145 and thus it is best that we see what he means before 
encountering the two forms of value-- both moral and nihilist-- that make up his philosophy 
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of historical value before encountering his genealogy. It was in the tragic poetry of Homer 
and Aeschylus that “all life rests on appearance, art, illusion, optics, necessity of perspective 
and error”, 146 was for Nietzsche best encapsulated. The tragic poet or ‘artist God’ is a 
fundamentally higher or noble type of being precisely because he can harness his own 
sensibility (suffering). That is, he can intensify suffering into a creative force147which affirms 
life.  
The Genealogist as a Cultural Physician of Health and Sickness 
It is important that we understand Nietzsche’s philosophy of value, and its relation to tragedy 
with regard to his perception of the historical life of the human body and social body. As a 
genealogical philosopher of values, Nietzsche is a cultural physician.148 Nietzsche, the 
cultural physician, approaches the values of a culture as a doctor would approach the health 
of a particular body.149 Nietzsche is thus, “someone who has pursued the task of pursuing the 
total health of a people”.150 In his late genealogical period, he is concerned with the cultural 
health of modern Europe. As a cultural physician, he attends to the will of a particular body 
produced through certain cultural (forces) conditions, and in that particular culture itself, as a 
modality of forces as a bodily organism.151 The struggle for any cultural organism to 
constitute itself, as an arrangement or union of smaller bodies is a bodily phenomenon, and as 
an arrangement of forces also composed, and are reciprocally determined by a “collective 
will”:152 
A species comes to be, a type becomes fixed and strong, through the long fight with essentially 
constant unfavourable conditions…Even the body within which individuals treat each other as equals, 
as suggested before-and this happens in every healthy aristocracy-if it is a living and not a dying body, 
has to do to other bodies what the individuals within it refrain from doing to each other: it will have to 
be an incarnate win to power, it will strive to grow, spread, seize and become predominant-not from 
any morality or immorality but because it is living and because life simply is will to power.153 
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For Nietzsche, the willing body, (both individual and social) is thus the site of spiritual and 
biological existence, 154 which as a physician he diagnosis as being psychologically ‘healthy’ 
or ‘sick’ in relation to the manner in which the will responds to the “worth of existence”, or 
the pathos of becoming with regard to the spiritual, or what Nietzsche considers to be the 
‘psychological’ strength of its will.155 The will is bodily experienced as a set of sensations 
(suffering as bad conscience) that occur through a temporal process.156 It is the will, as a 
form- producing force that ‘creates’ our mythological evaluations and architectural creations.  
Nietzsche conceives of these cultural creations as the “effects (sensations) of the will”,157 
which is the will’s “ ruling interpretation and thought”.158 Nietzsche diagnoses a cultural 
organism by evaluating its effects as ‘symptoms’ that reflect a deeper judgement on the part 
of the psychological strength of a will towards the value of lived existence.159 What is of 
central importance to Nietzsche’s diagnostic judgment is the manner in which that culture, 
and the aesthetic quality of its practices (as the effects of a bodily will) affirm or deny the 
locus of its inextricable suffering; the natural body of the drives. Thus it is not life in itself 
that is being valued, for the absurdities of life cannot have values in themselves,160 but in the 
establishment of values, a particular type of ascent (active) or descent (reactive) is 
evaluated.161 Judgements that affirm life reflect a set of symptoms associated with the bodily 
will of a healthy type.162 Those that devalue life, and wish for an end to suffering are 
symptomatic of an unhealthy or sick type:  
I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy morality, is dominated by an 
instinct of life-some commandment of life is fulfilled through a certain cannon of “shall” and “shall 
not”, some hindrance and hostile element on life’s road is thereby removed. Anti-Natural morality, that 
is, virtually every morality that has hitherto been taught, reverenced and preached, turns on the contrary 
precisely against the instincts of life-it is a now secret, now loud and impudent condemnation of those 
instincts…A condemnation of life by the living is after all no more than the symptom of a certain kind 
of life…Condemnation of life is only a value judgement on the part of life-of what life? Of what kind 
of life…of declining, debilitated, weary, condemned life.163 
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A healthy body is not only an affirmation of bodily life, but also a social organism that 
functions as a healthy body would-- an organic unity that seeks to extend and grow.164 In 
Nietzsche’s natural history of values, the creation of originary human aristocracies came 
about through the enslavement of a tribe of ‘animal men’ by smaller but far more powerful 
warrior tribes.165 Unlike modern political philosophy that took its direction from Hobbes, 
Nietzsche is opposed to social contract theory,166 and rather contended it was the animal 
drives of these warrior tribes that allowed them to conquer weaker beings as a pliant slave 
labour force, essentially constituting the creation of social communities or ‘states’.167 
Nobles, Slaves and a Critique of the Social Contract  
I employed the word “stat’: it is obvious what is meant—some pack of blond beasts of prey a 
conqueror and master race which, organized for war and with the ability to organize, unhesitatingly 
lays its terrible claws upon a populace perhaps tremendously superior in numbers but still formless and 
nomad. That is after all how the "state" began on earth: I think that sentimentalism which would have it 
begin with a “contract’ has been disposed of. He who can command he who is by nature “master,’ he 
who is violent in act and bearing-what has he to do with contracts.168 
 The initial hierarchical ordering of society commences through an organizational process 
that Nietzsche refers to as the “morality of mores”.169 The morality of mores, or master 
morality, are for Nietzsche, the first set of social-- and more importantly, religious’-- 
customary laws which come to have value for human beings with regard to a process of 
breeding and selection.170 These societies existed not only for more power, but more 
importantly to create higher types of human beings.171 Within this early form of human 
organization, the masters approach their herd of slaves with the purpose of inculcating a debt 
memory, as the initial social creditors and lawgivers, and thus the first contractual 
relationship for Nietzsche, between debtor and creditor is a power relationship.172  
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This power relationship is a violent and bloody process referred to in On the Genealogy of 
Morals as “mnemotechnics”.173 This is Nietzsche’s principle, that the master’s exerted force 
(which is painful) is used to create a memory. For Nietzsche, the debt memory created in this 
process distinguishes what Nietzsche calls the ‘”bad”’ as “dutiful, but more importantly 
calculable subjects”.174 The exploitation, brutality and suppression of those strange slaves, 
and “the right of the masters”,175 provides a labouring foundation to society, a set of lower 
castes which would perform the lower functions a society requires in the way a body does.176 
The desire and acts of killing by vicious torture, and the rawest animal drives are still allowed 
full autonomy against other cultures in the form of “open massacres”,177 yet within the “pale 
confines of their society”,178such acts are instituted to develop in the slaves a sense of 
allegiance, a debt which makes them useful to their masters.   
The pliant labour force that the slaves are never truly enters the sphere of aristocratic values.  
While their formation as obedient labourers characterizes a set of qualities which are 
embodied through a set of learnt customs proves to be useful to the flourishing of the higher 
parts of the social body, they are too physically weak. That is, they are "common, cowardly 
or unlucky”,179 to allow a social body to overcome the very set of unfavourable conditions 
that would allow it to constitute itself. This common perception of the slave class was 
reflected in the primary metaphors the by which the nobility used to distinguish them. The 
German word, schlecht, for example, means ‘bad’, but it also can denote ‘plain’ or 
‘simple’.180 The slaves never enter the sphere of noble valuation. ‘Bad’ is a mere 
afterthought, and in some sense the signified pity, on the part of the nobles towards the 
slaves, rather than contempt.181 What the slaves do is allow the castes within society to excel.   
‘Good’ is always assigned to the noble warrior rank of men, of value in itself, affirming it.  
The poets, of course being the natural allies of the warrior caste,182 valued the traits and 
qualities on the basis of their success for the community, which had been decried by the 
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warrior caste.183 The pre-Socratic Greek nobility for example, whose mouthpiece was the 
poet, Theognis referred to them as “truthful”, the etymological root of which is ethlos (who 
one is).184 Moreover, the term ‘good’ also refers to warriors of other rival aristocracies, who 
as sources of danger and fear, drive noble warrior types to become stronger, furthering the 
advancement of higher types of men.185   
Nietzsche’s key point regarding the formation of values in early aristocratic society is that the 
manner in which the masters sublimated their raw drives with regard to their relations with 
their equals, and redeployed them to advance the life of their community was of real value. 
Value was “first applied to human beings and only derivatively and at a later period applied 
to ACTIONS”.186 ‘Good’ only referred to a self-imposed rank put on by an aristocratic group 
of men, whose warrior strength meant their virtues and qualities were of inherent value to the 
community.187 These traits, being of value, meant that those who possessed them were thus 
afforded a rank. This form of valuation led to a form of cultural organization. Although the 
masters would view each other with “mutual jealousy, suspicion and rage”, and their desire to 
avenge, steal and murder was unforgiving,188 they sublimated these raw drives by means of 
agons,189 or “contests of opposition”,190 creating more sophisticated cultural pursuits in 
military and philosophical-aesthetic forms that strengthened opposing participants, that is; 
members of the knightly nobility, instead of allowing those natural drives the chance of 
“destroying the other”.191 Thus by means of various agons, the Greeks harnessed their natural 
drives into bodily forms of excellence in the form of qualities that would translate into 
valuable consequences for the community to grow stronger, while at the same time making 
sure that those in the society measured their power through contests in a reciprocal structure, 
which would perpetuate a growth of power that allowed unified (not chaotic) oppression.192  
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Nietzsche and the Affirmative use of the Gods 
In Nietzsche’s reading of religious traditions, the only reason a society believes itself to exist 
is due to the tremendous force of the virtues of their first ancestors.193 This inculcates a sense 
of debt, or the first form of bad conscience.194 The early tribes showed their allegiance, that 
is; they paid their debt to their ancestors through following their laws and customs,195 and of 
course, through war. These customs were what repressed the satisfaction of the animal drives 
through the creation of social relations that were the unconscious doing of the first political 
masters-- the ancestors. The stronger a society becomes, the more powerful they believe their 
ancestors to be, until those ancestors become gods.196 According to Nietzsche, this is the 
origin of religion.197 Nietzsche thus interprets the Homeric creation of the Olympian gods as 
the earliest ancestors of the pre-Socratic Greeks, whose heroic physical qualities are now 
deemed to be of the highest values.198 When the acts of the warriors result in failure 
according to the religious standards of the community, or damage the social organism itself, 
the intentions of the nobility-- that is, their guilt-- was never brought into question.199 The 
time of master morality, or the morality of mores, is considered by Nietzsche to be the pre-
moral period of humankind.200 Yet despite the lack of guilt, it must be understood that for 
Nietzsche, even the nobility would have to abide by certain customs, however severe for 
society to function.201 
Even the masters were not immune from the customary straightjacket that would eventually 
make man calculable. It was the masters who were the debtors, and since it was they who 
moulded their slaves through a violent process of mnemotechnics, they retained a natural 
power of active forgetting.202 The condition of active forgetting is embodied for Nietzsche in 
the poetic mythology of the ‘tragic’ Greeks. If an act of a nobleman had negative 
consequences in such a society it would be blamed on a god, not on the free intentions of the 
nobility.203 ‘He must have been deluded by a ‘god’, they concluded finally…This expedient 
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is typical of the Greeks”204. An example of this in Greek tragedy is in Homer’s epic poem 
The Iliad, when the father of Olympus Zeus is portrayed tricking Agamemnon into a 
disastrous act of war,205 but whenever Achilles or Odysseus perform an act of advantageous 
consequence, the value is attributed to him, the man-- not the intention or the act that is 
valued, but the qualities associated with the man and caste.206  The principle for Nietzsche 
here is that the gods themselves, in the metaphorical systems that distinguished pre-Socratic 
aristocratic society, are of fundamental importance in the creation of noble, psychologically 
healthy values. These did not negate the dangers and existential suffering brought about by 
violent drives of the body, since the gods took the guilt that the acts would have had on the 
perpetrator and brought negative consequences upon the community. 207  
Nietzsche thus praised the health of ‘tragic’ Greek culture for the manner in which the 
sensual, warlike and other impulses of the body were deified and praised, not as a reason for 
judgement as guilt. Of course bad conscience would still afflict the aristocratic masters in 
terms of the customary laws to which they had to abide, but tragic art had the ability of 
deceiving them as to horror of their situation as “natural beings”.208 This is central to what 
Nietzsche considers to be a life-affirming form of valuation. The tragic poets were aware of 
the inevitable dangers that the life of pure physicality-- that of the warrior caste-- would face, 
and as a result of which, ultimately perish. That is, the highest warrior types, who developed 
the warlike virtues the aristocratic society required for survival, would perish precisely 
because of those virtues:  
The strong races decimate each other, through war, thirst for power, adventurousness, the strong 
affects-wastefulness (strength is no longer hoarded, spiritual disturbance arises from an excess of 
tension arises through excessive tension); their existence is costly; in brief-they ruin one 
another…They are the races that squander. ’Duration’ as such has no value: one might well prefer a 
shorter but more valuable existence for the species.209  
The internal contradiction and absurdity that afflicted aristocratic life was that the morality of 
mores/ good/ bad systems that existed to breed the highest types that were paramount to the 
further advancement and existence of society. This would also lead to their demise, or their 
destruction,  due to the very instinctual nature of the aristocratic warring life. Daniel Ahern 
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correctly points out in a similar light that “both the tragic poets and pre-Socratics ’testify to 
the Hellenic nature as a pessimism of strength’ that affirmed the intimacy of destruction and 
creation”.210 Nietzsche’s Dionysian spirit affirms the contradiction as a fundamental part of 
life.211 The tragic life-affirming task is to have the strength to value the social imbrication of 
destruction and creation. It is not to seek their removal through valuing a stable form of life, 
but to deceive a community as to their desirability and honour. This is precisely why 
Nietzsche considered these tragic poets to be his highest types, because they encapsulated the 
fundamentally Dionysian insight and spirit of affirming the absurdities of a bodily warrior 
existence by means of the Apollonian illusions of epic poetry.212 Essentially, artists by nature 
need to affirm these contradictions; they are the only means by which they and their 
communities are able to live with suffering:  
[Artists] always need at the very least protection, a prop, an established authority: artists 
never stand apart; standing alone is contrary to their deepest instincts.213  
Nietzsche’s claim here is that all artists require the protection of the higher castes on society, 
yet they do not seek to leave or stand apart from their society. This is why they support the 
authority of the ruling caste, who they understand to be of real value to the community.214 
While we have already seen that the poets required the protection of the warriors to survive, 
the warriors (and therefore the slaves) would certainly need the poets to beautify the horrific 
absurdities of existence:  
The order of castes, order of rank, only formulates the supreme order of life itself; the separation of the 
three types is necessary for the preservation of society, for making possible higher and higher types.215  
Essentially, the claim being made is that artists always seek to advance the strength of their 
social body by valuing the virtues of a warrior caste, and agonic forms of excellence are 
permitted by the dense foundation of labour provided by the slaves. For Nietzsche, this is the 
central feature of aristocratic societies.  They are unified bodily forms that constitute a 
greater, ”active or healthy will to power”, a social organism which seeks to grow and extend 
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its power.216 Through their poet’s deification of the inevitable suffering brought about by 
natural life, the aristocratic society could function as a healthy organism: 
Bravery and composure in the face of a powerful enemy, great hardship, a problem that arouses 
aversion –it is this victorious condition which the tragic artist singles out, which he glorifies. In the face 
of tragedy the warlike in the soul celebrates its saturnalias; whoever is accustomed to suffering, 
whoever seeks out suffering, the heroic man extols his existence by means of tragedy-for him alone 
does the tragic artist pour this draft of sweetest cruelty.217 
This is the most important part of Nietzsche’s reading of tragedy. The suffering of man was 
not condemned but glorified as a festival for the gods. Suffering itself was not seen from the 
perspective of the sufferer, but from the being who took joy in causing it.218  “To be able to 
live the Greeks had, from direct necessity, to create these Gods”.219 Thus, the same could 
apply, and seem even more beautiful and life-enticing, when a noble mortal warrior such as 
Diomedes could wound an immortal god, Aphrodite.220 The poets beautified the inevitable 
sacrifice of their highest types as being part of a cosmological struggle between the gods, and 
as a specifically heroic act, a good death that is of value to overall advancement and strength 
of the community.221 By valuing the good heroic death, the poets do not entice the warriors to 
die, but to live and die and with glory. It was not their glorious death that gained respect, but 
their desire to continue to battle, and to strive for the survival and advancement their 
communities amongst the gods whose virtues were of the highest value.222  What must be 
understood through all of this is that the sacrifice of the highest type was inconsequential. It 
is in the nature of all human societies to fall under the swathes of becoming. Tragic poetry 
glorifies this through valuing the warrior instincts of the life-affirming warrior caste, whose 
hero in attempting to attain absolute heroic individuality trespasses against the “eternal 
contradictions” of becoming and suffers death.223 
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Nietzsche’s Naturalization of Value: Life Negating Morality  
Christian Morality and the Creation of Soul 
The second historical form of valuation in Nietzsche’s philosophy is what he calls “moral 
valuation”. It has, Nietzsche argues, been the dominant form of valuation hitherto:      
The sign of a period that one may be called moral in the narrower sense. It involves the first attempt at 
self-knowledge. Instead of the consequences, the origin: indeed a reversal of perspective! Surely, a 
reversal achieved only after long struggles and vacillations. To be sure, a calamitous new superstition, 
an odd narrowness of interpretation, thus become dominant: the origin of an action was interpreted in 
the most definite sense as origin in an intention,- one came to agree that the value of an action lay in 
the value of the intention. The intention as the whole origin and prehistory of an action-almost to the 
present day this prejudice dominated moral praise, blame, judgment, and philosophy on earth. 224 
Moral valuation is not a noble form of life-affirming valuation, which “always springs out of 
its own demands”.225 The moral form of valuation emerges; Nietzsche argues, as a reversal of 
the noble life-affirming evaluation system, good versus bad.226  The moral evaluation system, 
good, versus evil is for Nietzsche nothing other than the Christian religion.227 With 
Nietzsche’s historical turn to Christianity, he turns his physician’s eye to Europe, the locus of 
his concern as a genealogist.  Christianity, instead of focusing on the success or failure of a 
particular act in relation to the growth of the social organism, (the moral form of valuation) 
values a deed on the basis of the intention of the doer. It is the moral form of valuation which 
Nietzsche sees as the antithesis to his ontology of force and becoming:  
Popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral 
substratum behind the strong man…But there is no such substratum; there is no being behind doing, 
effecting, becoming; ’the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed.228 
Moral valuation emerges from the oppressed-- the ascetic priests and their herd, the slaves of 
nobility.229 They are both ‘physiologically sick’ from a degenerate type of life which lacks a 
healthy desire for natural life. In Nietzsche’s thinking, for this reason alone they can 
understand each other. However, the ascetic priest, for Nietzsche is a higher type than the 
slave,230 and takes up the position as the shepherd of the flock, or the protector of the herd.  
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“The ascetic ideal springs from the protective instinct of a degenerating life which tries by all 
means to sustain itself and to fight for its existence”.231 In Nietzsche’s historical 
symptomatology, the priest is a symptom of anarchy in the social body because he turns 
against the order of healthy functioning to protect its lower functions-- the sick.  Unlike the 
artist, the priest does not stand with his society; he desires his own autonomy from the herd. 
In order to attain his own form of power (over suffering), the priest seeks freedom outside the 
confines of the social.  For the early aristocratic cultures, the Christian priest’s instinct for 
freedom under the confines of custom seemed deeply immoral, even evil.232 This is the 
essence of what Nietzsche conceives to be the, “herd organization of Christianity”, which as 
we can see disobeys the law of a healthy form of life. The ascetic is: 
Both trusted and feared by the sick, so as to be their support, resistance, prop, compulsion, taskmaster, 
tyrant, and god. He has to defend his herd-against whom? Against the healthy, of course, and also 
against envy of the healthy; he must be the natural opponent and despiser of all rude, stormy, 
unbridled, hard, violent beast-of-prey health and might.233 
Nietzsche considers the Christian moral evaluation to be an ascetic ideal.  In his mature 
thought, the ascetic faith in the absolute value of truth, which is embodied in illusory ascetic 
ideals, constitutes the manner in which the priests’ life-negating or reactive will to power is 
exercised.234  
That which constrains these men, however, this unconditional will to truth, is faith in the ascetic ideal 
itself, even if as an unconscious imperative-don't be deceived about that -it is the faith in a 
metaphysical value, the absolute value of truth, sanctioned and guaranteed by this ideal alone (it stands 
or falls with this ideal).235  
The ascetic’s faith in truth here, for Nietzsche, is that truthful knowledge about the nature of 
existence can remedy the suffering caused by the flux of natural life.236  In contradistinction 
to noble morality, slave morality views the intentional value of one’s actions, and therefore 
oneself, is established on the basis of the lack of harm, or usefulness to the mass or herd of 
human beings. Slave morality therefore tames the beast in the animal human. It is a 
degenerative form that power, which by making man ‘good’, creates a weak and tame 
                                                          
231 Ibid 120 (Essay 3 section 13) 
232 Nietzsche, Daybreak, 29-30 ( aphorism 42) 
233 Ibid 126 (Essay 3 section 15)  
234 Ibid 116 (Essay 3 section 11) 
235 Ibid 154 (Essay 3 section 21) 
236 Ibid 160 (Essay 2 section 27) 
34 
 
creature.237In Nietzsche’s reading of the Christian tradition, what becomes valued is the 
‘good’ of one’s soul as the negation of one’s bodily desires, which Nietzsche sees as 
weakness, mediocrity and obedience, which Christianity depicts as one’s very human essence 
(the soul).238   
The subject (or, to use a more popular expression, the soul) has perhaps been believed in hitherto more 
firmly than anything else on earth because it makes the majority of mortals, the weak and oppressed of 
every kind, the sublime self-deception that interprets weakness as freedom, and their being thus-and 
thus a merit.239 
The Negation of Natural Life 
The common distinguishing factor of a sick will is to not only find it suffering contemptibly, 
but to find a truthful cause for that suffering in order to remove it. 240 This is the revengeful 
manner in which the slaves, under the influence of the priests, come to view the nobility, and 
eventually their own bodily existence and life in this world. The masters, by virtue of their 
healthy desire to overpower resistances and elevate themselves become the very mark of a 
dangerous evil soul:   
Here is the place for the origin of that famous opposition of ’good’ and ’evil’: into evil one's feelings 
project power and dangerousness. A certain terribleness, subtlety, and strength that does not permit 
contempt to develop. According to slave morality, those who are ’evil’ thus inspire fear; according to 
master morality it is precisely those who are ’good’ that inspire, and wish to inspire, fear.241 
The ascetic priestly castes and the other herd of slaves were too physically weak to 
overpower their evil’ masters, so the Christian priest created slave morality.242 Yet slave 
morality must not be considered a mere survival mechanism. Nietzsche considers the 
inversion of noble values to be the most dangerous and hostile form of “spiritual revenge”.243 
Nietzsche argues that in order to wage war against the nobility the Christian priest 
ingeniously inverted the noble value system ”by creating an ‘imaginary revenge”,244 in the 
form of an eternal afterlife where one would either be eternally rewarded, or eternally 
punished in accordance with the prescriptive adherence to the values of Christian morality.  
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Natures that are denied the true reaction, that of deeds…compensate themselves with an imaginary 
revenge...slave morality says no to what is “outside”, what is ’different’, what is ’not itself’; and this no 
is its creative deed…slave morality always first needs a hostile external world’…For this was alone 
was appropriate to a priestly people…to hang on to this inversion with their teeth of the most abysmal 
hatred (the hatred of impotence, saying ’the wretched alone are the good; the poor, impotent, lowly 
alone are the good; the suffering, deprived, sickly, ugly alone are pious, alone are blessed by God, 
blessedness is for them alone-and you-the powerful and noble, are on the contrary the evil, the cruel. 
The lustful, the insatiable, the godless to all eternity, the unblessed the, the accursed, the damned’).245 
In Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, the creative act of valuing life is to negate it, which is 
a form of saying no to life and all things of this worldly value.246 Moreover, the negation of 
life as a form of evaluation occurs simultaneously with the fictional creation of an evil Other 
that represents all forms of socio-religious difference as a danger to the herd. Christian 
morality, in Nietzsche’s thought, is not only a condemnation of human nature, but of the very 
impulse of natural life. The noble mode of valuation exemplifies this healthy animality as it 
opposes another creature only to “affirm and grow more spontaneously”.247 This for 
Nietzsche is the phylogenetic nature of all biological life. Natural life develops through 
processes of diversification from no foundational origin.248 Slave morality as an anti-natural 
force distinguishes all natural impulses as inherently evil, and as something to tamed and 
inhibited from exercising its nature:  
For an ascetic life is a self-contradiction… that of an insatiable instinct and power-will that wants to 
become master not over something in life but over life itself, over its most profound, powerful and 
basic conditions; here an attempt is made to employ force to block up the wells of force; here 
physiological well-being itself is viewed askance, and especially the outward expression of this 
wellbeing, beauty and joy.249 
 The Christian priest, under the guise of the will to truth created an imaginary realm-- the 
eternal realm created by God as the realm of true existence, while the natural world he 
created that we live in becomes a world of appearance, only the suffering shadow of the 
eternal realm of God. The Christian priest “thereby affirms another world than that of life, 
nature, and history; and insofar as he affirms this 'other world,' does this not mean that he has 
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to deny its antithesis, this world, our world?”250  As the protector of the herd, the priest is not 
only concerned with warring against the healthy forces of human nature, but making sure 
those natural forces don’t break out within the herd.251 Nietzsche’s contention is that the 
Christian distinction of the soul as the object of theological value, by virtue of its free-willed 
intentions is the fictional creation of a degenerate weak form of life. This makes being weak, 
cowardly and mediocre valuable traits as a form of control.  As Simon May aptly puts it, 
‘”suffering is a path to God, in whose realm, death, loss and transience are abolished…it is 
punishment for disobeying him. And of course, in traditional theodicy, suffering and evil are 
the price to be paid for the blessing of metaphysically ‘free will’”.252 Like all religions, 
Nietzsche argues that Christian morality operates via a system of debt, a superstitious 
repayment to the original ancestors that founded the security of their future progeny.253 He 
wants his readers to be aware of the very new meaning Christianity gives to debt, and the 
manner in which this changes the nature of a European’s bad conscience through the creation 
of free will.254 Christianity changes the debt relation by the priest’s creation of Original 
Sin.255 In theological mythology, man inherited his intrinsic sin by means of his primal 
ancestor, in the form of Adam’s disobedience to the laws of God.256 Nietzsche argues that 
Christianity proposed that man’s very nature was the cause of his suffering, and therefore the 
very reason for evil.257   
We think of the prima causa of man, the beginning of the human race, its primal ancestor who is from 
now on burdened with a curse (‘Adam’, ‘Original Sin’, ‘unfreedom of the will’, or of nature from 
whose womb mankind arose and into whom the principle of evil is projected from now on (‘the 
diabolizing of nature’), or of existence in general.258 
In Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, because man’s very nature is cursed he is unable to 
redeem his own debt; the Christian priest ingeniously claimed that to save man from his debt, 
“God himself makes payment to himself”.259 His will may be free, but he is naturally prone to 
sin, that is; enacting his desires. By invoking God as his own creditor and debtor, Nietzsche is 
drawing upon the Christian portrayal of Jesus sacrificing himself for the sins of man to God, 
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and paying the human debt incurred through Original Sin. “Man from has become 
redeemable from man himself-the creditor scarifying his debtor out of love”.260  The ascetic 
priest that is the target of Nietzsche’s critique is not Jesus, but Paul261 and his progeny: 
“There was only one Christian and he died on the cross”.262 In Nietzsche’s reading, Paul’s 
genius was to “supernaturalize” Jesus as both the son of God and God himself, as opposed to 
his image as the creation of all higher men. For Nietzsche, Pauline Christianity depicted 
Jesus’ death as God atoning for man’s sin; human beings can be redeemed from suffering by 
obeying the moral prescriptions laid out by God.263 For Nietzsche, the omnipotent and 
omnipresent Christian God as the redemption of human is simply nothing more than 
antithesis and destruction of natural life,264 and the anthropomorphized embodiment of the 
virtuous qualities of the weak promulgated by Christian ascetics for the purposes of political 
control.  
Disobedience of God, that is to say of the priest, of the ‘’law’, now acquires the name ‘sin’, the means 
of becoming reconciled with God are, as is only to be expected, means by which subjection to the 
priest is more thoroughly guaranteed: the priest alone redeems…From a psychological point of view, 
‘sins’ are indispensable in any society organized by priests, they are actually levellers of power.265 
Bad conscience is given a new form by the will of the Christian priest: guilt. Under the 
influence of the priest, Nietzsche claims the Christian sinner “reinterprets these animal 
instincts themselves as a form of guilt before God (as hostility, rebellion insurrection against 
the ‘Lord’”,266 That is, as intentional evil. The direction of bad conscience and suffering now 
turn inward. In Nietzsche’s reading of Christianity, suffering is contemptible, as instrumental 
penance is for eternal bliss and revengeful, eternal punishment of another. From the point of 
view of the sufferer, the individual is the recipient of suffering.267 In order to exist, one 
therefore has to negate oneself at every moment because God is the omnipresent of moral 
judge judgement. One cannot enact these desires, as they are always perceived in terms of 
their guilt as a sin in the view of an omniscient God. Nietzsche’s argument is that the priest 
God uses is an organizing and torturous principle meant to tame man, by making him negate 
his natural instincts to the point of physiological sickness.  
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He had become a ’sinner’, he was in a cage, one had imprisoned him behind nothing but sheer 
terrifying concepts…There he lay now, sick, miserable filled with ill will towards himself; full of 
hatred for the impulses towards life, full of suspicion of all that was  strong and happy. In short, a 
‘Christian’….In physiological terms: in this struggle with the beast, making it sick can be the only way 
of making it weak. This the church understood: it corrupted the human being, it weakened him, but it 
claimed to have improved him.268 
Nietzsche’s Naturalization of Value: Nihilism  
A Dead God 
Nietzsche’s third and last historical diagnosis of natural values is that of his own present; he 
is dealing with ‘who we are’. His focus on nihilism is what undergirds his diagnostic and 
historical work in genealogy. His diagnosis of modern European modern culture is that it is a 
nihilistic period, 269 which followed a great event: the death of God.270  
The greatest recent event, that God is dead; that the belief in the Christian God has become 
unbelievable-is already starting to cover its shadow over Europe…What this event really means-and 
now, that this faith, leaned on it, grown on it,- for example, our entire European morality,271 …an 
opposition between the world until which at now we were are home with our venerations, and which 
made it possible for us to endure life and another world that we ourselves are, a relentless fundamental 
suspicion concerning ourselves that is steadily gaining worse and more control over us Europeans and 
that could easily confront coming generations with the terrible Either/Or:-Either abolish your 
venerations- or yourselves!! The latter would be nihilism; but would not the former also be nihilism? 
That is our question mark.272 
Nihilism has been brought to purview due to the impending consequences of the death of 
God. Modern democratic societies are distinguished by a political movement called 
secularism in which religion is relegated to the private sphere. Legal and economic legislation 
are now administrated by public sphere no longer ordered by theological, but rational 
principles.273 Power is no longer in the hands of a theocratic monarchy, but supposedly 
follows the herd principles of justice and equal rights for all. The first paradox for Nietzsche 
is that Christian morality still governs modern society, but without the theological 
psychology of guilt that accompanies it. Before detailing the details of Nietzsche’s 
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psychological diagnosis of this seemingly social phenomenon, I want to frame Nietzsche’s 
diagnosis. Nietzsche’s claim about nihilism must not be misread; it is not an agent’s choice 
but the inescapable historical condition of modern Europe:  
What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer be 
described differently: the advent of nihilism.274 
The reason Nietzsche can diagnose nihilism is because he has already gone through the 
experience of it.275 Like Kant, Nietzsche does not separate himself from social modes of 
existence in his present moment.  He is diagnosing it as a psychological state that has 
afflicted him, but will soon spread throughout Europe. Nietzsche considers nihilism to be a 
transitional pathological stage to a period in the future276 when he will be long dead, and 
when a revaluation of values will take place277 which will constitute the creation of a great 
aristocratic life-affirming social organism. ”Only from my time and after me will politics on a 
large scale exist on Earth”.278 Nietzsche’s concern is with providing a therapeutic to his 
diagnosis of nihilism, which will allow a revaluator to create life- affirming values that shape 
the future of great politics.  In dealing with his present, it is not instructive to be caught up 
with, or immediately overcome by nihilism, since Nietzsche is foretelling a two-hundred year 
period and he claims the problems of nihilism that face the present will be encountered by 
future generations. ”To sacrifice God for nothingness-this paradoxical mystery of the ultimate 
cruelty has been reserved for the rising generation”.279 Thus, to reiterate, what is important to 
Nietzsche’s response to the Kantian question of ‘who we are’, is clarifying the consequences 
of nihilism diagnostically for future scholars who will be devastated by it. Nietzsche is 
diagnostically addressing these problems to future free spirits who are the very antithesis of 
‘modern men’. That is; men of democratic herd ideals, who will bring about the 
revaluation.280   
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Forms of Nihilism  
The first sense given to nihilism is that since the eternal world in which the valued of this 
world are gone, the world has become valueless.281The second sense of nihilism that is 
important is inextricable from the first; the nihilist condition of the body.282 What the ascetic 
priest does that is of value, and the reason Nietzsche affords Christianity acclaim, is that he 
still gave human beings a reason to live. Christianity gave the weak a reason and meaning for 
living but its moral venerations were negations of natural drives.283 The negation of the 
instincts caused such torture that man could no longer bear it.  Modern man can no longer 
bear the pain of the Christian God as an omnipresent witness, and this is why he kills him:   
He always saw me: I wanted revenge on such a witness – or no longer live myself. The god who saw 
everything, even human beings: this god had to die! Human beings cannot bear that such a witness 
lives.284                
 Negating the bodily instincts disaggregated the natural unity of a healthy human body,285 
which made the human body too psychologically and physiologically weak to affirm even 
such a degenerate form of existence. “So-called Holiness-holiness is itself merely a symptom 
syndrome of the impoverished, enervated, incurably corrupted body”.286 The European body 
became so sickened through the self-laceration of guilt, that it lost its healthy unity that 
allowed it to create beautiful illusions. In this ugliness, Nietzsche is referring to a degenerate 
form of life that can no longer create beautiful illusions that mythically centre life.287 
The second sense of nihilism, the anarchic disordering of the body as a state of psychological 
pathology, engenders a sense of despair in modern European man that will allow him to see 
the world as meaningless and valueless.  The third sense of nihilism that is important to 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis is that the anarchic disaggregation of the body is replicated in the very 
ordering of the social body-- the Christian instinct for the individual’s eternal peace is 
transposed into the very ordering of statist society.288 The third sense of nihilism is that there 
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is no order or central unity to the cultural organism,289 there is no meaningful horizon that 
holds a people together. Yet it is the very Christian community whose will to truth that has 
brought about this victory and the disintegration of the body that has led to this current 
predicament. Once this class perspectival interprets that the mythological illusion is a reason 
for suffering, religious mythology in accordance with its ugly condition, and its root, man’s 
natural religious or artistic impulse,290 the very key to the justification of existence becomes a 
source of negation and condemnation. This is tantamount, in Nietzsche’s thinking to the very 
nihilistic condemnation and revenge of all present and future existence:   
There is nothing more terrible than a barbaric slave class, who have learned to regard their existence as 
an injustice, and now prepare to take vengeance, not only for themselves but for all future generations. 
In the face of such threatening storms, who dears to appeal with confident spirit to our pale and 
exhausted religions, which even in their foundations have degenerated into scholastic religions?-so that 
myth, the necessary prerequisite of every religion, is already paralyzed everywhere, and even in this 
domain the optimistic spirit-which we have designated as the annihilating germ of society-has attained 
the mastery. 291 
This is why the death of God, for Nietzsche, needs to be understood. The scholarly analysis 
of religion does not justify myth; it historicizes it and robs the believer of the horizon which 
hitherto had allowed them to make sense of the entirety of existence. The death of God 
signifies the collapse of the whole Western Onto-theological system of meaning.292This 
means that the very mythological meaning that Europe has given to all existence for two 
millennia is without foundation.293 The Christian myth, the otherworldly set of illusions that 
has held the Christian herd and social organism to their existence and life, their moral 
direction forward, acting as a bridge to another existence, is deracinated by means of the 
rational historical scientific interpretations of the will to truth. Keith Ansell-Pearson and 
Christa Acampora argue, “In this respect, atheism is something of a modern disaster for 
Nietzsche simply because humankind is left empty, unable to satisfy its artistic instinct and 
devotes all its energies to an entirely secular culture with no aspiration.”294According to 
Nietzsche, with the creation of slave morality, and its imaginary revenge and guilt, the priests 
have conquered the nobility; the former slaves are now the masters:  
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The slave revolt in morality: that revolt which has a history of two thousand years behind it and which 
we no longer see because it-has been victorious,295…The over-all degeneration of man down to what 
today appears to the socialist dolts and flatheads as their ‘man of the future’ as their ideal-this 
degeneration and diminution of man into the perfect herd animal (Of, as they say, to the man of the 
’free society’), this animalization of man into the dwarf animal of equal rights and claims, is possible 
there is no doubt of it.296                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Nietzsche argues that modern man now attempts to create a heaven on earth by means of herd 
political institutions which assure all forces and impulses are directed in its directionless 
favour.  After lacerating his body with guilt, modern man has become squeamish at the very 
sight of suffering, yet suffering is only the means by which man has been able to create 
values. The very social ground of modern man is a nihilistic danger to the psychological 
health of the future creator:  
You want, if possible-and there is no more insane if possible -to abolish suffering. And we? It really 
seems that we would rather have it higher and worse than ever. Well-being as you understand it-that is 
no goal, that seems to us an end, a state that soon makes man ridiculous and contemptible that makes 
his destruction desirable. The discipline of suffering, of great suffering-do you not know that only this 
discipline has created all enhancements of man so far?297 
For Nietzsche, modern morality and its political branches still continue to create the perfect 
good human being. When the tragic nihilism immanent to the history of this endeavour 
makes sense to human beings, the meaninglessness of who they are will set in, along with 
anarchy.  The son of the God’s killer is the last man who will wade into passive nihilism, 
living his days out meaninglessly in an endless serious of hedonistic and barbaric exploits.298 
When man is faced with this terror, Nietzsche is aware that nihilism has become suicidal.  
The revaluation of values, the creation of new values, as Nietzsche sees it, would overturn the 
suicidal condition that has confronted the last man. The key to Nietzsche’s revaluation of 
nihilism is that, “one only demystifies to mystify better”.299 In all situations of human cultural 
disaster, Nietzsche considers the weak able to attain social security but unable to further the 
advance in human society in a manner that evil, creative life-affirming types have.300 Yet the 
conditions of modern society do not permit the formation of such an evil artist type, who for 
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Nietzsche is the next tragic poet.301 The good are simply bent on continuing to make man 
mediocre, weak and normal. They are rational and continue to calculate their advantage and 
security.302 The noble evil life-affirming types, in an egalitarian society have no support or 
prop from which to sacrifice and suffer in order to create. Their difference, their passion and 
innocence, will be seen by the mediocre as mad and evil. Thus noble spirits are most likely to 
fall victim to their impulses, and in their task.303  Nietzsche’s priestly mouthpiece, 
Zarathustra, the priest of the future revaluator, passes this judgement:  
Zarathustra calls ‘the good’, now ‘the last men’, and anon ‘the beginning of the end’; and above all he 
considers them the most detrimental kind of men, because they secure their existence at the cost of the 
Truth and the Cost of the future. The good-they cannot create; they are ever the beginning of the end. 
They crucify him who writeth new values on new tables; they sacrifice unto themselves the future; they 
crucify the whole future of humanity.304 
Section 2: Nietzsche’s Genealogical Concerns 
Clarification  
It is essential to have covered the history of Nietzsche’s philosophy of value before dealing 
with his concerns in the genealogy. This is the only way to appreciate how he uses genealogy 
as a historical method to diagnose in the present.305 In his time, Nietzsche had relatively few 
readers, and even fewer supporters. After a promising early career Nietzsche’s philosophical 
thought had proved to be uninfluential and unpopular.306  One of the reasons Nietzsche 
himself gave for this was that he had not been understood, and thus he sought to use the 
genealogy as a means of clarification.307 He disclosed this information to his close friend 
Peter Gast, in a letter written shortly after the text’s completion:  
I have at once vehemently exploited these better days and written a small polemical pamphlet which, I 
think, sharply focuses the problem of my last book; everybody has complained that I am ‘not 
understood,’ and the approximately one hundred copies which have been sold have made it quite 
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obvious to me that I am not understood… -- and this in my forty-third year, after I have published 
fifteen books!308 
Nietzsche’s writing Style  
While Nietzsche has written an entire philosophy that inverts a two-thousand year tradition of 
Platonism,309 reinstituting the illusory quality of art which redeems existence and appearance 
over the relation between reason, knowledge and virtue,310 he still considers himself a 
philosopher.311 Nietzsche considers the history of Western philosophy, following Plato to be 
an ascetic ideal.312 Philosophy since Plato, under the guise of the will to truth negated both 
the impulses of the body and becoming (life),313 through systematizing or controlling it, 
which is symptomatic of a particular type of life. For Nietzsche, becoming is irreducible to 
any such totality.314  The major reason Nietzsche is claiming “he is not understood” is due to 
his own writing style, which is also his formidable philosophical technique. Nietzsche’s style 
of writing from Human all too Human (1878) to Beyond Good and Evil resists the 
philosopher’s will to truth, in order to systematize his philosophy into a coherent whole. 
Nietzsche wrote in aphorisms, which is a style of producing a multiplicity of short segments 
that would at times follow, and other times not, a propositional sequence. His aphorisms 
followed no singular law of reasoning, but set insights that were contradictory.315 With this 
style of writing Nietzsche was trying to communicate the suffering he experienced via the 
perspectival apprehensive core of human existence(s), and the meaningless vicissitudes of the 
return. ”To communicate a state of inner tension of pathos by means of signs, including the 
tempo of these signs-that is the meaning of style”.316 By trying to communicate this 
experience, he was attempting to tear apart philosophers of ascetic ideals by constantly 
eluding to their desire to understand, negate and control ‘sensuous existence’. Deleuze refers 
to this technique as decoding; a means by which systems of mythical meaning located in the 
human subject are deracinated from their foundations.317 However, the stylistic attempt to 
elude reductive and dogmatic systematization that would reduce his philosophy to a systemic 
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set of propositions generated various problems with regard to thinkers understanding 
Nietzsche’s arguments.  
When one visits his/her physician in modern times, it is generally presupposed that the 
physician will diagnose one’s sickness and communicate this. As a physician who desired the 
revaluation, or a healthier time with new concepts and new values,318 Nietzsche was therefore 
forced to communicate his diagnosis of modernity in a manner that could be understood. 
Nietzsche was also aware that as a philosopher, he would be forced to consecrate his 
diagnosis in a conceptual framework dictated by the will to truth. While he may have inverted 
Platonism, as a physician he still required “that we godless metaphysicians, still take our fire, 
too, from the thousand year faith, the Christian faith that was also Plato’s faith, that God is 
divine, that truth is divine”.319 Nietzsche wrote On the Genealogy of Morals in traditional 
academic style to clarify the problems his subversive writing style created, and 
notwithstanding his epistemological perspectivism, to communicate his diagnosis to his free 
spirits after they had misunderstood his claims in Beyond Good and Evil.  In On the 
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche clarifies his philosophy in terms of its two key facets, 
through distinguishing genealogy as his historical methodology and form of philosophical 
inquiry as a cultural physician.  He ‘uses’:  
1. Genealogy as a historical method;  
2. Genealogy as an historical method that diagnoses the present.  
Clarification of the History of the Will: Nietzsche’s Methodology  
Nietzsche’s philosophical method has always been that of a genealogist.320 Nietzsche did not 
want genealogy as a historical method to be mistaken, so he explicitly differentiated it from 
Darwin’s theory of evolution as a naturalized history:321 
The entire history of a thing, an organ, a custom can in this way be a continuous sign-chain of ever new 
interpretations and adaptations whose causes do not even have to be related to one another, but on the 
contrary, in some cases succeed and alternate with another in a purely chance fashion. The evolution of 
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a thing, a custom, an organ is by no means a progresses to a goal, even less a logical progresses by the 
shortest route and with the smallest expenditure of force.322 
Nietzsche’s genealogical historiography does not trace the formation of the present through a 
linear series of causally related moments. The historical formation of any present thing for 
Nietzsche follows no real law, but is governed by the chaotic formative force of the will to 
power.323 For Nietzsche, the position of modern Darwinists, that man offered a progress of 
his ancestors, was not a universal truth, but a modern perspectival disposition.324 Nietzsche 
argues that modern progressive philosophical models of history, like those found in Kant and 
Hegel, follow a Christian Platonic line of thinking.325 He opposes his genealogical form of 
historiography to modern teleological models of historiographical inquiry. For Nietzsche, 
modern historians follow this philosophical tendency, a typical example of which is the 
English psychologists denigrated in the first chapter of On the Genealogy of Morals for 
practicing a form of historiography that is “unhistorical”.326 For Nietzsche these English 
psychologists abstract the meaning and the value of the concept, of ‘good’.327 They treat their 
particular moral interpretation as an objective fact that transcends the various cultural 
interpretations that have amalgamated through different historical processes.328 Nietzsche 
claims that his historical method possesses an “historical spirit” that the historiography of his 
time does not.329 In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche opposes genealogy as his 
historical method to mechanical models that seek causal principles for historical change and 
development:  
I emphasize this major point of the historical method all the more because it is in fundamental 
opposition to the now prevalent instinct and taste which would rather be reconciled even to the absolute 
fortuitousness, even the mechanistic senselessness of all events to the theory that in all events a will to 
power is operating…Thus, the essence of life, the will to power, is ignored; one overlooks the essential 
priority of the spontaneous, aggressive, expansive form giving forces that give new interpretations and 
directions.330 
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 Nietzsche’s genealogical method in On the Genealogy of Morals is not a linear history that 
represents a past reality.331 Nietzsche is not a conventional historian.332  Rather, Nietzsche’s 
genealogy is an anti-realist mode of historiography because he artfully interprets and values 
how different metaphorical historical interpretations of the real are generated by the relations 
that constitute the will to power.333 Instead of attempting to disclose a truthful reality, 
Nietzsche’s reticence towards the will to truth allows him to deploy genealogy as a form of 
art;334 but one could still perhaps claim that genealogical history certainly has its own form of 
methodological rigour.335  Genealogy therefore allows Nietzsche to track how different 
systems of meaning and valuations are generated by the active or reactive form of the will to 
power, while still maintaining a critical distance from those creations as being real.336 
Nietzsche therefore disturbs the reader’s perception of what is real, which makes human 
beings realize that their values are not transcendent but chance outcomes of a set of processes 
that may have been otherwise.337  It foreshadows post-structural historiography as a 
diachronic tracing,338 of ‘moral etymology’, or metaphors that are constitutive of a ‘historic-
diagnostic type’, reducible to either a life-affirming or life-negating form of the will to 
power.339 Nietzsche’s genealogical tracking of the will to power is therefore a perspectival 
history.340 He traces the perspectives from which certain valuations are made. In the noble 
system of good versus bad, valuing is oriented by an active perspectival affirmation of the 
self (good), where in the good versus evil system, the value positing eye is inverted as a 
reaction. The Other is valued first negatively (evil), from which the value of the self is 
derived (good).   
Genealogy is a history of power relations. To be more precise, it is a history of the will to 
power.  Therefore, it is also a history of the body, and (vice-versa) whenever Nietzsche has 
been diagnosing the values of a particular bodily type, this mode of historiography must still 
be considered a genealogy of the will to power; “Our drives”, though multifaceted in their 
particular aims to interpret the past in certain ways, “are reducible to the will to power”.341  In 
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tracking the historical relations immanent to form-producing forces of the will to power, 
Nietzsche is also communicating to his reader how different metaphorical evaluations of 
reality are a product of a particular historical configuration of the drives. As a historical 
study, genealogy uncovers how the original status of these moral concepts as metaphors has 
been forgotten. Their constitution as concepts reflects the dominance of a degenerate type 
distinguished by an ascetic, life-denying form of power that has hardened these sensuous 
concepts by means of the will to truth. Genealogy, as a mode of tracing the relations between 
forces is also a history of the degeneration of the body, as encapsulated in language:  
Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history. Its 
task is to show a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history’s destruction of the 
body.342 
 
 
Clarification of the History of the Willing Body  
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche introduces two new concepts, namely; 
ressentiment and bad conscience. These two concepts were deployed to clarify Nietzsche’s 
historical psychology of the body. While the third essay is Nietzsche’s deep historical 
interrogation into the meaning (s) of ascetic ideals,343 an interpretation of the first aphorism 
of the third essay illustrates that in the other two essays Nietzsche propounds a historically 
situated analysis of the formation of bad conscience (essay 2), and ressentiment (essay 1) as 
elements of the human bodily condition.  
Bad Conscience 
I have explained what Nietzsche means by the phrase ‘bad conscience’. His creation of the 
concept allows him to clarify the difference between human suffering and animal existence, 
which he had meditated on in Untimely Meditations. For Nietzsche, ‘bad conscience’ is a 
historical condition, and in On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche traces the two different 
forms that bad conscience has taken; bad conscience as debt and bad conscience as guilt. In 
this sense, the creation of the concept of bad conscience as a specifically historically 
mediated condition that discloses a particular type of human suffering allowed Nietzsche to 
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clarify how human suffering is thoroughly bodily and historical, and how present experience 
is brought about via the past.344 
 In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche uncovers how the first and second forms of bad 
conscience have led to the constitution of the modern man.345 What modern men call their 
‘moral conscience’ Nietzsche claims is not free will or even the voice of God, but rather a 
‘social straightjacket’ that has made man calculable.346 What we call conscience is therefore a 
product of memory (mnemotechnics) and guilt, where the negation of one’s drives or desires 
is structured by a mnemonic device that has learnt to react in accordance with punishment or 
reward (e.g., I promise I will not).347 Modern man must never be understood as a higher type 
of being, but rather a degenerate form that Nietzsche seeks to overcome.348 Thus, Nietzsche 
clarifies the relation between his historical philosophy and work as a cultural physician by 
explaining how the constitution of the present occurred through the relations of the will to 
power in the past. The will to power itself has a history, and for Nietzsche, “genealogy is the 
history of how the relations of the power of the past give birth to the actuality of the will in 
the present”349. Thus, when Nietzsche traces the will, he traces it as a process that determines 
and is reciprocally determined by the conflictual relations between forces,350 not any stable 
unified entity.  A central issue in Nietzsche’s scholarship is how the nobles eventually fell to 
the slaves; that is, how the gregarious man was created. Commentators have often ignored 
Nietzsche’s methodological principle of the will in their analysis of the formation of the 
‘gregarious sick’ modern body.351 For Nietzsche, the power relations between bodies are not 
distinguished by the effects of mechanical principles, but rather the relation between will and 
will. This is why Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals needs to be read alongside his 
other texts, and vice versa:   
Will, of course, can affect only ’will’-and not ’matter’ (not ’nerves' for example). In short, one has to 
risk the hypothesis whether will does not affect will wherever ,effects are recognized-and whether all 
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mechanical occurrences are not, insofar as a force is active in them, will force, effects of will352…in 
real life it is only a matter of strong and weak wills.353 
In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche explains that the ascetic priest left the confines of 
society so to repress his natural drives for “his own kind of happiness”. For Nietzsche, the 
priest therefore seemed to have conquered suffering, and his anti-nature was seen by the 
nobility characteristics as a strong will. “They sensed the superior force that sought to test 
itself in such a conquest, the strength of the will in which they recognized and honoured their 
own strength and delight in dominion.”354  All men came to bow to the priest out of fear as he 
represented that beyond the natural world, and it was in these priestly societies that the priests 
took to making men sick by making them feel guilty about their nature. In Nietzsche, there is 
no free will. The will to power is always exercised as a command; “you are guilty!”, but he 
who commands must also obey;  “I am also guilty”. This is central to every effect of the will 
that Nietzsche will diagnose as symptomatic of either health or sickness.  In On the 
Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche clarifies his historical method by explaining that the 
psychological process of European man becomes sick in terms of the metaphysics of the 
willing body. The second form of bad conscience afflicts the health of the willing body, by 
making it feel guilty about its nature.  This process of course cannot be dissociated from the 
morality of mores, which over thousands of years, gave man a memory.355 This present 
condition of the will is what Nietzsche calls the will to nothingness. Nietzsche is therefore 
tracing the ”memory of the will”.356  The history of the will is also the history of the body, a 
principle of Nietzsche’s genealogical historiography of the body as psychological ground of 
existence.357 
Ressentiment  
What Nietzsche wants to communicate to his readers is that as a psychological and 
physiological state, “it [ressentiment] is in one particular interpretation, the Christian moral 
one, that nihilism is rooted [in]”.358 In the first essay of, On the Genealogy of Morals, 
Nietzsche’s task was to describe the psychology of Christianity and its priest,359 and how they 
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emerged out the spirit of ressentiment.360 The inversion of the values of good versus bad, to 
good versus evil, occurs when ressentiment becomes creative.361 In the third essay, Nietzsche 
explains how the Christian priest “diverts the course of ressentiment” from being exercised 
within the social relations of the herd, to an internal relationship that the individual takes up 
towards himself. The inward turn of ressentiment is the root of Christian moral interpretation, 
Original Sin and its relation the good and evil soul. Ressentiment is “a desire to deaden pain 
with the affects”.362 Most Nietzschean scholarship continues to deal with ressentiment as a 
spirit of revenge, but do not go far enough to explain the physiological nature of 
ressentiment.363 Nietzsche conceives of it as the dominant body drive that motivates the 
Christian moral interpretation and is the reason for its demise, in the form of the death of 
God. The problem of understanding modernity as a fundamentally Christian interpretation of 
the world is due to ignorance and the  dominant drive of them both-- ressentiment.  
On the psychological problem of Christianity –The driving force is: ressentiment, the popular uprising, 
the revolt of the underprivileged...Herein [lays] psychological difficulty that has hampered the 
understanding of Christianity: the drive that created it forces one to fight against it as a matter of 
principle. Only as a peace and innocence party has this insurrectionary movement any possibility of 
success, it must conquer through an extreme mildness, softness; it grasps this by instinct- Masterstroke: 
to deny and condemn the drive whose expression one is, continually to display by word and deed , the 
antithesis of this drive.364 
Ressentiment is the drive which, in attempting to deaden pain or suffering, has led to 
equalization of man and the death of God. The real enemy of the genealogy is the modern 
constitution of ressentiment in the form of modern science and egalitarian politics. The latter 
are bodily evaluations, driven by a dominant drive ressentiment that changes the tacit 
perception of one’s sin, un-grounding it, “so that we [are] straying ever further from the 
sun”.365The drive ressentiment is central to Nietzsche’s above-mentioned diagnosis of 
nihilism; it is the drive ressentiment that has become dominant at the expense of the health of 
the body and its disaggregation into nothingness without direction, a “homeless world 
                                                          
360 Ibid  
361Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality, 36 (Essay 1 section 10) 
362 Ibid 127 (Essay 3 section 15)  
363 R. Jay Wallace Ressentiment, Value, and Self-Vindication: Making Sense of Nietzsche’s Slave Revolt. in, 
Nietzsche and Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); P.J.E Kail, Genealogy and the Genealogy, In 
Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, Cambridge Critical Guides, (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 229 ; Peter Poellner, Ressentiment and Morality, in,  Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morality, 
Cambridge Critical Guides, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011), 
364 Nietzsche, The Will to power, 109 (aphorism 179) 
365 Nietzsche, The Gay Science , 119-120 (aphorism 125)  
52 
 
without meaning”.366 As a drive it certainly is a spirit of revenge, but it must be conceived as 
a spirit of revenge of the weak and the degenerate against life itself. "And when the Christian 
condemns, calumniates, and befouls the ‘world’, he does so from the same instinct from 
which the socialist worker befouls society”.367  It is only through overcoming ressentiment 
that the moral sickness of nihilism can be overcome for future generations. It is the only 
means by which Nietzsche was himself able to see through nihilism. A key part of 
Nietzsche’s diagnosis of the body is the understanding and overcoming of ressentiment, 
something he traces through the history of the body in On the Genealogy of Morals: 
Freedom from resentment and the understanding of the nature of resentment, who knows very much after all I 
am indebted to my long illness for these two things.368 
Clarification of the Present 
A Creative History of the Present  
With regard to Nietzsche clarifying his position towards the Kantian question of who we are, 
he addresses his contemporary philosophers, “we knowers”369 in an intellectual spirit that he 
formulated earlier in his career. For Nietzsche, historical studies are only of value if they 
advance life.370 In the same essay, he argues “the unhistorical and the historical are necessary 
in equal measure for the health of an individual, of a people and of a culture”.371 Nietzsche, 
while being critical of the will to truth is not opposed to intellectualism, and as a form of 
science, but not the nihilistic consequences of positivist science.372 The German term 
Nietzsche used to describe these forms of scientific positivism, the methodological, natural 
and social sciences, as well as theology and economics is Wissenschaft.373 This form of 
science which values critique above all is something that we have seen Nietzsche is already 
opposed to.374 Nietzsche’s “life affirming science” is a philosophy of the future,375 which he 
refers to as a “frohliche Wissenschaft” or ‘gay science’, which is embodied in an historical 
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diagnostic approach to his genealogy.376 In opposition to traditional science, the gay scientist, 
while still endorsing a strict historical method in his genealogy, does not endorse truth, but 
rather looks at truths as aesthetic forms of illusion with regard to the value, affirming or 
negating; they have for life--377 that is, the revaluation.  In tracking the will to power to the 
present, Nietzsche’s genealogical method is artistic and reconstructive, redeploying three 
historico-aesthetic techniques he described in an earlier essay for future philological studies, 
“Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life”.378 
 The techniques he uses in his genealogy are now redeployed in terms of his valuation of the 
past values of various forms of the will to power.  As a “monumentalistic historian”,379 he 
looks at the acts and deeds of great figures in the past with regard to the value they have in 
the present. The best example of this in Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals, is his 
affirmation of Homer’s aesthetics with regard to the noble uses of the gods for the future, and 
the normative reinstitution of the good versus bad value system as essential to the revaluation 
of all values.380 The second form of history that Nietzsche practices in his genealogy is 
“antiquarian history”, which surveys the value certain customs and forms of morality may 
have for the present and future.381 This is a more conservative use of historical writing. 
Despite his vicious critique of the Christian priest, he wants the philosopher artist of the 
future to have the highest intellectual standards. Nietzsche considers these intellectual 
standards to be the creation of the priests. “Human history would be altogether a too stupid 
thing without the spirit that the impotent have introduced into it”.382 Nietzsche spends part of 
the third essay as well as part of the first and second explaining how certain priestly practices 
have led to the highest intellectual standards and the creation of art.383Nietzsche expresses 
that the future artist must nurse his procreative impulse, or his artistic instinct, by being 
careful with regard to sexual practices. Although Nietzsche is no ascetic, he prescribes as 
truly valuable “a healthy sensuality”.384 
 Nietzsche’s claim that the healthy existence of a people rests on the unhistorical is incredibly 
important to understanding his genealogical historiography. The health of a period thus also 
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rests on a third, critical use of history, which negates the influence of the other two forms of 
history from being too influential. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche uses his critical 
historical method to negate the value that ascetic ideals, the denial of nature and the will to 
truth have, for the present and future, revaluation. Nietzsche thus uses genealogy as an 
artistically-driven historical diagnosis of the present for the revaluation of values.385 
Nietzsche’s Diagnosis: Symptoms of the Will to Nothingness, Herd Politics and Science 
As mentioned earlier, Nietzsche is a cultural physician that diagnoses effects of a cultural will 
as symptoms of a healthy or sick type of life. It is under the influence of the dominant drive, 
or ressentiment, that the will to nothingness emerges.386With ressentiment morality, the will 
to nothingness engenders the disaggregation of the body, the destruction of a meaningful 
horizon for sociality and denial of suffering.387 In On the Genealogy of Morals, he clarifies 
his diagnosis of nihilism by communicating to his present and future readers the will of 
nihilism, which is also their will, or the will to nothingness:  
Let us dare to grasp it-a will to nothingness, an aversion to life, a rebellion against the most 
fundamental presuppositions of life; but it is and remains a will… And, to repeat in conclusion what I 
said at the beginning: man would rather will nothingness than not will388.  
With regard to his diagnosis, Nietzsche gives a list of the effects and symptoms of the ascetic 
will to nothingness which he had already mentioned in other texts. In the last essay, he 
attacks modern scientism as a symptom of the will to nothingness. “No! Don’t come to me 
with science as the natural antagonist of the ascetic ideal”.389 The task of modern science, 
Nietzsche posits, is to remove as much pain as possible.390 By existing to eliminate suffering, 
and having no higher values, Nietzsche sees science as the Platonic accumulation of rational 
knowledge eliminating sources of suffering that makes man a creative and mythological 
creature. In the second essay, he reaffirms democratic and socialist politics as another 
symptom of the will to nothingness. He writes:  
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That every will must consider every other will its equal-would be a principle hostile to life. An agent of 
the dissolution and destruction of man, an attempt to assassinate the future of man, a sign of weariness, 
a secret path to nothingness.391 
 In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche’s argument is that the two symptoms of modern 
nihilism-- positivist science and herd politics-- are the reasons why there is,  and (for a while) 
will be, nothing left to fear in man. These are rooted in the Christian moral interpretation of 
the world which has now become a desire for nothingness. In communicating his diagnosis, 
Nietzsche wants the reader to understand what type of life his present human condition, or 
who we are, is under the influence of the will to nothingness.  The sight of man does not 
arouse fear, which we know is an elevating and productive force, but weariness, sickness and 
depression. “What is nihilism today if it is not that, we are weary of man?”392  The will to 
nothingness has made the sight of man nauseating and is the source of such nausea. It is 
nausea; Nietzsche argues that it is cultural and existential spirit, symptomatic of a body 
whose drives have lost any form of organic unity and all creative power. Thus, Nietzsche 
uses genealogy as an historical method that uncovers the past relations of the will to power in 
order diagnose a present existential condition. This is Nietzsche’s genealogical response to 
the Kantian question of who we are. 
 Section 3: Nietzsche’s Genealogy in Relation to Revaluation  
Following his historical method, with the diagnosis of the will to nothingness, Nietzsche is 
fundamentally communicating that he diagnoses who we are, or who one is, in terms of a 
composition of forces.393 Genealogy is always a creative history of the will to power. The 
physiology of modern man, his bad conscience and ressentiment, are manifestations of 
particular forces which constitute and are collectively reciprocally determined by the will to 
nothingness.  For Nietzsche, nihilism is: 
The danger of dangers…Tremendous forces have been unleashed; but they conflict with each other; 
they annihilate each other… Nihilism represents a pathological transitional stage… whether the 
productive forces are not yet strong enough, or whether decadence still hesitates and has not yet 
invented its remedies.394  
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For Nietzsche, the revaluation can only occur when active life-affirming forces have become 
dominant, when these productive forces have been unleashed395. The key to this 
transformation to the revaluation of values in Nietzsche’s thought is his doctrine of the 
eternal return.  Nietzsche’s cosmological vision of the eternal return is also his therapeutic, 
his “yes-saying task”, to his diagnosis and destruction of modern values, or his “no-saying 
task”:  
After the Yes-saying part of my task had been solved, the turn had come for the No-saying, No-doing 
part: the revaluation of our values so far, the Great War – conjuring up a day of decision. This included 
the slow search for those related to me, those who, prompted by strength, would offer me their hands 
for destroying.396 
Nietzsche’s therapeutic, the eternal recurrence, is characterized by the idea of reaffirming life 
as a painful process, an active pathos of breeding and selection.397 The recurrence as a 
doctrine is also a therapeutic in the form of “a mechanism of mutation that reorganizes forces 
within a system”.398 Yet this transmutation in the constitution of forces is inextricable from a 
self-destructive existential project on the part of Nietzsche’s free spirits, the future 
revaluators. The transformation that Nietzsche desires, which would constitute the transition 
to the revaluator, is not the Darwinist fantasy of the Übermensch, but the rather the creation 
of new tragic poets.399 This current composition of our modern system we must remember 
constitutes a nihilist physiology,400 a complete anarchy of the bodily ordering of the 
individual and society. The danger that Nietzsche forecasts to his free spirits, is the “passive 
nihilism”,401 which is taking shape around Europe, is the greatest danger to a revaluation. 
Passive nihilism is characterized by the continual decline of power of the spirit of man, the 
process by which he continues to dwarf himself with the reactive nature of modern science 
and egalitarian politics.  This is the difference between Nietzsche’s diagnosis and what he 
(Nietzsche) sees as that of the priest. When the Christian priest saw his flock suffering, he 
poisoned the world by making suffering contemptuous and instrumental.402 Nietzsche’s 
therapeutic is to affirm the meaningless condition modern Europe has found itself in. To 
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affirm this nothingness, but wanting to grow out of it is a self-relational therapeutic form of 
re-creation-- that of the fundamental health of the willing spirit of a human being:  
Nihilism. It is ambiguous: A. Nihilism as a sign of increased power of the spirit: as active nihilism. B. 
Nihilism as decline and recession of the power of the spirit: as passive nihilism.403 
For Nietzsche, the affirmation of the eternal return is always an affirmation of nihilism. 
Remember, his claim is asif one had to affirm the consequences of the return, that is, “if the 
thought gained power over you it would transform and possibly crush you”.404 In accordance 
with Nietzsche’s naturalist psychology, the affirmation of life is the province of only the 
highest types.405 A close reader of Nietzsche must notice that he claims that he gives the 
genealogical diagnosis of the will to nothingness to those who had already offered their hands 
for destruction. One will therefore need to be able to affirm his/her Dionysian fate amor fati,   
as encapsulated in  Nietzsche’s genealogy of who we are, and in facing and destroying their 
consequences, will still be able to affirm the present and future.406  Nietzsche’s test of the 
return is a process of active nihilism, in which one encounters oneself at the end of a process 
of decline, one that is meaningless and contradictory. The free spirits of the future, in 
affirming their fate, affirm the nihilistic tragedy of their Dionysian soul, its return and 
meaninglessness. In that sense, even their negation of the priest is also an affirmation of the 
role his poison has in the creation of the modern men of Europe.  
Thus, as we can see, affirming the return might be one thing, but Nietzsche is asking his free 
spirits to affirm the meaninglessness of their own return, and the historical contradictions of 
their own ressentiment-rooted Christian nihilistic existence. For Keith Ansell Pearson, the 
fate that we therefore have to affirm is ourselves, which is “our greatest weight”.407 
Moreover, Nietzsche commands in his Dionysian spirit that free spirits have to affirm that the 
current predicament of their souls, and nihilistic pathology, is the self-incurred fate of the 
European Christian human, but also as creators to affirm one’s freedom from Christian 
torture and the will to nothingness. The eternal return, for those who take it up, effectuates a 
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change in the relations of forces through an affirmation of nihilism, or active nihilism.408 
When one affirms one’s fate, one is affirming the fated consequences of one’s nihilistic past, 
as well as the contradictory task of destroying those values. Yet through this process of 
destruction, only those spirits that are strong and innocent enough, who are able to intensify 
this destructive suffering into a reason for joy and happiness, will be able to create values. 
Nietzsche’s question, “how well disposed would you have to be to life?”, is therefore a 
question of selection and breeding which only the highest noble spirits would be able to 
answer yes to. Nietzsche’s genealogical diagnosis of the fated production of the will to 
nothingness as all one has been, is and will be indissociable from his therapeutic, the eternal 
return.  
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Chapter 2: Michel Foucault’s use of Genealogy  
Introduction  
In this Chapter I elucidate the manner in which Michel Foucault used genealogy. My 
argument is that Foucault is the only inheritor of an authentic Nietzschean genealogy. While 
Foucault’s radical historiography changed the way thinkers in the contemporary academy 
view genealogical historiography, my claim is that the very form Foucault gives genealogy is 
grounded in a Nietzschean framework.  In order to fully appreciate the way Foucault uses 
genealogy as a Nietzschean, it is very important to understand how he revises the 
genealogical method by tracing the relationship between Heidegger and Nietzsche in his 
work. In section 1, “Foucault’s Ontological and Historical Frameworks”, I will briefly 
describe the manner in which Foucault begins his philosophical career as a Heideggarian 
archaeologist. Thereafter, I will explain the Nietzschean inspired switch that informs 
Foucault’s use of genealogy, the way he reads the events that constitute May 1968 as the 
death of the subject, and the consequence of the Nietzsche’s death of God. After this 
preliminary framing, in the remainder of section 1 I pay attention to the Nietzschean and 
Heideggarian ontological metaphysics that inform Foucault’s genealogical works, Discipline 
and Punish,  and The History of Sexuality: Volume 1: The Will to Knowledge. This task 
consists of an analysis of the manner in which Foucault, contra Nietzsche, provides a 
historical and anti-elitist account of power relations that are constituted around the anti-statist 
political resistance that characterized May 1968.  In his genealogies, Foucault’s framework 
combined this Nietzschean notion of power as an informal process with the Heideggarian 
notion of the episteme that was central to his archaeological work. He did this in order to 
create a new concept.  The apparatus, which served as the central concept in Foucault’s 
genealogies, was created as a historical framework for subjectification. I suggest Heidegger’s 
relationship to Foucault is, moreover, one that extends to the latter’s understanding of the 
subject, and his role as a physician, albeit one of Heideggarian possibilities. Since Foucault 
never simply applied metaphysical systems, I therefore explicate the manner in which he 
traces the history of two apparatuses, imprisonment and the confessional, in Discipline and 
Punish, The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, and The Will to Knowledge, respectively. After 
providing a thorough explanation of the ontological and methodological frameworks that 
frame his work, in section 2, I will provide coherence to my claims regarding Foucault’s 
ontological frameworks, by elucidating the three ways in which Foucault used genealogy:  
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1.   Genealogy  as the anarchist practice of a strategic intellectual;  
2. A historical framework for the production of subjectivity; 
3. An aesthetic ontology of who we are for the purpose of resistance.  
Following this section, which reduces Foucault’s rich historical content to the analytic and 
political roles it played in his work as a genealogist, I will conclude the chapter with section 
3, which consists of a brief exposition of the role genealogy played in Foucault’s 
philosophical career. The reason this last task is important is because in Foucauldian 
scholarship, there are a multiplicity of positions which contradict each other. That is, there is 
confusion over the relationship between Foucault’s different modes of research and their 
relation to his overall position. Drawing on Foucault’s reflections, my claim in this final 
section that is there is no continuity or overall insight that undergirds Foucault’s work, and 
that his genealogical period is studied in its specificity.  
Section 1: Foucault’s Ontological and Historical Frameworks 
Foucault’s Ontological Sources: Heidegger and Nietzsche  
Foucault conceived his relation to Friedrich Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) in 
an oppositional manner to the dominant strands within French thought at the time. “One had 
to be on familiar terms with Marx, not let one's dreams stray too far from Freud. And one had 
to treat sign-systems-the signifier-with the greatest respect”409. While Foucault certainly does 
have a relation to these modes of thought-- Marxism, Psychoanalysis and structuralism,410 my 
claim is that Foucault is a Nietzschean and Heideggarian post-structural genealogist, and his 
comments below should be taken with the utmost intellectual seriousness:  
For me Heidegger has always been the essential philosopher…My entire philosophical development 
was determined by my reading of Heidegger. I nevertheless recognize that Nietzsche outweighed him.  
These are the two fundamental experiences I have had …. I had tried to read Nietzsche in the fifties but 
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Nietzsche alone did not appeal to me - whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger: that was a philosophical 
shock! ...these are nevertheless the two authors I have read the most. 411 
Omitting Foucault’s relation to these thinkers, Nietzsche and Heidegger, is a practice that has 
attained normality in the study of Foucault. Gayatri Spivak has rightly argued that Hubert 
Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow have democratized Foucault.412 For Francois Cusset, this 
approach is not rare; it is indicative of the presentation of Foucault’s thought in the United 
States.413 Wendy Brown is an example of a scholar who has presented Foucault in the most 
haphazard and politically appropriative manner. In her book, Politics out of History, Brown 
posits that Foucault is not an anarchist, but a thinker that can be compliant with liberalism.414 
In her opinion, Foucault’s genealogical work has no direct relation to the riots of 1968 and 
can therefore be divorced from them.415 It is precisely this thin reading of Foucault, of which 
Brown is only a symptom, which I want to contest. I contend that Foucault does not use 
genealogy for reform, but anarchist revolution.416 Colin Koopman, another reader of 
genealogy, has even claimed that Foucault is not a subversive Nietzschean.417 Koopman has 
cast Foucault as a neo-Kantian and even gone so as far to claim that he is not opposed to 
disciplinary power.418The reason I find this a problem is because such a misreading of 
Foucault completely compromises an appreciation of the manner in which he uses 
genealogy.419  Foucault’s historiographical forms of analysis in his genealogical period are 
ungraspable without a brief analysis of his archaeological period, yet the two are different to 
the third period, the “technologies of the self”.420  While Foucault is still certainly influenced 
by Nietzsche in his archaeological period,421 Heidegger is still the dominant influence.  
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Foucault’s Take-up of Heideggarian Themes: The Episteme as Historical World 
While it is not possible to fully articulate the influence of Heidegger on Foucault, there are 
three major areas that deeply affect Foucault’s work: (1) Heidegger’s attempt to transform the 
question of rational knowledge and truth to truths that work at a deep ontological level often 
prior to consciousness, knowledge and visible history.422 (2) How a new understanding of 
truth affects the understanding of human (particularly Cartesian) subjectivity as a practical 
engagement with the world in the form of possibilities, specifically in the genealogical 
period.423 (3) How both ontological truth and subjectivity operate in accordance with the 
Heideggarian notion of the episteme, but not being.424  
In his archaeological period, Foucault drew on Heideggarian principles in his three historical 
periods; The Renaissance (1500-1650); the Classical period (1650-1780); and the Modern 
period (1780-1950). In his 1966 publication, The Order of Things, Foucault elucidated his 
Heideggarian framework for the analysis he was undertaking as practicing scholarship in the 
discipline of the history of ideas.  The term he used in The Order of Things to elucidate the 
epistemological unity of a historical epoch was the Heideggarian term, episteme. For 
Heidegger:  
From the earliest times until Plato the word techne is linked with the word episteme. Both words are 
terms for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at home in something, to understand 
and be expert in it. Such a knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is revealing.425 
 Heidegger’s notion of epistemic knowledge is a form of knowledge that is both tacit of one’s 
possibilities in the world, and a correlated specific technical knowledge that derives from the 
rules governed by the unveiling of these historically factical possibilities by   “being to the 
open”, or clearing.426 For knowing to occur at all in any epoch, the human being has to-- and 
more importantly for Heidegger, and consequently Foucault-- tacitly accept a set of rules that 
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are enshrined in linguistic conventions that govern the meaningful relationships of a historical 
people. Foucault however never resorts to such strong Heideggarian terminology. For 
Michael Schwartz, Foucault “…takes up Heidegger’s retrieval of ancient episteme as a 
knowing that reveals, only to recast it so that episteme is now construed as the historical 
conditions of knowledge that exhibit the mode of being of order, with this order coming forth 
via the a priori of resemblance”.427  
In every culture, between the use of what one may call the ordering codes and reflections upon order 
itself, there is the pure experience of its order and modes of being…What I am trying to bring to light is 
the epistemological field, the episteme in which knowledge, envisaged apart from all criteria having 
reference to its rational and objective forms, grounds its positivity and thereby manifests a history that 
is not of growing perfection, but rather that of its conditions of possibility…It is evident that my 
present study is, in a sense, an echo of my undertaking to write a history of madness in the Classical 
age; it has the same articulations in time, taking the renaissance as my starting point, then encountering, 
at the beginning of my nineteenth century, just as my history of madness did, the threshold of a 
modernity we have not left behind.428 
The episteme is Foucault’s philosophical and historical relocation of the Heideggarian 
opening, or clearing, in which particular modalities of being are disclosed.429 For Heidegger, 
the possibilities in the world which constitute the way individuals make sense of their 
undertakings in the world, and how it relates them to others is only made intelligible within 
the confines of a system of meaning that is inextricably linguistic and historical. Moving 
away from Heideggarian existential themes, Foucault deploys the epistemological object by 
using the idea of conditions. These are familiar to us in Kant’s formulation of the condition 
for the possibility of knowledge, which in a much wider sense is answering the question, 
what are the conditions for the possibility of order or a field of knowledge as a whole? While 
I consider that there is a strong Kantian influence here, Foucault has warned that the episteme 
must not be misunderstood as a Kantian category.430 In this way and learning from 
Heidegger, Foucault conceptualizes knowledge as not being confined to a subject’s 
understanding or a subject’s ability to make judgments. What can be established as 
knowledge of particular objects by subjects is premised on a particular set of linguistic rules 
immanent to the ordering of each historical period. For Foucault, this a priori Heideggarian 
episteme:  
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…is what, in a given period, delimits in the totality of experience a field of knowledge, defines the 
mode of being of the objects that appear in that field, provides man’s everyday perception with 
theoretical powers, and defines the conditions in which he can sustain a discourse about things that is 
recognized to be true.431 
The three epistemes that Foucault describes in The Order of Things each dealt with a 
particular form of presencing that corresponded to the nature of, and relations between 
sign(s); there is resemblance, representation and the transcendental doublet all constituting 
positivist logic which map on to the Renaissance, the Classical and the Modern periods 
respectively. The idea which Foucault adopts from Heidegger is that it is the episteme that 
governs and limits human epistemological and social possibilities within a time frame, rather 
than the time period itself consecrating relevance and relations between humans and objects. 
The form of presencing that took place in the Renaissance, as “resemblance”,432 forms the 
basis from which Foucault traces the Classical and Modern epistemes that have grounded the 
relations of knowing, meaning and the modes of being immanent to Western society until the 
present day. In The Order of Things, the Renaissance episteme and resemblance as both the 
function and content, or presencing of the sign,433 gave way to the Classical episteme, and the 
order of representation. In the Classical episteme, thought itself and the things in the world 
are no longer divorced from language or representation.434 The representative function of 
language is embodied in the change of the constitution of the sign. “From the seventeenth 
century… the arrangement of signs was to become binary… as the connection of a significant 
and a signified”.435  With this epistemic switch, Foucault claims “one began to ask how a sign 
could be linked to what it signified”.436  The new distinction of the sign signalled a change in 
the very experience of the world. Language had lost its primary function.437 “Before this 
language of language”, Foucault writes, “it is the thing itself that appears, in its own 
characters, but within the reality that has been patterned from the very outset by the name”.438  
Now part of the task for all scholars was to establish the meaning of things. That is, what a 
sign has signified, with recourse to its place in a tabulated system of identity and differences 
in accordance with the principles of mathesis and taxanomia that ran through several 
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discourses such as natural history, general grammar and an analysis of wealth.439 Yet 
throughout this period, the function of language and thought as representational went 
unquestioned.440 What this fundamentally meant for Foucault was that scholars never asked 
on what basis representations and language operated.441  
Foucault’s position on epochal language differentiates him from Heidegger.442 Heidegger 
adopted a philosophical stance, where on the basis of a philosopher’s attunement to an 
ontologico-historical grounding force of being, some room was made for the philosopher’s 
creativity and agency. Foucault negates this position. As an archaeologist he posits that the 
subject is a function of discourse that is not a product or determinately influenced by a grand 
tradition.443 All thinkers are bound by the same rules. Philosophy functions in accordance 
with the rules of episteme, like any other regional science.444 Foucault’s deployment of the 
episteme as a tool of analysis relies on Heidegger, but ultimately breaks with philosophy, and 
more importantly; the prejudice assumed by philosophy as a superior discipline that creates 
intellectuals critical enough to see through their very constitution.445 So for Foucault, 
although the classical episteme transforms into a modern one with the great philosopher 
Kant’s questioning of representation, this is part of a greater rift that is occurring “under our 
feet”:446  
Kant in his Logic, when to his traditional trilogy of questions he added an ultimate one: the three 
critical questions (What can I know? What must I do? What am I permitted to hope?) then found 
themselves referred to a fourth, and inscribed, as it were, ‘to its account’: Was ist der Mensch?... The 
concern it has for man, which it lays claim to not only in its discourse but in its pathos, the care with 
which it attempts to define him as a living being, an individual at work, or a speaking subject.447 
For Foucault, after the Kantian critique the radical reflection on language by language ceases 
to be a problem of real concern.448 While language could never be divorced from thought in a 
network of representations, language now simply operates functionally in accordance with 
the historical rules a priori that govern modernity in order to represent the positivist essence 
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of the human being as an object of knowledge.449 The epistemic shift that now governs 
modern thought is the knowledge of the positivity of the finite human being, or creature that 
necessitates representation.450 The switch to the question of the essence of man, and 
Foucault’s strong opposition to the a priori principle that grounds knowledge, seems odd in 
his archaeological period which was characterized by a strong focus on language. In spite of 
this, in his genealogical period he makes clear his post-structural contention regarding the 
transcendental doublet as a principle of epistemic structuration presupposes not a problem of 
linguistic elitism, but a political problem regarding subjectification called “dividing 
practices”.451,  
Foucault’s presentation of the positivism of this period is of course inextricable from the 
Heideggarian view of the modern subject as the ground of absolute knowledge.452 The 
historical a priori that governs the modern Western episteme is man as a transcendental 
doublet.453 Man is both a subject and a scientific object of knowledge.454 The difference that 
characterizes the modern episteme is that of presencing, which is viewed in its 
positivity.455According to Foucault, for a subject of knowledge to conceptualize an object in 
terms of its positivity, or a positive ahistorical essence in relation to a discourse of objective 
truth, is to tacitly understand the object of discourse (s) as an objective condition of a set of 
discursive rules that govern perceptual outlooks of those scholars who work, speak and write 
in a particular field.456 
This true discourse finds its foundation and model in the empirical truth whose genesis in history and 
nature it retraces so that one has an analysis of the positivist type (the truth of the object determines the 
truth of the discourse that describes its formation457 
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The Episteme: Discourse and Objects  
 
Despite his break with Heidegger over the issue of philosophy, Foucault was influenced by 
the German thinker into his genealogical period. Like Heidegger, Foucault views the creation 
of the objects in a particular episteme and the discourses that constitute them to be 
independent of the control of human beings or human agency.458 We can thus see how 
Foucault utilises the conditional aspects of the episteme and its discursive constitution to 
limit the possibilities governing a subject’s experience of the world.459 According to Jűrgen 
Habermas, this theme in Foucault’s work extends into his genealogical period, and is 
politically motivated.460 In modern thought, Marx most notably created a distinction between 
knowledge and ideology. For Habermas, Marx and Freud’s rationalism allowed them to 
distinguish an agentive role for the subject, and create an authentic space for humanist 
discourse in opposition to illusory and repressive systems of meaning that support social 
oppression.461 Habermas correctly views Foucault as negating the modern humanist impulse. 
Indeed, his postmodern/post-structuralist negation of universals and turn to language 
constitute a subversive Nietzschean position.462 While the critique will turn on power, 
Foucault’s epistemic historicizing is premised on negating the idea that the rational subject 
can be neutral and objective in any inquiry, a theme which ran through Madness and 
Civilization.463 This of course raises the question of whether Foucault and Heidegger are able 
to give an account of historical a prioris that structure experience. Foucault did rewire agency 
or creativity within his discursive schema with the idea that certain thinkers, like Freud and 
Marx, are subjects of discursivity. These subjects have the ability to engender new 
discourses, or ways of seeing and speaking.464 However, these creators will simply engender 
a new set of discursive rules.  For Foucault, no consciousness is sovereign to discursive 
ordering.465 If the subject is governed by rules as Foucault claims, what status can his 
archaeological historiography have if the author/enunciative modality are bound to discursive 
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rules external to his control?  Foucault as an archaeologist would seem to maintain a critical 
distance from his sources, material and discursive formations, claiming to simply describe the 
latter in their positivity. Still, the question remains as to whether the archaeologist can 
approach his material accurately, or if his conscious perception of all things is bound by 
discursive rules.  Laclau and Mouffe, for example, claim it is the constitution of objects 
within the discursive formation that designate the conditions of lived experience for speaking 
and writing subjects. The subject cannot interpret any object outside its discursive 
constitution:  
The fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has nothing to do with whether there 
is a world external to thought… An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly 
exists… What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different 
assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive condition.466 
 Thus, Foucault’s claim is that humans can only theorise, see and perceive within a particular 
discursive formation.467  We will therefore have to leave the question regarding whether his 
explanation can ever account for the historical structures he describes accurately. I have now 
concluded that Foucault, like Heidegger does not conceive of knowledge in the traditional 
rationalist sense. There is a critical difference between the two, and such difference is in part 
relatable to Foucault’s French heritage. Foucault wants us to think of discursive formations as 
a form of knowledge that is different to the one we normally conceive of. Foucault uses two 
French terms, connaissance and savoir which are generally translated into English as the 
singular term knowledge. In French, connaissance refers to a particular discipline or branch 
of knowledge (such as psychiatry) and savoir refers to the entirety of all branches of 
knowledge.  Foucault radically reconceives both these terms so that together, we may be able 
to conceive of the rules that constitute relations of what can be considered ‘knowledge’ 
outside the domain of an intentional, free willed knowledge producing subject. Foucault 
writes:  
By connaissance I mean the relation of the subject to the object and the formal rules that govern it. 
Savoir refers to the conditions that are necessary in a particular period for this or that type of object to 
be given to connaissance and for this or that enunciation to be formulated. 468 
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The philosophical unit of the discursive formation that is central to Foucault’s notion of 
knowledge as relations is the statement.  It is the level of the statement at which enunciative 
modality or subject, the objects and concepts of discourse coalesce.469 For Foucault, the issue 
is not a presupposed natural world of objects which exist prior to our naming them, but an 
object itself can only be spoken or written about as an object according to discursive 
conditions of emergence. Foucault explains this by claiming that these discursive conditions 
occur at the limit of discourse. By ‘limit’, Foucault is not referring to a point that constrains 
discourse, forcing certain forms upon it.470 The limit is the relations themselves: the rules of 
regularity of the statements that constitute a discursive formation are neither interior (like 
secondary relations) nor external to the discursive formation: 
They have probably found it difficult enough to recognize that their history, their economics, their 
social practices, the language (langue) that they speak, the mythology of their ancestors, even the 
stories that they were told in their childhood, are governed by rules that are not all given to their 
consciousness; they can hardly agree to being dispossessed in addition of that discourse in which they 
wish to be able to say immediately and directly what they think, believe, or imagine; they prefer to 
deny that discourse is a complex, differentiated practice, governed by analysable rules and 
transformations.471 
The way man is seen in the modern period, Foucault argues, is due to the discursive relations, 
not the rational subject’s access to the objective truth of human nature. The way in which 
man is understood objectively as an object in the modern episteme and so studied is through 
modalities which are viewed as intrinsic to his empirical, not transcendental being.472 It is not 
that Foucault is directly negating Kant here, but rather he is describing how man has been 
viewed in modernity in accordance with the presuppositions of man as a living, speaking and 
labouring being that constitutes the epistemic ordering of modernity.473 These modes; 
language, life and labour are embodied in the discourses of linguistics, biology and 
economics respectively.474 These three sciences, or discourses, are inextricably linked to 
Foucault’s genealogical critique of the modern human sciences of psychology and sociology, 
as well as to the production of the modern subject and world. The notion of life as an 
objective modality of man’s being is specific to modernity, as  classical thought, in the form 
                                                          
469 Ibid; Deleuze, Foucault, 9 
470 Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, 108 
471 Ibid 221 
472 Foucault, The Order of things,  347 
473 Ibid 
474 Ibid 
70 
 
of natural history had no concept of life but only living beings.475 Biology, focused on the 
functions specific to the life of man as an organic structure and in accordance with an 
environment, both natural and cultural, is an attempt to study the “possibility of finding 
norms of adjustment”.476 Economics is the study of how the history of man’s needs and 
desires lead him into conflictual relations, from which he established particular rules for the 
benefit of himself and/or others.477 The study of linguistics focuses on the meaning made by 
human beings, and how the significatory practices are articulated in the form of various 
cultural systems.478 In the final Chapters of Order of Things, Foucault elucidates the 
emergence of the human sciences, which lack any scientific credibility as merely derivative 
discourses of the primary models; discourses of biology, economics and linguistics.479 
Psychology is fundamentally a study of man in terms of functions and norms (functions and norms 
which can, in a secondary fashion, be interpreted on the basis of conflicts and significations, rules and 
systems); sociology is fundamentally a study of man in terms of rules and conflicts… lastly, the study 
of literature and myth is essentially the province of an analysis of significations and signifying systems, 
but we all know that this analysis may be carried out in terms of functional coherence or of conflicts 
and rules.480 
The Beginning of Genealogy: Foucault’s turn from Heidegger to Nietzsche:  Power, God 
and the Death of the Subject 
 In 1970, Foucault pointed out that he would be embarking on a new method called 
genealogy.481 His turn to Nietzsche signifies the switch from archaeology to genealogy. In 
1971, in Theatrium Philosophicum he alludes to an entire philosophical development with 
regard to his change from archaeological to his genealogical period. This meant an analytic 
switch from using Nietzschean themes instead of Heideggarian ones as frameworks for 
analysis. Foucault claims that his philosophy is moving away from a “philosophy of 
representation - of the original, the first time, resemblance, imitation, faithfulness”.482 
Heidegger’s philosophy of Being had come to represent an old theology, and in its place 
Foucault noted he was moving towards a philosophy that constitutes a “dance of masks…A 
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dead God and sodomy are the thresholds of the new metaphysical ellipse”.483 In his 
genealogical philosophy, Foucault welcomes a new Nietzschean philosophy in which atheist 
transgression is opposed to the new metaphysical order.484 It is this move to the Nietzsche’s 
death of God thesis which characterizes Foucault’s Nietzschean aesthetic mystification of the 
May 1968 revolts. This would inform his whole use of the genealogical method. In 1973, in 
his lecture “Truth and Juridical forms”, Foucault makes this theme in his thinking explicit. In 
his lecture, he proposed that there were two fundamental events in the history of Western 
knowledge; the first is the death of God. The consequence of the death of God is the 
“fundamental rupture of the relation between knowledge and the known thing”; since 
Descartes had invoked God on epistemological grounds.485 Thus, Foucault’s conception of 
Nietzsche’s death of God is an implicit take up of Heidegger’s reading of Nietzsche.486 This 
is a questionable reading of Nietzsche, for which nihilism was an oncoming wave about to 
sweep over Europe from the late 1900s. I posit, however, that this is simply Foucault reading 
Nietzsche and Heidegger in relation to one another for his own benefit.487  
Foucault argues that the conclusion of that event would darken our minds to the extent that 
we totally de-deify nature.488 The death of God would therefore “rupture the continuity 
between knowledge and the instincts”, which would lead to the disappearance of “the subject 
in its unity and sovereignty”.489 Normatively in the Western tradition, the subject (for 
Foucault, instincts) is configured in such a manner that it has natural access to knowledge, 
which from a Nietzschean perspective is pure fantasy. The death of God de-deifies the 
subject’s notion of himself.  The consequence of de-deification would of course result in the 
death of the unified subject’s self’-knowledge, the subject’s relation to itself, and “the 
relationship between the body and truth”.490 The revolt against the politics of identity in the 
struggles of May 1968 is, in Foucault’s Nietzschean thinking, congruent with the death of the 
subject. Todd May reports: 
Students at the university at Nanterre go on strike to protest their administration's temporary closing of 
the university in the wake of demands for ‘anti-imperialist’ study. These strikes are soon followed by 
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workers' strikes, and intersection of these strikes brings together, at least temporarily, two sections of 
the French population that are traditionally separate from each other… it looks for a brief period as 
though President de Gaulle's government might fall. It would be the first revolution in modern Western 
Europe, succeeding where the revolts of 1848 and 1871 fail.491 
At the time, 1968 looked like it would open a door to a new beginning. Foucault and Deleuze 
were central in portraying the awakening of an anarchist revolution as a massive event.492 For 
these thinkers, May 1968 opened up new politically subversive questions about “the culture 
of everyday life, prisons, mental health institutions, sexuality, gender and the family”493 that 
either befuddled or outraged the FCP. The very core of political life, that is-- ‘who we are’ as 
political subjects were-- for Foucault was being questioned through resistance. He makes this 
clear in his paper, “Genealogy and Social Criticism”: 
A certain fragility has been discovered in the very bedrock of existence - even, and perhaps above all, 
in those aspects of it that are most familiar, most solid and most intimately related to our bodies and to 
our everyday behaviour.494   
Thus, these struggles were anarchic, but Foucault’s Nietzschean claim is that their very 
existence was opposed to the manner in which the intersection of power and knowledge had 
come to have a hold on their lives: 
They are anarchistic struggles ….They are an opposition to the effects of power which are linked with 
knowledge… What is questioned is the way in which knowledge circulates and functions, its relations 
to power… all these present struggles revolve around the question: Who are we? They are a refusal of 
these abstractions, of economic and ideological state violence, which ignore who we are individually, 
and also a refusal of a scientific or administrative inquisition which determines who one is.495 
Foucault’s focus on resistance relates to a fundamental methodological feature in his 
genealogical method, which he explicates in his paper, “The Subject and Power”. He suggests 
that it is easier to study power relations from looking at the forms of resistance which emerge 
in opposition to power.496 This is because in Foucault’s ontological analytic of power 
relations, where there is power, there is always the possibility of resistance, an outlet of 
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forces exterior to strategic relations of domination.497 Foucault does not only use the 
Nietzschean ‘de-deification’ to mystically explain the happenings of May 1968, but also the 
transversal struggles that have appeared across Western society.  The revolts of May 1968 
constitute the death of the subject in Foucault’s reading because the subject-object relation 
that characterizes the modern world engendered by exercise of pastoral power has been 
demystified. Foucault reads these forms of resistance as human beings directly refuting the 
role of scientific knowledge in their lives.498 Foucault here is not pointing out that those 
resisting are constituted by ressentiment. Foucault was quite clear that resistance should not 
be conflated with reactive force.499 In Foucault’s thought, resistance rather constitutes a mode 
of freedom that allows us to change the circumstantial power relations that have constituted 
who we are.500 However, following Nietzsche’s metaphysics, Foucault’s understanding of 
resistance does not correspond to any transcendent or redemptive role in an historical 
narrative, but is rather conceived in terms of a philosophy of energy and force-- that is, 
bodies.501 The anarchic resistance towards knowledge does not follow any dialectical pattern 
of change, but as a reversal in the relations in the forces which manifest as resistant bodily 
actions.502 The transversal struggles are thus conceived as an event, one which follows as the 
culmination a bodily modality, following effects of the death of God.  
Foucault’s Nietzschean theory of Power 
In his genealogies, Foucault presupposes and relates to the death and the subject in terms of 
an event of resistance, (in May 1968) to his study of the “form of power which makes 
individuals subjects... a form of power which subjugates and makes subject to”.503 Foucault’s 
historical analysis of power is Nietzschean. While the two forms of power he studies in the 
modern period are disciplinary and bio-power, they have a common source in Christianity 
that indicates a Nietzschean disposition:  
It has often been said that Christianity brought into being a code of ethics... Less emphasis is usually 
placed on the fact that it proposed and spread new power relations throughout the ancient world…it 
postulates in principle that certain individuals can, by their religious quality, serve others not as 
princes, magistrates, prophets, fortune-tellers, benefactors, educationalists, and so on but as pastors. 
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However, this word designates a very special form of power… It is a form of power whose ultimate 
aim is to assure individual salvation in the next world...It is a form of power which does not look after 
just the whole community but each individual in particular, during his entire life…Finally, this form of 
power cannot be exercised without knowing the inside of people's minds, without exploring their souls, 
without making them reveal their innermost secrets… It implies knowledge of the conscience and an 
ability to direct it.504 
In his genealogy, Nietzsche had reduced Christian morality to a form of reactive or life 
denying power.505 He had also called this form of power “slave morality” to distinguish it as 
the organization of the all weaker herd types.506 Foucault has taken up this form of power as 
pastoral power, and he replicates Nietzsche’s ideas in the sense that pastoral power is defined 
by the relation of a pastor to the salvation of his flock, and the capacity of the former to 
manipulate and direct the conscience of the latter. However much Foucault may shadow 
Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of the priest’s relation to bad conscience, he formulates the 
modern production of subjectivity in accordance with the change that he decrees to have 
occurred in pastoral power in the course of Western history: 
An important phenomenon took place around the eighteenth century-it was a new distribution, a new 
organization of this kind of individualizing power. I don't think that we should consider the "modern 
state" as an entity which was developed above individuals, ignoring what they are and even their very 
existence, but, on the contrary, as a very sophisticated structure, in which individuals can be integrated, 
under one condition: that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of 
very specific patterns. In a way, we can see the state as a modern matrix of individualization or a new 
form of pastoral power.507 
Foucault’s above argument must be read alongside the Nietzschean death of god thesis and 
his self-proclaimed philosophy of masks.508 Foucault’s argument regarding the masks and 
death of God is indebted to Deleuze’s interpretation of Nietzsche. Michael Mahon argues that 
since Foucault was sceptical of Nietzsche’s relationship between force and psychological 
interiority, he is closer as a theorist of force to Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, than 
Nietzsche himself.509 
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 In Nietzsche and Philosophy; Deleuze develops a systematic Nietzschean ontology. I suggest 
that this undergirds Foucault’s deployment of a philosophy of masks. Deleuze went further 
than Nietzsche in elaborating a natural theory of forces with particular quantities and 
qualities, namely active and reactive.510 In Deleuze’s reading of Nietzsche, “the object itself 
is force, the expression of force”,511 a principle that applies to the entire biological and 
political world, since “every relationship of forces constitutes a body-whether chemical, 
biological, social or political.”512 Deleuze configured the will as the force of reciprocal 
determination between forces. The will is thus both determined in accordance with a 
changing relation of forces, and determines the manner in which forces relate to one another 
in a continuum of motion with no primary cause.513 In Deleuze’s interpretation the quality of 
forces is reducible to the primary evaluative quality of the will. The will is either affirmative 
or negative in accordance with the dominant state of forces, if they are active or reactive 
forces dominating, respectively.514 All meaning and value is imposed through the interpretive 
relationship between forces in accordance with the valuing force of the will.515 Taking up 
Nietzsche’s thesis, Deleuze diagnosed the Christian religion, and its modern nihilist 
derivatives as constitutive of a base or slave type that is determined by the dominance of 
reactive forces.516 Deleuze explained the relationship between the ascetic ideal (Christianity), 
and modern philosophy in terms of a “masked relation” in accordance with a theory of forces. 
Deleuze’s centralized the role of the genealogist, as someone who can interpret the 
relationship between forces, and therefore masks:  
Philosophy itself does not throw off its ascetic mask as it grows up: in a way it must believe in this 
mask, it can only conquer its mask by giving it a new sense which finally expresses its true anti-
religious force. We see that the art of interpreting must also be an art of piercing masks, of discovering 
the one that masks himself, why he does it and the point of keeping up the mask while it is being 
reshaped…The difference in the origin does not appear at the origin – except perhaps to a particularly 
practised eye…the eye of the genealogist.517 
Foucault claims the effects of a theologically-centred pastoral power may have disappeared, 
but they have transformed into new relations of power.  As Deleuze pointed out in his reading 
of Nietzsche, in order for a being to grow and survive and overpower in accordance with the 
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nature of the will to power, it generally masks itself through concealing the interpretations of 
dominant forces via dominant forces as its own. The patterns of pastoral power coalesce to 
creatively integrate a set of multiplicities in the form of individualized bodies that constitute a 
formal macro-political structure called the state. Foucault’s claim, contra to psychological 
theories of human normality or essence is that our particular historical subjectivity is 
inextricably linked to the political organization of society.518 Nietzsche’s claim regarding 
nihilism was that European human beings’ relation to the eternal salvation of heaven was 
reconfigured in terms of the ordering of socio-political life by power relations. Foucault takes 
this claim and extends to an historical account of power relations in modern Europe:  
It was no longer a question of leading people to their salvation in the next world but rather ensuring it 
in this world… in this context, the word ‘salvation’ takes on different meanings: health, well-being 
(that is, sufficient wealth, standard of living), security, protection against accidents.519 
Foucault is extending a Nietzschean philosophy of masks, with regard to pastoral or reactive 
power, to a host of subject positions; doctors, psychiatrists, educationalists and health 
professionals. The subject’s position that determines the strategic exercise of bio and 
disciplinary power are masked in their relations of domination over their flock in terms of 
individualizing moral principles and scientific objectivity. These are metaphysically 
grounded in the will to truth of pastoral power.520 Foucault, as a genealogist, reads the 
existence of the human sciences and the humanism they practice to be a masked pastoral 
power relation that seeks to a produce individualized subjects as a mode of social control:  
Each individualizing ‘tactic’ which characterized a series of powers: those of the family, medicine, 
psychiatry, education, and employers.521  
Foucault’s Genealogical move from Nietzsche: Power as Mechanics 
In his genealogical period, Foucault, like Nietzsche and Deleuze, promulgates a materialist 
metaphysics where the body is both the bearer of forces, and specifically conditioned and 
constituted by the historical configuration of power relations.522 In taking up Nietzschean 
power, Foucault views power as positive, inculcated in the body’s will to produce discursive 
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regimes of truth.523 Power creates objects of discourse, new modes of sight, or things for 
subjects to see, and new things to say or for subjects to talk about-- that is, knowledge as 
savoir.524 For Foucault, it is in the very nature of power as a form of mythological (mythos) 
mystification to hide its rational series of objectives and aims525 which are outside the control 
of autonomous rational subjects.526 For this reason, in the history of the Western 
philosophical tradition since Plato, Foucault argues that we have deceived to the extent that 
power, discursive knowledge and our conception of what is true are intricately related.527 
Foucault’s position of knowledge is a Nietzschean one. Unlike Platonic rationalism, 
knowledge is not conceived as natural faculty.528 For Foucault and Nietzsche it is produced 
from the instincts as an imposition on the essence of reality, which is “chaos”.529 “The will to 
know composes illusions, fabricates lies, accumulates errors.”530 For Foucault, this will 
includes both normative knowledge (connaissance) and his conception of discursive 
knowledge (savoir).531 Thus, Foucault, following Nietzsche’s insights is launching a 
philosophical critique of the foundational notions of truth, reason and the soul, from which 
philosophical debates have derived from Plato, Aristotle and Christianity.532 While Nietzsche 
shifted the focus towards health, Foucault is deploying this critique of foundations in his 
genealogies to change social and subjective relations. While genealogy is certainly curative in 
Foucault, he does not rely on ahistorical qualities like Nietzsche. Thus, Foucault, like 
Nietzsche, conceives as foundation the productive capacity of power and the body as a 
relation between natural forces.533 But unlike Nietzsche, this is not in terms of quanta or 
qualities.534 Foucault’s notion of power/knowledge is immanently strategical. Foucault, 
studies a mode of power as a strategic rationality: 
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…it is the moving substrate of force relations, which, by virtue of their inequality, constantly engender 
states of power…power is not an institution, nor is it a structure, neither is it a strength that we are 
endowed with. It is the name given to a complex strategical situation in a particular society.535 
Colin Gordon argues that there may be agents in “strategic positions” who enforce the series 
of calculated aims and objectives that are a constitutive of a strategy, but there is “no 
programmer”.536 In Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Foucault studies 
disciplinary and biological power as respective strategic rationalities that have constituted 
human beings as subjects from the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries respectively, to the 
present. Following the very nature of pastoral power, these two forms of power coalesce to 
constitute the worldly salvation of the flock. This occurs through a process of subordination, 
exclusion and if possible correction of all social dangers and abnormalities on the basis of a 
rationality that defines the normative and productive model of the modern rational subject 
within its population.537 Disciplinary and biopower work together to create a docile and 
obedient subject population, but one that is also healthy, skilled and productive enough to 
contribute to the benefit of a capitalist state. For Foucault, power is not exercised by a class, 
but its positive results are obtained through the way in which a strategy locks certain groups 
together, inculcating relations of domination.538 In this sense, there “are two meanings of the 
word ‘subject’: subject to someone else by control and dependence; and tied to his own 
identity by a conscience or self-knowledge.”539  In Foucault’s genealogies, each form of 
power does not generate a particular type of subjectivity, but the two operate through a set of 
“concrete relationships”,540 that reciprocally enforce one another by orienting the body, 
individual and social through a set of dividing practices:   
The first to be formed-it seems-centred on the body as a machine: its disciplining, the optimization of 
its capabilities, the extortion of its forces, the parallel increase of its usefulness and its docility, its 
integrations into systems of efficient and economic controls, all this was ensured by the procedures of 
power that characterized the disciplines…The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species 
body, the body imbued with the great mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the biological 
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processes…Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and regulatory 
controls: a bio politics of population.541 
With this focus on the relationship from power/knowledge to its mechanistic relation to the 
individual and social body, it is evident that Foucault moves from Nietzsche’s organic 
cosmology of power to an analysis of power as a strategic mechanistic process that is 
inscribed in the natural world. Nietzsche of course was opposed to all mechanical models. 
Foucault conceives the two forms of power to be a bio-polar technology that operates 
mechanistically. It is this mechanistic process which Foucault refers to as an apparatus that 
produces an intersubjective modal subject-object (knowledge) relation of different bodies 
(savoir), that characterizes the framework and form of analysis that Foucault undertakes in 
his genealogical work:  
Perhaps the equivocal nature of the term ‘conduct’ is one of the best aids for coming to terms with the 
specificity of power relations. For to "conduct" is at the same time to ‘lead’ others (according to 
mechanisms of coercion which are, to varying degrees, strict) and a way of behaving within a more or 
less open field of possibilities.542 
 The Apparatus as the Historical Technology of Power in Foucault’s Genealogy 
I understand by the term 'apparatus' a sort of-shall we say formation which has as its major function at 
a given historical moment that of responding to an urgent need. The apparatus thus has a dominant 
strategic function…the apparatus is essentially of a strategic nature, which means assuming that it is a 
matter of a certain manipulation of relations of forces, either developing them in a particular 
direction…The apparatus is thus always inscribed in a play of power, but it is also always linked to 
certain coordinates of knowledge which issue from it but, to an equal degree, condition it. This is what 
the apparatus consists in: strategies of relations of forces supporting, and supported by, types of 
knowledge.543 
The notion of an apparatus is what distinguishes Foucault’s genealogical study from the 
synchronic approach of French structuralism.544 That is, Foucault’s genealogies did not just 
study a “time slice”, or “look at relations between things at a particular time”.545 The notion 
of an “apparatus” enabled Foucault to not so much uncover the genesis of particular 
structures,546 but rather explain how mutually supporting diachronic strategies of power and 
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knowledge-- the strategic function of an apparatus-- could emerge in response to an urgent 
need. The apparatus does not preclude the episteme, which I suggest continues to be the 
central Heideggarian concept in Foucault’s genealogical period:   
What I should like to do now is to try and show that what I call an apparatus is a much more general 
case of the episteme; or rather, that the episteme is a specifically discursive apparatus, whereas the 
apparatus in its general form is both discursive and non-discursive, its elements being much more 
heterogeneous… I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic apparatus which permits 
of separating out from among all the statements which are possible those that will be acceptable 
within.547 
The episteme becomes the principle of discursive cohesion, which as types of knowledge is 
supported by strategic relations between forces. In Foucault’s genealogical thought in the 
mid-1970s, he understood the terms ‘governance’ and ‘government’ as the strategic functions   
of an apparatus, and as forms of technology.  Foucault did not understand technology in the 
sense usually attributed to it, but as “practical rationality governed by a conscious goal”.548 
The goal is informed or premised on the urgent need to which an apparatus responds to. 
According to Marco Altamirano, Foucault understands ‘technology’ as something that 
surpasses the traditional distinction between the ‘natural’ and the ‘artificial’,549 and that we 
must see the ‘technological’ act of governing as a mechanistic process that will allow one to 
transform a present need or problem into a future solution that is useful.550 The reason that an 
apparatus emerges is due to an urgent need, and the manner in which it responds, “as its 
strategic function” is an “activity of pure governance” that tries “to obtain an effect that is 
more or less immediate”.551 The effects that the apparatus produces are subjects, which may 
or may not be useful552  in relation to the urgent need that has developed. An apparatus, as 
Agamben notes, can be understood in a technological sense insofar as it “‘as it [is] a piece of 
machinery”, in which the mutually supporting strategies operate mechanistically to govern 
human beings so that they are produced as useful subjects through a historical period.   
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Discipline and Punish: Foucault’s Ontological and Historical Framework 
 The Urgent Need of Disciplinary Power 
The two technologies of power-knowledge or apparatuses that Foucault describes in his 
genealogies are imprisonment and the confessional. Imprisonment is the apparatus of 
disciplinary power,553 while the confessional is the apparatus of sexuality.554 The urgent need 
for governance that informs the strategic deployment of disciplinary power occurs because of 
problems that emerged during the unrest and revolution in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century within relations among sovereign powers in France and Europe. Foucault explains 
that the public torture of the ‘condemned’--that is, he who had broken one of the sovereign 
laws-- had a juridico-political political function:  
The public execution then, has a politico-juridical function. It is a ceremonial by which a momentarily 
injured sovereignty is reconstituted. It restores that sovereignty by manifesting it at its most 
spectacular. The public execution, however hasty and every day, belong to a whole great series of 
rituals in which power is eclipsed and restored.555 
The violence meted out during the torture and executions was a means by which the 
sovereign could use force that far exceeded the act of the crime against the condemned in 
order to exact terror from the public attending the execution.556  According to Foucault, it was 
by terrorizing the public in this fashion that the sovereign not only nullified the danger 
represented by that crime while at the same time representing his own power as invincible, 
but more importantly, intimidating the public so as to deter crime.557   It is for this reason that 
the executions were public.558 According to Foucault the ambivalent functionality of the 
political ritual of the public execution was that the sovereign’s use of force terrorized the 
public (deterring them from crime) but also turned that terrorized public against the 
condemned, aligning the public as the obedient subjects of the sovereign.  Through this 
political ritual the temporarily injured sovereign reconstituted his power, his unquestioned 
power over his subjects; this was the juridico-political function of the public execution.  
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There are several problems that led to the demise of the juridico-political function of public 
torture as a mode of punishment. The first problem was the change in crime. Foucault notes 
that “[by] the end of the seventeenth century…one observes a considerable diminution in 
murders and generally speaking, in physical acts of aggression; offences against property 
seem to take over from crimes of violence.”559 While crime against property was less violent 
and dangerous, it still had a higher rate of repetition, and in the years after the revolution, the 
French economy became based on private property.  These changes in so-called criminal 
practices are quite obviously a contentious issue, since within the political landscape of 
France in that period, criminal practices were supported not only against the falling 
sovereign, but also the newly installed bourgeoisie.  Foucault writes:  
 …to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a regular function, co-extensive with 
society; not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with a more attenuated severity perhaps, but 
in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into 
the social body.560 
Strategic Subjectification in a Carceral World 
Imprisonment is the apparatus that emerges in relation to this urgent need. As Alan Sheridan 
suggests, the penal theory behind the prison was a sign of the bourgeoisie fear of the working 
class. It was a means for controlling prisoners: or rather those who were rebelling against new 
classist laws could be locked away.561 Prison was also attractive to reformers because it was 
through incarceration that knowledge (savoir) could be gained to prevent further crime by 
studying the behaviour of those incarcerated. It was through methods of incarceration that the 
forces of modern penal reform were able to make man a criminal, an object of discourse. It 
was the nature of this knowledge that had a strategic function proper.  As Foucault notes:  
…a whole corpus of  individualizing knowledge was being organized that took as its field of reference 
not so much the crime committed (at least in isolation), but the potentiality of danger that lies hidden in 
an individual and which is manifested in his observed everyday conduct.562 
Prison could be used as a means to rehabilitate criminals.   Reformers believed that by subtly 
disciplining the body and mind of the prisoner in prison, they could reach and correct his 
soul.563 For Foucault, the corrective capacity of incarceration as a disciplinary strategy that 
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prevented further crime was attractive to reformers because it held the capacity to create an 
obedient subject.564 The obedient subject was the “individual subjected to rules, orders, an 
authority that is exercised continually around him and upon him, and which he must allow to 
function automatically in him”.565 This is why the prison is so important for Foucault; it is 
“where one can witness the entry of disciplinary forces”.566  Inherent to this corrective and 
disciplinary process was the supervision and recording of individual behaviour, “by the 
development of knowledge of individuals”.567 The knowledge to be attained from criminals 
could only be attained if they were always visible,568 reversing the darkness of the dungeon, 
and if every hour of their time could be controlled.569   
Obedient subjects would be useful effects in relation to a strategic rationalization of the 
imprisonment apparatus that was consecrated around the idea of deterring criminal or 
revolutionary acts against a newly installed property class.   Although prison was attractive to 
reformers because it had this capacity, it failed to eliminate crime.570 But the failure of 
prisons, according to Foucault is perhaps what has led to its continued existence. It produced 
a delinquent class. The class of delinquents were created, or for Foucault, “fabricated”571 in 
prison, and were more politically useful than the class of political rebels. Delinquents were 
not only a less-dangerous political subject that could be used to report on the behaviour of 
much more dangerous inmates, but could also be made to act on behalf of social 
authorities,572 to infiltrate “political parties and workers’ associations, in breaking strikes and 
quelling riots”.573 But the creation of this delinquent class of subjects had a much more 
strategic advantage. It made delinquency or the delinquent an “object of knowledge”.574 
Foucault explains that after being made an object of knowledge, the delinquent as a particular 
type of subject was completely abstracted and reified from the offense he had committed (the 
actual illegality), so as to show that the delinquent was a real type of person that “moved 
behind illegalities”.575 For Alan Sheridan, the creation of this class of delinquents provided an 
                                                          
564 Ibid 128 
565 ibid 128-129 
566 Tony Schirato, Geoff Danaher and Jen Webb, Understanding Foucault  (London: Allen and Unwin, 2012), 
80 
567 Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 125 
568 Ibid 201 
569 Ibid 6-7 
570 Ibid 277 
571 Ibid 278 
572 Ibid 280 
573 Sheridan, The Will To Truth,159 
574Foucault, Discipline and Punish, 277 
575 Ibid 277 
84 
 
excuse for the disciplinary mechanisms to be used outside of prison, as the criminal, or crime 
came to be comprehended as a “departure from the norm and a sickness to be cured”.576  
Prison was a failure, psychologists and legal specialists would argue, because delinquency or 
rather the ‘abnormality’ immanent in particular individuals had already taken hold of them. 
While normal (obedient) individuals were supposedly alright, there were many abnormal 
individuals who were in need of constant supervision and care.  Schirato, Danaher and Webb 
illustrate, that “the prison provided a model for the rest of society. In its dense web of 
disciplinary coercions, the prison developed and used procedures that, with modification, 
could be adopted in other fields”.577 The notion of delinquency, and more importantly its 
underlying substratum, abnormality, or the ‘anomaly’, now provided the grounds to extend 
disciplinary mechanisms outside prison walls. This is why Foucault argues the level at which 
it was deemed acceptable to punish was lowered and universalized:   
…it was no longer the offense, the attack on the common interest, it was the departure from the norm, 
the anomaly; it was this that haunted the school, the court, the asylum or the prison…Replacing the 
adversary of the sovereign the social enemy was transformed into a deviant, who brought with him the 
multiple danger of disorder, crime and madness. The carceral network linked, through innumerable 
relations, the two long, multiple series of the punitive and the abnormal.578  
It is by turning to the strategic function of the apparatus, ‘the panopticon’, which enables the 
reader to understand how the carceral disciplinary network is formed, and how the strategic 
function of this apparatus operates.579 It is through the disciplinary program of the panopticon 
that individual subjects are created as they exact the power of normalization on themselves.  
For Foucault, the panopticon is a historical reality consisting of particular disciplinary 
methods which have been “implemented in hospitals, workshops, schools prison”,580 which 
constitute an objective world of possibilities.  The panopticon is thus neither pure knowledge 
(just a design), nor power (the institutional acts characterizing the designs implementation), 
but by nature their imbrication, deployed as a process of technological rationalization. 
Panoptic power operates by means of a mechanism where objectification created by 
discipline working on the body is at the same time a mechanism which creates a self-
conscious state of subjection-- it determines who we are:  
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First the hospital, then the school, then later, the workshop were not simply “reordered” by the 
disciplines; they became, thanks to them, apparatuses such that any mechanism of objectification could 
be used in them as an instrument of subjection.581 
It is in the nature of panopticism as strategic function that a soul is produced by means of the 
internalization of the body’s objectification, which may be referred to as panoptic 
subjectification. The body can only be objectified if it is subjugated in a spatial arrangement-- 
specifically the panoptic arrangement-- where the body is placed in an individuated cell, and 
is visible to the supervisor in the above tower. This relationship is applied differently 
throughout modern institutions, yet the panopticon’s design can account for all these different 
applications. This is why “in each cell a madman, a patient, a condemned man, a worker or a 
school boy” would come exact the power of normalization on themselves.582 In Foucault’s 
analysis of Bentham’s panopticon the supervisor can see the body-object, but the body-object 
cannot see the supervisor. This relation of visibility that characterizes the power relation (and 
strategic function of an anonymous apparatus) of disciplinary modernity between the judge of 
normality and object of knowledge is applied differently throughout modern institutional life.  
Foucault writes:  
Disciplinary power, on the other hand, is exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes; 
at the same time it imposes on whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility. In discipline it is 
the subjects who have to be seen…It is the fact of constantly being seen, that maintains the disciplined 
individual in his subjection.583 
This, in the thought of Foucault is a relation of power which is an act that constrains those of 
another.584 Moreover this act of power is always constituted by the relation of visibility and 
corresponding disciplinary techniques of objectification in the panoptic program, whether in 
the prison, school or hospital. It is a power relation because the gaze and techniques constrain 
the act of other subjects according to the measurement of the norm through a constant process 
of examination . Foucault posits that that it is through this constant examination process 
(being observed, punished and rewarded) by which the pupil “or any subject”, learns about 
their own visibility and internalizes the power relation that characterizes their own constraints 
and objectification that produces the modern soul. 585 He thus internalizes what were hitherto 
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external constraints that were exacted on his body with the intention of normalizing his 
behaviour (making him docile).  Foucault writes:  
He who is subjected to a field of visibility, and who knows it, assumes responsibility for the constraints 
of power; he makes them play spontaneously upon himself, he inscribes himself the power relation in 
which he simultaneously plays both roles; he becomes the principle of his own subjection.586 
Foucault has claimed that he wrote a genealogy of normalization instead of normality.587 
Psychology as Foucault understands it is predicated on an analysis of a descending 
individuality in relation to the norm.  The status of the norm, Foucault tells us, is that “the 
calculable man” has taken the place of the “memorable man”, 588- which was the ascending 
notion of individuality that proliferated before modernity. “All the sciences, analyses of 
practices employing the root- psycho- have their origin in this historical reversal in the 
‘processes of individualization’”.589 This descending individuality is an abnormal 
individuality or rather; in modernity abnormality is individuality. Nonetheless, what is 
essential is that the abnormal are not excluded like the Lepers of the Renaissance.590 Instead, 
they are still subjugated as objects of knowledge, and subjected to disciplinary processes that 
try to arrest, correct and normalize their abnormal condition. While there may be anomalies 
in relation to the norm, these human beings will still be subject to the control and dependence 
of some psycho professional in an institution which forms part of the carceral network of 
possible relations.  
Ontological and Historical Metaphysics in the History of Sexuality 
A concatenation of Forces: The urgent Need of Bio-power as the Birth of Psychoanalysis 
While Foucault’s Discipline and Punish is a fully fledged historical genealogy,591 The 
History of Sexuality: Volume 1 is considered by Todd May to be a “programmatic 
methodological” treatise that lays the ground for a future “genealogical study of sexuality… 
but was never completed”.592 Thus, in this text, he does not write the entire history of an 
apparatus producing subjects. However, Foucault explicates the relationship between 
disciplinary and bio-power in terms of the production of sexual identities that characterizes 
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the very normalization of society in accordance with the confessional as the apparatus that 
responds to an urgent need. Bio-power, as a power exercised over the life of the social body, 
is not a power that attempts to reconstitute a sovereign relationship. Foucault’s claims that 
instead wars are being waged on behalf of a sovereign, who “exercised his right of life only 
by exercising his right to kill” his subjects and others as a “deduction of forces”, they:  
…are now waged on behalf of  the existence of everyone…It is as managers as managers of life and 
survival, of bodies and race, that so many regimes have been able to wage so many wars, causing so 
many men to be killed. And through a turn that closes the circle, as the technology of wars has caused 
them to tend increasingly toward all out destruction, the decision that initiates them and the one that 
terminates them are in fact increasingly informed by the question of survival…The principle 
underlying the tactics of battle-that one has to be capable of killing in order to go on living-has become 
the principle that defines the strategy of states. But the existence in question is no longer the juridical 
existence of sovereignty; at stake is the biological existence of a population.593  
The urgent need is framed by the principle of survival of a statist organization on the basis of 
its biological existence. The relations of bio-power therefore work to increase the forces of a 
population, to strengthen it to avoid destruction, constituting the worldly salvation of the 
flock. In the concluding chapter of The History of Sexuality: Volume 1, Foucault explains this 
change in power relations in terms of a layered transformation “from a symbolics of blood to 
an analytics of sexuality”.594 This transformation, Foucault suggests, led to the birth of 
modern racism. The meaning tied to the symbolism of blood which distinguished the 
mythical ground of sovereign power was reformulated in biological terms. 595 This is where 
the strategic interventions that politicized the settlement of the nation, “at the level of the 
body, conduct and everyday life, received their colour and their justification from the 
mythical concern with protecting the purity of blood and ensuring the triumph of the race”.596  
For Foucault, disciplinary and bio-power enforce one another in the form of the confessional 
apparatus, over the question of the individual’s sex, which links the sexual normalization of 
individualization and the regulation of a biological race-species:  
Sexuality was on the side of the norm… perfecting the species inclined the whole problem toward an 
extremely exacting administration of sex (the art of determining good marriages, of inducing the 
desired fertilities, of ensuring the health and longevity of children).597  
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Disciplinary power works on each individual body, for the purpose of distributing “effects 
around a norm”,598 in which the “true sex” of each individual determines its intrinsic value 
and utility within a national economy of politicized life. Foucault’s strong claim in his last 
genealogy is that human beings do not have a sexual-- that is, essential-- nature, but rather 
modern sexuality has been strategically produced by the confessional apparatus. Foucault’s 
genealogical history of the modern sexualized and normalized subject does not simply 
oppose, but instead seeks to allocate the archaeological or epistemic grounds of 
psychoanalysis, as a constructivist position on human sexuality with material consequences in 
a lived modern world.599  While Foucault hardly mentions psychoanalysis in The History of 
Sexuality Volume 1, he considers it to be an extension of other discursive forms which 
exercise the psy-function, positivist psychology and psychiatry.600   
The notion of sex made it possible to group together, in an artificial unity, anatomical elements, 
biological functions, conducts and sensations, and pleasures, and it enabled one to make use of their 
fictitious unity as a causal principle, an omnipresent meaning, a secret to be discovered everywhere: 
sex was thus able to serve as a unique signifier and a universal signified. Further by presenting itself in 
a unitary fashion, as anatomy and lack, as function and latency, as instinct and meaning, it was able to 
mark a line of contact between a knowledge of human sexuality and the biological sciences of 
reproduction…by virtue of this same proximity, some of the contents of biology and physiology were 
able to serve as principle for human normality. Finally the notion of sex made it possible to invert the 
representations of relationships of power to sexuality, causing the latter to appear, not in its essential 
and positive relationship to power, but being rooted in a specific and irreducible agency it tries to 
dominate; thus the idea of sex makes it possible to evade ‘what gives power its power’; it enables one 
to conceive power solely as law and taboo.601 
It was at the junction of sex that a discourse on the reality on the nature of human normality 
and abnormality, which was biological and causatively and derivatively psychological, was 
produced. Psychoanalysis, in compliance with the Western onto-theological tradition had 
defined desire in an essentialist sense, as lacking.602 While Foucault does focus on Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, the schematic critique of The History of Sexuality and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis draws its historical trajectory from the foundational insights made by one of 
Foucault’s masters of suspicion, Sigmund Freud.603  Traditional Freudian psychoanalysis 
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posits an inextricable and essentialist relationship between “the process of civilization and the 
libidinal development of the individual”.604 For Freud and his progeny, our aggressive anti-
social desires are primarily sexual, or libidinal, which are located in the unconscious, or the 
id.605 He argued that it is this very erotic impulse (Eros) which draws human beings together 
to form a civilization, not a rational social contract.606 Our rational selves, which are 
delimited by the boundaries of the unitary individuated ego are not autonomous to the desires 
of the id, but rather are structured by them, in accordance with ethical commitments 
historically instituted through the social super-ego.607 For Freud, our unconscious desires are 
formed in the primary social organization, the family.608 He argued in conformity with the 
masculine solipsism of his time that within this primary social organ, male children come to 
view their mothers as the first objects of sexual desire. In this light, the male child and the 
father come to view each other as sources of hate, competition and jealousy. Indeed, Freudian 
Psychoanalysis goes so far as to posit that this oppositional contempt, the death drive 
(Ananke), which defines masculine socio-individual development, can manifest in an extreme 
desire to injure and kill.609  Freud however argues that historically, when the sons of a family 
acted aggressively toward the father, they were damaged psychologically, due to the remorse 
and guilt they felt for the deed.610 
Drawing on the tragic epic of Oedipus Rex, Freud diagnoses the sexual condition that is 
constitutive of human normality as developing through the oedipal complex that distinguishes 
familial relations,611 in which human beings are incontrovertibly heterosexual.612  What one 
desires in terms of the oedipal complex are objects (the mother) external to oneself. That is; 
the male subject always begins in a relation to a lack of the objects it desires, and the 
relations governing subject-object relations are instituted by repressive prohibitions of the 
super-ego.613 Freudian psychoanalysis therefore conceives of desire as a lack occupying a 
relation to power that is primarily repressive.614  To act instinctually in a manner that 
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transgresses the codifications is what is generally experienced physiologically as pleasure.615 
Yet for Freud, some of these pleasures could follow a healthy pattern, while others are 
symptomatic of unhealthy neurotic individuals.616  Freud and subsequent psychoanalysts 
were concerned with treating sexual abnormalities, or neurotic cases, in whose constitutions 
the effects of primary repression in childhood had curbed the normal development of the 
ego.617 In Foucault’s writings he praises psychoanalysis for uncovering the unconscious 
forces of human organization, yet critiques it for recoding the bio-political strategies of the 
state.618  While psychoanalysis may have found processes far more powerful to rationality in 
the development of bio-social organisms, it concluded that the natural sexuality that 
characterized the normative development of the human ego could only exist within the 
province of the nuclear family. Abnormalities could only be treated and corrected through the 
confessional relation between the analyser and analysand, in which the familial structure 
acted as a polarity between; 1) illness and repression, which through the course of therapy, 
became a structure of; 2) reintegrated normality.619 Psychoanalysis, in the form of the 
confessional apparatus responded to an urgent need that afflicted each racial state, which was 
the manner in which each of their citizens used their sex.620  
The Confessional apparatus and Sexual normalization  
Foucault locates the confessional as the central technique for producing sexual identities in 
the West from the dawn of Christianity to modern times.621 “The confessional was, and still 
remains, the general standard governing the true discourse on sex. It has undergone a 
considerable transformation however”.622  In modernity, the function of the Christian 
confessional is redeployed, and exercised within the intersubjective relations that constitute a 
power strategy of panopticon normalization. The confessional is no longer characterized as a 
ritual within a specific local setting. Instead, “it spread; it has been employed in a whole 
series of relationships: children and parents, students and educators, patients and 
psychiatrists, delinquents and experts”.623 Foucault’s argument is that the dissemination of 
the confessional from a localized technique to a fully-fledged apparatus, inculcated in a 
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concrete disciplinary strategy of normalization, is only plausible with the aid of 
psychoanalytic discourse.  
Power, Foucault argues, does not stand in a repressive position in relation to desire and 
pleasure, but rather a position that is totally productive.624 The confessional produces 
individualizing sexualities on the basis of four strategies which seek to normalize the 
population in accordance with the need to create a heterosexual population that affirmed a 
statist principle of survival. The first strategy, “the hysterization of women’s bodies”, 
naturalized the role of women as mothers and therefore part of the family.625 Sex was 
considered to belong to both men and women, but only belongs in a positive sense to men. 
On the other hand, sex was seen to be lacking in women, “but at the same time as that which 
constitutes the woman’s body, ordering it wholly in terms of its functions of reproduction and 
keeping it in constant agitation through the effects of that very function”.626 According to the 
delimitation of female functions, modern power and knowledge (savoir) conferred upon 
women the biological and moral status and functions of the mother, the essential caregiver of 
the family. But this was also the pathological source of reproduction and hysteric agitation, 
whose uncontrollable energies always hold the threat of a social meltdown. Thus, Foucault’s 
claim is that the pathological sex that was deemed intrinsic to a woman’s sexual being gave a 
reason for the placing of female bodies in a communicative and controlling relationship 
between the family cell and the corrective faculties of the social body.627 Foucault portrays 
the second and third strategies attending to the sexual-- that is, procreative-- normalization of 
a racial population. The second strategy, the sexualisation of children, created children as 
“sexed objects of knowledge” on the basis of the dividing line of puberty and 
menstruation.628 Although children were considered “pre-sexual beings”, Foucault’s claim is 
that in psychological and clinical discourse, the sexuality of children posed both moral and 
political dangers to the hetero-normative familial ordering of society.629 Thus, the 
confessional apparatus effectuated a series of power relations where parents, doctors and 
psychologists630 would carefully supervise, take charge, and doctor the course of children’s 
sexuality to the point where it crossed over to the third strategy. The third strategy, “the 
socialization of procreative behaviour”, consisted of a set of political and economic tactics 
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whereby a discourse on the “responsibility of couples towards the health of the social body” 
was generated.631 It was this strategy that ordered sexuality on the basis of a racial nation 
state. Hitlerite eugenics, Foucault posits, was simply a more brutal racial ordering of 
society,632 as it followed a mechanism that was totally active in liberal democracies,633 and in 
the racialization of class enemies in communist states.634  Lastly, the fourth strategy, “a 
psychiatrization of perverse pleasure” deals with the strategic interventions on the basis of 
sexual abnormality or deviance of individuals, who possess a sexuality that is Other to the 
normal heterosexual.  
All these strategies, exercised through the vocal apparatus of the confessional, produce 
sexualized individuals. Freud, and his psychoanalytic progeny, believed the only means by 
which individuals could overcome their repression would be through talking about their 
experiences in a manner mediated by a psychoanalytic professional.  Foucault’s claim is that 
in the historical West, there has always been a discourse on truth and sex, which in modernity 
has come to characterize the very truth and liberation of the normal individual.   There is no 
innate complex of desires that produce homo, hetero or any other form of sexuality. I argue 
that for Foucault, while there are certainly corrective measures in place in the carceral 
network, to deal with supposedly ‘abnormal’ perversities, the purpose of such procedures was 
“not the exclusion of these thousand aberrant sexualities, but the specification, the regional 
solidification of each one of them. The strategy behind this dissemination was to strew reality 
with them, and incorporate them into the individual”.635 Within the confines of the 
confessional dictum, under the constraints of the psychoanalytic analyser- analysand 
relationship, a process of subjectification commences where the subject comes to accept his 
or her sexuality as the truth.  
For us, it is the confession that truth and sex are joined, through the obligatory and exhaustive 
expression of an individual secret. But this time it is truth that serves as a medium for sex and its 
manifestations. The confession is a ritual of discourse in which the speaking subject is also the subject 
of the statement; it also is a ritual that unfolds within a power relationship, for one does not confess 
without the presence (or virtual presence) of a partner who is not simply the interlocutor but the 
authority who requires the confession, prescribes it and appreciates it, and intervenes in order to judge, 
punish, forgive, console and reconcile; a ritual in which the truth is corroborated  by the obstacles of 
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resistance it had to surmount in order to be formulated; and finally, a ritual in which expression alone, 
independently of its external consequences, produces intrinsic modifications in the person who 
articulates it.636 
Following his epistemic principle of the human being as a transcendental doublet, Foucault’s 
claim is that each object of discourse is also a subject of a confessional statement. The 
panoptic principle constituted strategic relations in the surveillance of human objects by 
human subjects, producing written case files on the ranked normality of individuals as 
objects. This corresponded to rewarding normal and punishing abnormal standards as a 
mechanism of subjectification which augmented a form of self-relation where individuals 
would instead internalize surveillance by tacitly policing their actions in accordance with a 
set of prescriptive sexual norms as a modal characteristic of their very being. Foucault sees 
this as a dividing practice. In his genealogies of the modern subject, disciplinary and bio- 
power relations as a mode of domination becomes less physically violent than sovereign 
power relations, but domination becomes regulated and consequentially internalized. This is 
what Foucault means when he claims that the subject becomes divided within themselves.  
Thus, for Foucault, the panoptic and confessional complex, are two apparatuses which 
coalesce to ensure and constitute the continued existence of the modern state. These produce 
“the hysterical woman, the masturbating child, the Malthusian couple and the perverse 
adult’\”,637 as objects of a discursive order, which, in their conceptual specificities constitute 
subjective figures.638   Foucault conceives of these individualized objectivities as anchorage 
points for the derivative discursive concepts which constitute individualized subjectivities: 
the abnormal woman who does not desire marriage, prisoners, the homosexual as a species; 
‘lesbian or gay’, the passive man, the virile woman, the paedophile, schoolboys and 
schoolgirls. I suggest that what is of fundamental importance to Foucault’s analytic is that the 
agents of confessional and panoptic domination, as subjects of knowledge who exercise the 
psy-function of modern apparatuses, are bound as perceptual agents who exercise their own 
self-policing functions, or normal behaviour, by acting in accordance with the rules of 
discursive formations concomitant with the strategic rational tactics of panoptic 
imprisonment and the confessional. I am further suggesting that the normalizing relation that 
the pastors of normality adapt to the objective signification that each sexualized identity 
effectuates as an object and concept of discourse is a modal rule which constitutes minor 
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tactics in the overall strategical rationalization of statist society.  Parents, teachers, 
psychologists, sociologists, lawyers and politicians are professional subjects of knowledge 
who are indissociable from a control of life through the normalization of their own 
sexualisation. Foucault’s neo-Heideggarian claim is that an everyday world of subjective life 
has been ordered by the normalization of a population’s sex. The everyday possibilities of 
each individual as a sexual subject and transcendental doublet in a carceral world are 
characterized by its proximity to normative and abnormal standards of sexuality. For 
Foucault, sex thus has a role which is: 
…more practical than theoretical. It is through sex-in fact, an imaginary point determined by the 
deployment of sexuality-that each individual has to pass in order to have access to his own 
intelligibility (seeing that it is both the hidden aspect and the generative principle of meaning, to the 
whole of his body (since it is a real and threatened part of it, while symbolically constituting the 
whole), to his identity (since it joins the force of the singularity of a history639.   
 
Section 2: Foucault’s Use of Genealogy  
Foucault uses the genealogical method in three ways:  
1.  Genealogy as the anarchist Practice of a strategic intellectual;  
2. An historical framework for the production of subjectivity; 
3. An aesthetic ontology of who we are for the purpose of resistance.  
1. The Anarchist Practice of a strategic intellectual  
Since Kant, intellectuals have conceived of theory as occupying a dominant role in relation to 
socio-political practice.640 For Kant, a scholar would formulate a scheme of representation 
which would be grounded by a set of foundational or ‘truthful’ principles to guide action, or 
practice morally.641 Foucault and his interlocutor Deleuze argued that the representative, neo-
Kantian intellectual did not operate in opposition to power, but rather his very Platonic 
foundational universalism maintained that particular system.642 He occupied a pastoral 
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relation to his flock which perpetuated and recoded the functioning of a statist apparatus.643 
Foucault distinguishes himself from universal intellectuals as a strategic intellectual in line 
with the events of May 1968. 644 As a strategic intellectual, Foucault does not seek to impose 
a new version of truth, but instead produces theory as a form of action, that is; theoretical 
action, that forms a relay between the obstacles met by the transversal struggles configured 
around the central moments of May 1968.  He writes:  
The intellectual no longer has to play the role of an advisor. The project, tactics and goals to be adopted 
are a matter for those who do the fighting. What the intellectual can do is to provide instruments of 
analysis, and at present this is the historian's essential role. What's effectively needed is a ramified, 
penetrative perception of the present, one that makes it possible to locate lines of weakness, strong 
points, positions where the instances of power have secured and implanted themselves by a system of 
organisation dating back over 150 years. In other words, a topological and geological survey of the 
battlefield - that is the intellectual's role.645 
Thus, Foucault uses genealogy, as an historical diagnosis of the present, and as an historical 
ontology of who we are as a means to overcome the obstacles that afflict those attempting to 
resist the power relations that constitute the organization of statist society.646 As I mentioned 
earlier, Foucault creatively interpreted the event of May, 1968, and the transversal struggles 
that accompanied it as an event he called “the death of the subject”, which he argued in 
Nietzschean terms was a consequence of the the death of God.647  
Foucault uses genealogy to uncover the process of subject construction in order to make the 
human beings he is writing for aware of the continued domination they face at the hands of 
the apparatuses that engender sexualisation and normalization. The transversal struggles, that 
is; the form of resistance that Foucault is concerned with is premised on a correlative social 
and subjective domination, in which the subject becomes divided within himself, fortifying 
his social domination in a statist apparatus. Following this logic, Foucault deploys the 
genealogical method to configure how power has constituted both material domination within 
modern society and a deeper subjection. This with regard to forms of subjectivity that 
determine possible modes of being that constitute an ontology of the modern world. He is 
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keen on distinguishing this very subject and its role as a deeper form of subjection that 
supports and is beneficial to worldly conditions determined by statist rule, for the very 
purpose of providing a route of both forms of domination. 
The problem of our days is not to try to liberate the individual from the state and from the state's 
institutions but to liberate us both from the state and from the type of individualization which is linked 
to the state.648   
For Foucault, in order to create new ways of life as a mode of resistance, subjects must be 
aware of their actual constitution as subjects in the form of dividing practices, as well as the 
relations of power that continue to engender them as obstacles to further practices. Foucault’s 
genealogical history of the present is not a Nietzschean diagnosis of life-affirming and 
denying symptoms, but is rather concerned with a political diagnosis of the subjective and 
correlative institutional obstacles, to form a relay towards further practices of revolution.   
 
 
2.An Historical Framework for the Production of Subjectivity and Truth 
Foucault was part of a generation of burgeoning young scholars who disposed their 
philosophies in opposition to the French Hegelian tradition, who had grown to prominence in 
the middle of the twentieth century.649 Foucault, alongside Deleuze and questionably Jacques 
Derrida, tried to “free themselves once and for all from that tradition”.650 These thinkers were 
opposed to universal and totalitarian histories that constituted Hegelianism, Kantianism and 
Marxism.651 Encompassed in this post-modern incredulity towards old historical 
metanarratives,652 Foucault framed archaeological historiography as being opposed to 
totalitarian or ‘total’ history which would reduce all plurality and discontinuity. He considers 
himself a general historian, who promotes discontinuity in the face of universal continuous 
metanarratives:653  
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A total description draws all phenomena around a single centre –a principle, a meaning, a spirit, a 
world-view, an overall shape…the theme of a total history begins to disappear, and we begin to see 
something very different that will be called general history.654  
The historical framework that Foucault uses to trace a history of the production of 
subjectivity outside the control of any human agent or teleological unity is an historical study 
of an apparatus. The historical study of an apparatus is therefore what Foucault refers to as 
his genealogical method. The notion of an apparatus enabled Foucault to not so much 
uncover the genesis of particular structures,655 but rather explain how mutually supportive 
diachronic strategies of power relations and discursive knowledge configured around the unit 
of the episteme, and  exercised “the strategic function of an apparatus” could emerge in 
response to an urgent need.  In his genealogies, Foucault studied historical formations, or 
apparatuses that arose, as Agamben notes rather carefully, as, “a pure activity of governance 
devoid of any foundation in being”.656 The apparatus, having no foundation in any historical 
process, allows Foucault to recapitulate the archaeological focus on historical discontinuity in 
his genealogical method without the methodological errors of autonomous discourse 
theorized in The Archaeology of Knowledge, 657and the epistemic structuralism of the Order 
of Things and Madness and Civilization.658  
In his genealogies of modernity, Foucault portrays the emergence of subjective life as being 
produced through a set of discontinuous technological processes, without any transhistorical 
foundation premised on the philosophical positions of onto-theological metaphysics. 
Foucault’s claim is that the subject positions do not characterize our human nature, since we 
can seek to create new forms of subjectivity.659 Foucauldian genealogy is premised on a 
negation of human nature. For Michael Clifford, Foucault’s, “Genealogical critique, in fact, 
challenges the metaphysics of essence, which posits a substantive given subject”.660  
Moreover, Foucault’s genealogical method is premised on the notion that our subjectivities 
are produced through the historicity of groundless apparatuses, and therefore an epistemic a 
priori structuring of discourses which regulate the way speaking subjects perceive the world.  
For Foucault, our concepts of the norm, and more importantly; the notion of sex from which 
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it derives, are not trans-historical idealities from which we derive the truth of our human 
nature, but rather historical constructs that produce ‘who we are’ with no truth value.661 For 
Foucault, genealogy is a method that traces how power and knowledge apparatuses produce 
individuals that are also the transcendental doublets, concepts and strategic impulsive of 
discourses662  through an informal historical process, engendered by an urgent need that has 
come to constitute a world of truthful relations between human beings. For Foucault, 
genealogy as a method therefore conveys that those values and epistemic systems of truth that 
have ordered modernity are not the neutral or objective results of a trans-rational historical 
process, but rather a set of interpretive errors that have hardened into valuable truths through 
a series of dominations and power relations. For Foucault, by deracinating an entire regime of 
truth as the ordering-force of society inculcated through a meaningless and informal process, 
genealogy is an effective history.663 That is, genealogy is a textual device that is deployed or 
used for a practical, not theoretical effect: 
The initial result is that we can understand those who resemble us as completely determined systems and as 
representative of diverse cultures, that is to say, as necessary and capable of modification. And in return, 
we are able to separate the phases of our own evolution and consider them individually. The purpose of 
history, guided by genealogy, is not to discover the roots of our identity, but to commit itself to its 
dissipation. It does not seek to define our unique threshold of emergence, the homeland to which 
metaphysicians promise a return; it seeks to make visible all of those discontinuities that cross us.664 
4) An Ontology of Who we are for the Purpose of Resistance  
At the very beginning of the first Chapter, I pointed out that Nietzsche’s genealogy responded 
to the Kantian question of who we are, which for Foucault characterized the Enlightenment 
attitude to philosophy. Foucault includes his own philosophy as embodying this attitude, yet 
his take on it, or response to the Kantian question in his genealogies, is Heideggarian. While 
his historiographical method of tracing power relations is Nietzschean, Foucault’s response to 
who we are is premised on the notion of savior (discourse) which belies a disposition that is 
fundamentally Heideggarian.665 Foucault’s genealogical method moves from Nietzsche’s 
organic cosmological conception of power, to an analysis of power as a strategic mechanistic 
process inscribed in nature. This produces a Heideggarian world as a carceral network, as a 
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combination of disciplinary and bio-power relations to the discursive ordering faculty of the 
episteme ordered via the notion of a human being as a transcendental doublet possessing an 
essence. This informal process of power relations therefore produces an episteme which 
provides a set of intersubjective modal subject-object (savoir) discursive relations that limit 
the subjective possibilities of knowing human bodies, characterizing a historico-ontological 
world. Deleuze describes this relationship in Foucault’s work perfectly, despite his mistaken 
use of the term Being, for which I would supplant an episteme, or power relation that 
configures the modalities of plastic bodies.  
If knowledge (savoir) is constituted by two forms, how a subject could display any intentionality 
towards an object, since each form has its own objects and subjects? … Knowledge is Being, the first 
figure of Being…From epistemology to strategy. This is another reason why there is no ‘savage’ 
experience, since battles imply a strategy and any experience is caught up in relations of power. This is 
the second figure of Being…power-Being, as opposed to knowledge Being…It is the informal forces or 
power relations that set up relations between the two forms of formed knowledge.666 
Foucault’s genealogical historiography is not a form of historical sociology.667  It is rather a 
historical ontology of who we are.668An historical ontology of who we is a history of the 
informal process by which power relations produce an episteme constitutive of an a priori   
that orders discursive relations of knowledge (savior) that conjoin human beings 
intersubjective possibilities in a historico-ontological carceral world.669  
While the question of historical ontology in Foucault’s writing has been rightly analyzed, its 
relation to social science has not been treated sufficiently. In Nietzsche’s genealogy, he had 
to resort to a conceptual and academic schema to communicate his diagnosis of the present. 
Moreover, Nietzsche used genealogy as a form of historiography that was artful and 
reconstructive. Foucault, like Nietzsche, uses genealogy as an historical deracination of a 
traditional regime of truth and a diagnosis of the present. Moreover, Foucault uses genealogy 
as an historical diagnosis of the present so as to ascertain the historico-statist limits that 
condition who we are, so as to overcome those limits to reinvent ourselves. Foucault’s 
historiography therefore runs into the same danger that afflicts Nietzsche’s; how to critique of 
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the rational notions of truth and knowledge, and still communicate one’s position to his 
readers.670 This is an especially important issue in Foucauldian scholarship.  
To frame the problem exactly, Foucault, in opposition to the will to truth, argues that he has 
never written anything but fictions.671 He posits that his genealogy does not hold the status of 
a science,672 but still claims that he has written the history of a political reality.673 The 
problem can be solved through a closer reading of Foucault’s relation to Heidegger’s 
conception of the clearing-- truth. For Heidegger, great art possesses the capacity of 
disclosing the truth of Being’s disclosure of existential possibilities into the open region of 
the clearing. Art is the aesthetics of aletheia, a portrayal of the factical historical horizon of 
intelligible meaning that distinguishes the experiential truth of human beings in the world. 
For Heidegger, art is therefore a work that is revealing of existential truth, which in 
Foucault’s analysis is a political reality:   
The essence of art, on which the artwork and the artist depend, is the setting-itself-into-work of truth. It 
is due to arts poetic essence that, in the midst of beings, art breaks open an open place, in whose 
openness everything is other than usual. By virtue of the projection set into the work of the 
unconcealment of beings, which casts itself towards us, everything ordinary and hitherto existing 
becomes an unbeing. This unbeing has lost the capacity to give Being as a measure. The curious fact 
here is that the work in no way effects existing beings by causal connections. The working of a work 
does not consist in the taking effect of a cause. It lies in a change, happening from out of the work, in 
the unconcealment of beings, of Being.674 
Foucault’s genealogies follow the change incited by the transversal struggles that took place 
in Europe surrounding the event of May 1968. As an historical ontology, Foucault uses 
genealogy to supplement these anarchistic struggles with an artistic portrayal of open regions 
or clearings within a carceral network that are brought about through a set of strategically 
conditioned micro-dominations, or power relations. In his book, Foucault, Deleuze compared 
Foucault’s work in his genealogies to that of a cartographer.  As a cartographer, Foucault is 
considered to have stressed the role of the visual in his histories in a manner no different than 
that of an artist.675 From the painting by Vasquez, to the sovereign relation of power that 
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permitted the decapitation of Damiens the regicide,676  to the depiction of the open regions of 
a democratic world resembling prisons;677 Foucault is intent on visually elucidating the 
existential historicity of individualized subjects. For Deleuze, “analysis and illustration’”678 
are inextricably linked in Foucault’s work, with regard to an analytics of power and the 
subjectification of the body.679 In his genealogical analysis of the carceral world, Foucault 
analytically illustrates, through written paintings, a set of open regions engendered by power 
relations as dominations that distinguish the capabilities of who we are:  schools, juvenile 
centres, asylums, prisons, clinics, hospitals, military barracks and factories; he uses an 
aesthetic history to cross the bounds of fiction and existential reality as truth, qua Heidegger’s 
notion. For Foucault, within the confines of factories, workhouses and prisons, “reality 
happens”.680  
The purpose then, following the change happening outside the work in the transversal 
anarchistic struggles, is to revoke the experienced of subjugated knowledge. This is done via 
a counter memory that was produced and suppressed through power relations, through an 
illustrative form of writing that traces a memory of dominations as a political reality of 
possibilities, for the tactical purpose of situating such open regions as to overturn them.681 
Foucault therefore uses genealogy as a militant cartographer who is producing of a map of 
power relations for the purpose of supplementing resistance to them, while additionally 
deconstructing the manner in which those power relations have produced relations of truth 
that determine our behaviour. Foucault is an effective historian because his method allows 
him to master a technology of the will to power that has historically, until the present,  
governed, who we are, in such a way as to supplement forces of resistance for possible future 
change, or chance:682 
They were concerned with a historical knowledge of struggles. In the specialised areas of erudition as 
in the disqualified, popular knowledge there lay the memory of hostile encounters which even up to 
this day have been confined to the margins of knowledge. What emerges out of this is something one 
might call a genealogy, or rather a multiplicity of genealogical researches, a painstaking rediscovery of 
struggles together with the rude memory of their conflicts. Let us give the term genealogy to the union 
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of erudite knowledge and local memories which allows us to establish a historical knowledge of 
struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today.683  
Section 3: Genealogy in relation to Foucault’s project  
Foucault had of course, proposed that there were three modalities of genealogy that have led 
to the constitution of human beings are as subjects, in modernity:  
Three domains of genealogy are possible. First, a historical ontology of ourselves in relation to how we 
constitute ourselves as subjects of knowledge; second an historical ontology of ourselves in relation to 
a field of power through which we constitute ourselves as subjects acting on others. Third, an historical 
ontology of ourselves in relation to ethics through which we constitute ourselves as moral agents.684 
In the course of writing a genealogy of ethics, Foucault came across difficulties that led him 
to abandon the project. = Therefore, in my reading of Foucault, the History of Sexuality: 
Volume 1 signifies the end of a methodological period,685 which as we can see, clearly 
includes archaeology.686 In his later years, Foucault adopted a new method, in which he 
sought to reconfigure the processes and relationships with which human beings constituted 
themselves as subjects. However, the interesting alterations that marked the methodological 
problematizations that distinguished the “technologies of the self”,687 in Foucault’s later 
years, gave birth to certain remarks. These were no doubt related to the discoveries he made 
in his new books, which contradicted his earlier genealogical work. Suddenly, the anarchist-
theorist who was opposed to the idea of a theorist advancing a theoretical dictum that would 
dictate politico-moral practice made the startling claim that:  
The historical ontology of ourselves must turn away from all projects that claim to be global or radical. 
In fact we know from experience that the claim to escape from the system of contemporary reality so as 
to produce the overall programs of another society, of another way of thinking, another culture, another 
vision of the world, has led only to the return of the most dangerous traditions. I prefer the very specific 
transformations that have proved to be possible in the last twenty years in a certain number of areas 
that concern our ways of being and thinking, relations to authority, relations between the sexes, the way 
in which we perceive insanity or illness; I prefer even these partial transformations that have been 
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made in the correlation of historical analysis and the practical attitude, to the programs for a new man 
that the worst political systems have repeated throughout the twentieth century.688 
Instead of a structure of agency-relation, Foucault replaces a power/subjectivity/resistance 
model. Foucault’s critique of the essentialist conceptions of sex and sexuality that has 
distinguished modern notions of human normality is indissociable from a form of resistance 
in which “the body and its pleasures” occupy the central rallying point.689 However, Butler 
has pointed out that Foucault’s earlier and later work on the body both offer insights that are 
contradictory.690This corresponds not only to his views on the body, but the entire 
communicative content of Foucault’s work.691 For a thinker who once claimed that 
everything is discourse, and that one is always at the mercy of the mystifying effects of 
power relations, it would be awfully contradictory to claim that we are now free without the 
altering the relations of power that have that constituted us. Thus, I am in agreement with 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Foucault that last two volumes of The History of Sexuality 
were not meant as alternatives to his earlier deconstructive genealogies.692 Nonetheless, I am 
aware that Foucault’s later works on the mastery of the self as the ethical conundrum693 
altered his theoretical disposition. I would go as far as to suggest that the claim that “we must 
write a critical historical ontology of ourselves” in What is Enlightenment, may be addressed 
to a different, albeit academic audience as opposed to Intellectuals and Power’ after the 
revolts in France had settled at the turn of the 1980s. Taking this into account, I would like to 
suggest, in conclusion, that the freedom Foucault espouses is neither noumenal nor 
pragmatic,694 but rather a constitutive affective plasticity that permits us the capacity to 
change who we are through resistance, so that we may become otherwise.695 However, even 
the notion of becoming otherwise engenders certain problems with regard to the reading of 
Foucault, and the place of his genealogical critique of his overall project. In 1972 Foucault 
claimed that the individual is only a product of power, and promoted the deconstitution of the 
lines of the constitution of the subject into a set of revolutionary “groupuscules”.696 Several 
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years later he sought to ascertain another form of subjectivity.697 Even when he moves 
against his former position regarding partial transformations in the paper “The Subject and 
Power”, towards an anarchist refusal and the state,698 he still proffers the demand for the 
creation of new subjectivities. However, as I understand it, freedom is only tangible as a form 
of resistance that untangles power relations, setting up a line of flight exterior to two statist 
apparatuses that would lead to the formation of new relations of forces, what Deleuze calls 
“the outside”.699 
I do not want to end this Chapter with an analysis of subjectivity and freedom and its 
paradoxical relationship to power and force relations that constitute, out of human control, 
who we are. What I do want to conclude with is a refusal of attempts of Foucault’s readers to 
try and create continuity between disparate textual exercises. It is of course arguable that 
Foucault attempted to do this to some degree, under the notion of the subject.700  Yet despite 
this, my claim is that Foucault is a thinker who contradicts himself, not because he is an 
inadequate philosopher, but rather a thinker that does not espouse the traditional view of the 
author. Foucault’s early work stressed the author’s functionality in relation to a discursive 
field.701 The subject was not decried any metaphysical autonomy and unity but as Foucault 
argued, rather occupied a set of positions as an enunciative modality(ies) in a field of 
regulative statements that conjoined the subject’s relation to itself and the other as the 
historico-ontological level of intersubjective capability. Certain subjects, Foucault argued, are 
founders of discursivity,702 thinkers who transgressed the hold of prior discursive regimes, 
through the creation of new ones.703 For Foucault, the very act of writing was never a 
reductive, but a transgressive exercise in which the functional subject of discourse crosses his 
or her own limits of constitution.704 In that sense, Foucault’s anarchic-genealogical politics 
are best be left to the historical set of events, and the transversal struggles that brought them 
into being.  We should not attempt to create relations of continuity in his work, and to 
himself, against his own wishes. Foucault is a thinker that does not answer to discontinuity 
and contradiction; he promotes it as a path to political and personal transgression.  
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Chapter Three: Edward Said and the Abuse of Genealogy  
Introduction 
In this Chapter I will embark on an analysis of the post-colonial abuse of the genealogical 
method, a method which I have recently shown to have been created by Friedrich Nietzsche 
and deployed effectively by Michel Foucault. Within the disciplinary context of post-colonial 
theory, Edward Said is considered to have written a genealogy called Orientalism, and has 
the esteemed title of being a ‘genealogist’. Several post-colonial theorists have mistakenly 
labelled Edward Said’s creation of an analytic method, which he has called an “intellectual 
genealogy”,705 to be a correct extension and application of Foucauldian and Nietzschean 
genealogy. I argue that this is a misunderstanding of the correct methodological use of 
genealogy within post-colonial theory. For the scholar William Spanos:  
Not unlike the genealogy of the modern disciplinary society in Foucault’s ‘Discipline and Punish’, 
Said’s genealogy ‘Orientalism’ is structured in terms of an apparent sharp contrast between the power 
relations of a pre-modern past and that of modernity.706 
More problematically, within this field of academic criticism and activism, the relation of 
Said’s genealogy to the work of Nietzsche and Foucault is also far from being assured. There 
is a certain degree of confusion with regard to what type of genealogy Said has written. 
While Spanos may argue that the genealogy of Said is Foucauldian, William Hart for 
example, considers Said to be a Nietzschean, not Foucauldian genealogy:  
Thus, to say that Said’ s genealogy ‘deviates’ from Foucault’s genealogies is to say that it is more like 
the genealogies of Nietzsche. Both Nietzsche and Said are more interested in the distinctive signatures 
of individual authors – which is not a methodological mistake but a difference in methodological 
accent – than they are in the constitutive powers of anonymous discourses.707 
Hart goes on to say that, “this makes Said much more like Nietzsche than Nietzsche’s 
supposed heir Michel Foucault”.708In the face of this interdisciplinary confusion, I would like 
to put forward a position that is the radical.  The purpose of this chapter is to exhibit that the 
post-colonial appropriation of genealogy, via Said and his followers has not only turned 
genealogy into a social science methodology, but in doing so has robbed genealogy of its 
potential for post-colonial studies. In order for me to have a claim regarding the future of 
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post-colonial genealogy, I will first need to coherently show why the work of Said is not a 
genealogy methodologically in the same sense as the genealogists whose work I have just 
elucidated, Nietzsche and Foucault. What Said outlined as his central problem of Orientalist 
discourse in Orientalism not only challenged the colonial and neo-colonial essentialized 
representation of the Eastern ‘Other’, but in challenging that representation attacked the very 
binary division of reality that grounded the ‘West’s’ perception of itself, and its identity. This 
is the central problem of Orientalism:709  
For Orientalism was ultimately a political vision of reality whose structure promoted the difference 
between (Europe, the West, ‘us’) and the strange (the Orient, the East, ‘them’). This vision in a sense 
created and then served the two worlds thus conceived.710 
In Orientalism, Said’s central aim is premised on overcoming an epistemology that 
ontologizes a binary vision of human reality; that binary of Western modern, rational civility 
contra Eastern primitive, mystical barbarity.  I will explain these terms in the course of the 
analysis, but it is important to set out exactly what Said does, as an intellectual genealogist, in 
Orientalism. The link between Said’s outlook in Orientalism and the genealogical outlook of 
Nietzsche and Foucault is often considered to be a shared sceptical attitude towards 
knowledge in general, and a desire to overcome the authorative and dogmatic theological and 
scientific knowledge has had over living beings in particular:  
I hope to have shown my reader that the answer to Orientalism is not Occidentalism. No ‘former’ 
Oriental will be comforted by the thought that having been an Oriental himself he is likely – too likely-
to study new ‘Orientals’-or ‘Occidentals’- of his own making, it is in being a remainder of the 
seductive degradation of knowledge, of any knowledge , anywhere at time.711  
Said’s project in Orientalism is the manner in which the personal dimension of the text is 
imbricated, and on principle never dissociable from the text’s central problem, which is 
overcoming the binary essentialist framework that, in his opinion, splits the world into West 
and East, Occident (European) and Orient (Asian). This is due to what is referred among 
Saidian scholars as the paradox of Said’s identity. For Pat Ahluwalia and Bill Ashcroft, in 
Said, “we find a person located in a tangle of cultural and theoretical contradictions: 
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contradictions between his Westernised persona and political concern.”712  It is this 
contradiction that marks one of the most important passages in the book. Said makes explicit 
to the reader that in writing Orientalism, he “never lost hold of the cultural reality of, the 
personal involvement of been constituted as ‘an Oriental.’”713 Thus, when Said is writing the 
intellectual genealogy of colonial power and Orientalist discourse, he is also tracking a 
historical inventory of racist stereotypes of the Orient, and traces from antiquity to the 
present.  Thus, who Said is operates at both elements of the binary. He too has entered the 
tradition of the Orientalist scholar who is latently racist in creating the Orient and as a created 
Oriental who, in accordance with the view of Orientalist scholars, would have required moral 
conversion in order to correct his intrinsic racial or essential abnormality. By recounting the 
inventory of traces that constitute this experience conditioned by hegemonic consent, Said 
hopes to attain a critical consciousness that extinguishes this opposition, since it would allow 
him to see past the hegemonic constraints of both social constructs. Therefore, my critique of 
Said’s genealogy, and what most academic critiques miss, is that despite Said’s 
epistemological  mistakes-- since he wrote the text as both an intellectual, and an ‘Oriental’-- 
Said’s text is still considered a genealogy because it traces all the dehumanizing 
representations of the Orient all the way back to antiquity.  Thus, Said traces the experiential 
reality of not only being dominated and denied autonomy, but also the feeling that one’s 
“uniquely punishing destiny”714 is reducible to the degenerate racial characteristics of an 
Oriental. In order to correct this abnormality, one needs to consent to the hegemonic 
principles of Western rationality.  
 It is in ignorance of Said’s existential project by Western academics that has allowed post-
colonial theorists to continue to claim that Orientalism is a genealogy. It is in terms of this 
existential or experiential project that Orientalism shares an important commonality with 
Nietzschean genealogy. Nietzschean thought seeks to free the life of living beings from the 
negative constraints of what appears to be a natural system of scientific or theological truth. 
For many scholars, just by showing colonial discourse to be constructed, Said had liberated 
them from the existential torture of having to identify with a stereotype produced by the 
racism immanent to colonial practice. This is what a very subtle thinker, Dennis Porter points 
out when he suggests that despite its numerous epistemological errors, Orientalism is a very 
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important book.715  Said’s success is of course, awarded on the perception that he did 
overcome the binary racialized vision of reality, since his text was articulated from the 
perspective of an “Orientalized experience”’.716 Therefore, he overcomes the problems 
outlined in Orientalism directly regarding racial objectification and essentialization.717 For 
these thinkers, Said has as a result overcome his own diagnosis of “latent Orientalism”,718  or 
the definitive structural characteristic of Orientalist discourse (which I will discuss shortly). 
While it is evident that Said couldn’t overcome this binary racialized latent structure in 
Orientalism, due to his overtly racist portrayal of all Europeans,719 Said claims to draw on 
this critical sense as a means of speaking the truth to power, thereby overcoming the racial 
and essentializing division of human reality in the series of interviews published as 
Representations of an Intellectual.720 When he changes his position to “speaking the truth to 
power”,721 Said distinguishes his move by drawing upon the same “critical consciousness”722 
that the writing of Orientalism was intended to produce.723 My contention is that, contrary to 
Said’s supporters, that in Representations of the Intellectual, Said does not overcome a binary 
racialized view of reality, but reconstructs it.  His binaries simply manifest,724 differently.  
While Said seemingly embodies a critical disposition towards epistemological neutrality in 
general like the genealogists, my claim is that Orientalism is not a genealogy because of its 
stance towards truth and its metaphysical analytic, which does not correspond to the power 
and force ontology that connects the research of Nietzsche and Foucault. There have been a 
number of thinkers who have previously made these points; however, it has not been taken as 
a central failing in the field of post-colonial studies. One of the thinkers that addressed the 
problem of the Nietzschean content in Said’s text as a Nietzschean genealogy shortly after its 
appearance in 1981was the scholar Paul Bove. Bove responded to Said’s text shortly after its 
publication in 1981.  For Bove, Said shared a commonality with Nietzsche and Foucault 
insofar as his history in Orientalism decimated a history of truth.725 Nonetheless, he argued 
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that because Said attempted to “replace one regime of truth with another”, he did not have a 
critical standpoint that characterized a genealogist.726 In this I will show how Said’s 
miscomprehension and revision of Foucauldian genealogy leads to a failed project. After 
elucidating how Said’s methodological revisions do not correspond to the structure of a 
genealogy, I will detail that his own exercise fails to the extent that his thought leads to a re-
establishment of dehumanizing binary system on the basis of a secular/religious divide, a 
division that he paid due attention to overcoming in Orientalism.  Moreover, the search for a 
science, or a true account of colonial affairs would, in my reading, overstep and transform the 
genealogical method into a caricature of Nietzsche’s original intent. As we have uncovered, 
genealogy does not have the hold status of a science, since it tracks how a regime of truth 
constrains and sickens the life of the body through an historical analysis of the present. This 
tracking in the Nietzschean and Foucauldian reading does not reaffirm another truth, but 
instead denies the impulse of the will to truth, with regard to the lived condition of the 
experiential body. In this very light, Bove pointed out that Said’s concern with truth was the 
distinguishing factor in denying Said as a genealogist. In order to demonstrate Said’s failure 
to overcome the binary and racial characteristics of his thinking, this section will disengage 
Said’s ontological analytic in Orientalism from the organic cosmology that frames 
Nietzsche’s aestheticism in On the Genealogy of Morals. More importantly, this 
disengagementwill also be done from Foucault’s power and knowledge relation in his notion 
of the apparatus in his genealogies, since it is the one of the methods that Said claims to be 
employing. It also includes an explication of how Said’s history is not a post-structural 
genealogical diagnosis, but written as a structuralist linear history. This consists of three 
interrelated tasks: 
1. To locate  Said’s conception of power in Gramsci’s Marxism rather than Nietzsche’s 
genealogy; 
2. To describe Said as a structuralist and not as a post-structuralist; 
3. To demonstrate how Said’s structuralist conception of discourse contradicts the 
principle of discourse and therefore power and knowledge.  
Once I have shown all three faulty of elements of Said’s methodology, I will be able to 
conclude that Said lacks the ontological and thus historical framework for a Foucauldian or 
Nietzschean genealogy. Orientalism, as already stated, is an intellectual genealogy that traces 
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the experience of being stereotypically othered. When one critiques a piece of writing that 
deals with the experience of being othered one cannot simply fault that experience of  it  on  
epistemological grounds, but one must respond to that experience ethically by attempting , as 
Deleuze says of Nietzsche as a genealogist, to “rock in the same boat”.727 My response to 
Said is also premised on the fact that like him, my concern is also for those dehumanized by 
colonization. If Said’s text is a failure with regard to its own project, yet is seen to be 
effective and an authoritative standard for post-colonial genealogy, then it is essential for the 
future of the post-colonial project that I show it as a failure here.  In the second part of this 
chapter, by delving deep into Said’s concern towards his present reality in terms of who one 
is-- that is, his own reframing of the genealogical position towards the Kantian attitude 
regarding who we are-- I indicate how Said cannot account for such an experience, and show 
how the constitution of such experience is grounded not as Said thinks, through hegemonic 
consent to stereotyping, but rather a genealogical framework of subjectification.  For me to 
illustrate my point within the framework of dealing with a tortured post-colonial subject 
condition, I draw on Homi Bhabha and Frantz Fanon. Thus, after showing how Said’s 
Orientalism does not have the framework of a genealogy, and “rocking with” Said’s concerns 
in the third section of this chapter, I will then consider his weaknesses and show how, in 
Speaking the Truth to Power, he still cannot overcome the Orientalist frameworks he was 
trying to overcome on the basis of not using a genealogical framework that would deal with 
his own subjectification.  
 
 
Section 1: Said’s Ontological Framework 
Power 
In Orientalism, Said claims he employs Foucault’s notion of a discourse, as described by the 
latter in The Archaeology of Knowledge and in Discipline and Punish, to identify the 
discourse in Orientalism.728 Notwithstanding the fact that Foucault’s books under question 
typify completely different approaches, archaeology and genealogy respectively, when Said 
is referring to the nexus of power and knowledge,729 he is speaking of Orientalism and 
                                                          
727 Deleuze, Nomadic Thought ,255 
728 Said, Orientalism,  3 
729 Ibid 27 
112 
 
modern imperialistic political power. I argue that the difference between Nietzschean and 
Foucauldian power and Said’s theory is that power in the latter has been poorly 
understood.730  The Nietzschean ontology of force was revolutionary insofar as it was able to 
theorize how power operated in society without relying on the traditional substantive models 
used by political theory.731 In the Nietzschean ontologies that I described in Chapter 1, power 
is not something that merely exists in reality; it is not a substance or a form. In Nietzschean 
thought, power engenders the real.  The object is produced by power,732 or is an expression of 
force.733 Most importantly, in the Nietzschean cosmology of power, the exercise of power, or 
a quanta of strength is never conditioned by a neutral substratum that acts on the basis of its 
own volition.734 
In Foucault’s genealogical histories, the model of power and knowledge that constitutes an 
apparatus, the same one Said is said to be deploying, are forces that affect each other which 
are not exercised in terms of quanta or strength, but in terms of a rational strategy. Yet, within 
Foucault’s model, although a strategy of power may give birth to a situated form of class 
domination, the difference is that power is never exercised as a top-down oppressive 
structure, but rather such domination in the form of the state, or law, is rather the terminal 
effect or consequence of power relations. Thus, for Foucault, power is never exercised:   
From the choice or a decision of an individual subject; let us not look for the headquarters that preside 
over its rationality… the rationality of power is characterized by tactics that are quite often at the 
restricted level where they are inscribed.735 
 Said has conceptualized power completely differently. For him, there is a “neutral 
substratum” that chooses whether to exercise its strength or not. Orientalism does not simply 
correspond to the raw exercise of power, but “it is, rather than expresses, a certain will or 
intention to understand, in some cases to control, to incorporate what is manifestly 
different.”736  Power for Said in Orientalism, is political power that exists objectively in an 
already presupposed reality, one in which it is evident that Said cannot escape the West/East 
binary. Power still interestingly possesses the potential to engender discourses such as 
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Orientalism, thereby “engendering limits on thought”.737 The political power that Said is 
concerned with in Orientalism and that produces its discourse,738 is the power of the colonial 
West. Orientalism is:   
A Western style for dominating, structuring and having authority over the Orient…,739 There are 
Westerners, and there are Orientals. The former dominate; and the latter must be dominated; which 
usually means having their land occupied; their internal affairs rigidly controlled, their blood and 
treasure put at the disposal of one or another Western power.740 
 This is not a material form that force relations have taken. Edward Said is not a post-
structuralist Foucauldian or Nietzschean but a modern Gramscian structuralist.741 What I 
mean is that Said is not a theorist of force, and therefore not a Nietzschean theorist of power.  
In Said’s analysis in Orientalism, political structural power is not uniform, but structures the 
experiences of human agents in different yet complementary ways. Political or colonial 
power constitutes the structural base from which other power structures operate. Thus, while 
Said’s analysis of power is political, the manner in which political power engenders the 
discourse of Orientalism is not a simple causation, but produced through an intersection with 
the different structural forms of power. Said argues that the discursive formation of 
Orientalism “is produced and exists in an uneven exchange”,742 with four forms of power. He 
writes:  
Power political (as with a colonial or imperial), power intellectual, (as with reigning sciences like 
comparative linguistics and anatomy, or any of the modern policy sciences), power cultural (as with 
orthodoxies and canons of taste, taste, texts, values), power moral (as with ideas about what ‘we’ do 
and what ‘they’ cannot do or understand as ‘we’ do).743  
Since these four forms of power operate in relation to each other, I want to see how they 
function before claiming whether that power is intentional, and therefore not the relations of 
power that ground genealogy as its historical framework. 
 
Edward Said’s Conceptualization of Power/Knowledge  
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Said argues that the seat of power shifts west from about the 16th century from Islam,744 to its 
current location in the contemporary United States of America, Said’s present reality.745 The 
shift in power in the 16th century to Europe provides Said with an historical framework for 
Western power engendering the discourse of Orientalism:  
The period of immense advance in the institutions and content of Orientalism coincides exactly with 
the period of unparalleled European expansion; from 1815 to 1914 European direct colonial dominion 
expanded from about 35 percent of the earth’s surface to about 85 percent of it. Every continent was 
affected, none more so than Africa and Asia.746  
In one of the most famous passages in Orientalism, Said interrogated former British Prime 
Minister, Arthur James Balfour’s 1910 speech to the House of Commons, in terms of the 
power and knowledge relation that characterized Orientalist discourse.747 Addressing the 
House of Commons, Balfour’s speech dealt with the problems, ‘we’ the British have in 
Egypt748. Said convincingly shows how Balfour’s argument was premised on dividing human 
reality, on the basis of a binary logic in which Europeans are considered superior to all 
“subject races”.749 In Said’s argument, Balfour was comfortably seated within a discursive 
tradition. In his speech, Balfour argued that the inferior civilized races lacked the knowledge 
to govern their own affairs adequately.750 Balfour claimed to have superior knowledge of the 
entire East, a geographical province which, he claimed, both historically and at the time of his 
speech lacked the capacity for self-governance.  He argued that there was only was a history 
of despotism in the East. Balfour claimed that European nation states, as members of an 
enlightened civilization it was the responsibility of Europeans to look out for the best for their 
less-enlightened counterparts.751 
  In Said’s thought, it is the strength,752 of political power that engenders the discursive 
construction of the Orient. The fact that Said conceives of power as strength means that his 
theory of power is closer to Nietzsche’s (quanta of force), than Foucault, despite Said’s 
proposal in Orientalism, that he is closer to the latter.753 Thus, Said argues that they who 
create and have knowledge of a human being in this dehumanizing manner is tantamount to 
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“authoritatively dominating it”.754 The creation of the Orient endorses the idea of European 
superiority, 755 which for Said, was what colonial administrators used to justify the further 
exercise of political power: 
Knowledge of the Orient is directly translated into activity, and the results give rise to new actions in 
the Orient…The Orientalist has now become a figure of Oriental history, indistinguishable, its shaper, 
its characteristic sign of the West.756 
Orientalism is less about the realities of colonization than the strength of Western cultural 
discourse within the West,757 a strength that Said claims is not to be confused with the effects 
of a traditional superstructure.758 In Orientalism, Said is less a Nietzschean than a closet 
Marxist. His intellectual genealogy of the relations between discourse Orientalism and 
political power is a self-confessed Gramscian project. Therefore, the reader of Said must not 
be confused by Said’s claim that he is deploying a Foucauldian methodology, which would 
logically derive from a Nietzschean ontology of power. Said’s conception of power, and the 
ontological location discourse he fulfils in his analytic of Western scholarship, is rather 
premised on Marxian and Gramscian principles.  
 
Said’s Marxian Background  
Antonio Gramsci was an Italian Social theorist and revolutionary who drew and developed 
ideas from the Marxist tradition. Karl Marx, a German philosopher and economic sociologist 
proposed that the driving forces in history were not found in the realm of ideas but rather in 
the material forces of production, constituting the structural relationship by which human 
beings labour on their surroundings i.e. nature, transforming the very structure of the world 
and their place in it.759 Marx called his theory of history and society “historical 
materialism”.760 Marx viewed historical development as being generated by a dialectical 
relationship between economic forces, or classes. He considered a class to be a collectivity 
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sharing a common relation to the means of material production that characterized any social 
configuration. The history of man was constituted by the history of class struggle:761  
Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian Oppressor and oppressed, stood in a constant opposition to 
one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight that ended either in a 
revolutionary reconstitution of society at large or in the ruin of the contending classes.762 
 For Marx, the material relations of reduction are a primary level of human existence, a level 
that he calls “the base”, which structures all other activity in the cultural sphere of “legal, 
educational, artistic and political activities”.763 He argues that the “totality of these relations 
of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which 
arises a legal and political superstructure”.764 The cultural sphere, or the superstructure, is the 
realm of ideas of what we have come to call conscious or cultural life. In Marx’s view, the 
domains of ideas, or the ideologies that proliferate around the cultural superstructure, are the 
ideas of the ruling class.765 The ideologies of the cultural superstructure legitimize the 
material structure of society.  The materiality of economic life and conception of an 
ideological consciousness are not only interwoven, but support one another in terms of the 
maintenance of class domination. However, for Marx the relationship between the base and 
the superstructure, between material activity and conscious ideas, are a one way street. The 
economic base determines the ideological constitution of the superstructure, but not the other 
way around.  For Marx:  
We set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life processes we demonstrate the 
development of the ideological reflexes and the echoes of this life process… Morality, religion, 
metaphysics, all the rest of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer 
retain the semblance of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing 
with material production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this, their existence, their 
thinking, and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness 
by life.766 
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In Orientalism, Said eschews Marx’s traditional base superstructure model, instead 
privileging Gramsci’s concept of hegemony.767 The Gramscian critique of Marx was 
premised on the fact that culture (ideas) had no influence on the base, or the political 
economy. In contrast to the economic determinism of most Marxists, Gramsci sought to 
establish a more coherent relationship between base and superstructure, or political and civil 
society respectively.768 For Gramsci, this relation was not a way of causation but one of 
mutual reinforcement, an intricate relationship that he designated with the term “historical 
bloc”.769 Since Gramsci’s writings are not only playful and elliptical but dense, I will briefly 
cover the content necessary to express Said’s Gramscian outlook in Orientalism: 
1.  According to Antonio Gramsci, civil society consists of everyday or private 
institutions,770 like the church,771 the family, and the media and sports teams.772 
Political society on the other hand refers to the political institutions of the bourgeois 
class, that legally enforce discipline in order ensure the consent of their subservient 
population, which Gramsci refers to as a form of rule by domination.773 
2. In opposition to those who saw civil society as a-political, Gramsci argued that 
because “civil society blurred the distinction between political and everyday life”, it 
should be conceptualized as a form of “coercive power”.774 Gramsci’s point is that our 
civil institutions generate cultural ideologies and values that people come to conform 
are both natural and desirable. These cultural values and dominant ideologies are 
coercive; they often come to be accepted without question.  Hegemony, Gramsci 
argued, is a form of coercive power constitutes the function of civil society.775   
3. For Gramsci, the political agents that constitute a dominant social group are no 
different in being coerced by normative hegemonic cultural standards.776 The actors in 
political society come to exercise disciplinary domination on the lower classes, or 
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subaltern groups, in terms of those hegemonic cultural standards generated by civil 
institutions.777    
4. For Gramsci, the political agents that constitute a dominant social group are no 
different in being coerced by normative hegemonic cultural standards.778 The actors in 
political society come to exercise disciplinary domination on the lower classes, or 
subaltern groups in terms of those hegemonic cultural standards generated by civil 
institutions.779    
5. The hegemonic ideals of civil society come to play a direct role in the structure of 
political domination. Lower classes come to consent with the hegemony of the 
historical bloc, as hegemony as a fundamentally Marxist thesis is also “material and 
economic”.780 For Gramsci, The ideas that constitute cultural hegemony are 
disseminated throughout the sphere of social relations, creating not only health 
benefits and provisions for ‘holidaying’, but also multiple spheres for social 
recreation.781 The bourgeoisie not only come to win the hearts of lower classes, but 
through coercive power, the lower classes come to believe that they are living freely, 
or governing themselves782 in the process of consenting to dominant practices.  With 
regard the interrelation between the civil society and political society, it is important 
what role agency has in Gramsci’s work. I argue that while Gramsci relies on a fairly 
stable capitalist form of economic structuration in his analysis, his reformulation of a 
traditional Marxist base, or superstructure schema into a set of less structured practices 
that constitute the intricate and complex relation between civil and political society is 
premised on explicating the agentive and unifying role that hegemony plays in a class 
leading well in a capitalist society. Therefore, Gramsci is never clear on whether 
coercion or consent is more of a priority, but instead rather on distinguishing how they 
are unified through cultural hegemony.  Instead of the mechanistic priority of a 
Marxian base, Gramsci’s favour unified relations of reciprocal determination. For 
Barry Smart,  
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Hegemony contributes to or constitutes a form of social cohesion not through force and 
coercion, nor necessarily through consent, but most effectively by way of practices, 
techniques…cultural practices which cultivate behaviours and beliefs, tastes and desires, and 
needs as seemingly natural qualities, and properties.783 
6. Thus, when the lower classes and upper classes come to adopt hegemonic ideals, the 
relations they maintain with the civil society have economic repercussions. Partaking 
in hegemonic activities are always economic exercises, and although funding such 
exercises costs the bourgeoisie at first,784 they generate surplus value which eventually 
benefits the bourgeoisie, and therefore the strength of political and civil society.785 
Thus, despite Gramsci’s notion that “we are all conformists”,786 power still operates in 
terms of a positionality premised on the leadership of the bourgeoisie in a democratic 
society where the relations of civil and political society are ordered in accordance with 
an acculturalizing force of bourgeois hegemony.  In Gramsci’s political thought, one 
has to lead to take power, but after a social group has taken it as a position, one has to 
lead well to keep it.787 According to Gilles Deleuze, this conception of power would 
still be slavish in the Nietzschean sense, since it is conceptualized as an object of 
representation, a position that a will desires.788 At this point, Said’s Gramscian theory 
of power must be conceived as antithetical to power relations that allow one to frame a 
Nietzschean genealogy.  
7. To conclude, Gramsci argued that while democratic societies operate by consent and 
coercion; if human actors no longer coerced by cultural hegemony, or no longer 
consent to an authority of rule, political society will step into assure complicity of the 
lower classes by force. In that sense, while the hegemonic  political power that the 
bourgeoisie class exercises over subordinate classes in modern democratic society 
operates coercively to deal with the masses who might not consent, in times of crisis 
the state apparatus will resort to violence to retain its desired order.789   
                                                          
783 Barry Smart, The Politics of Truth and Problem of Hegemony, in, The Foucault Reader, Edited by David 
Couzens Hoy, ( New York: Blackwell, 1986),  160 
784 Jones, Gramsci, 51 
785 Ibid 50 
786 Ibid 48 
787  Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, 58 
788 Deleuze, Nietzsche and Philosophy, xx-xii 
789 Jones, Gramsci,  53; Stuart Hall, Gramsci and Us, in, Marxism Today; ( London: June 1987), no page 
numbers  
120 
 
Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is a central analytic tool in Said’s intellectual genealogy of the 
discourse in Orientalism. While Marx came under critique in the book as a racist Orientalist 
whose Western politics of historicism clashed with his humanistic concern for the suffering 
of the oppressed,790 Gramsci does not. The reason, Said claims, is that Marx’s politics of 
historicism win out over his humanism.791 Said identifies the opposite in Gramsci. It is worth 
noting that Gramsci gives grounds for this reversal when, as early as 1911, he speaks out 
against colonial powers when he identifies with an anti-colonial struggle over the unity of 
historical progress being led by the West.792  Moreover, it was Gramsci that claimed since the 
world had through colonization been assimilated into the process of Western thought despite 
the values of specific cultures, in the current historical climate they happen to be elements of 
a Western process.793 For Gramsci, the subordination of local values to a unifying process 
tied to Western domination was constitutive of a global or expansive Western hegemony, 
where the colonized would come to consent Western culture.794  For Said, it would seem that 
Gramsci’s analysis is philosophically sufficient to explain worldwide cultural domination.795 
He conceives of Orientalism as a hegemonic discourse.796 For Said, this is why thinkers in 
political society, such as Balfour and Cromer, adhere to the hegemonic discursive stereotypes 
of the Orient that were generated by the activities of thinkers in the cultural institutions of 
civil society, by writers like Flaubert or Lane. The implications of Said’s argument are huge; 
he is claiming that the advances of European political society into the Orient are to a degree, 
hegemonically conditioned by actors consenting to set of dominant cultural ideas about the 
Orient that exist in the civil sphere of dominant culture. Said is arguing that political 
advances of Europe or “us”, are effectively brought about by the consent to a uniform set of 
ideas, and that it is contrary to the theoretical standpoint of  traditional Marxism. For Said, 
intellectual ideas influence not only political power, but the perceptual encounter between 
Orient and Occident:  
What they shared…was the kind of intellectual power I have been calling Orientalism. In a sense 
Orientalism is a library or archive of information commonly and, in some of its aspects, unanimously 
held. What bound the archive together was a family of ideas and a unifying set of values proven to be 
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effective797…To say simply that  Orientalism was a rationalization of colonial rule is to ignore the 
extent to which colonial rule was justified in advance by Orientalism, rather than after the fact.798 
 Said on Language, Discourse, Representation  
It should now be apparent to the reader that Said does not follow a Nietzschean or rather 
Foucauldian conception of power as he previously claimed. Said does not conceive of power 
as an ontological relationship between forces, but rather a form of Gramscian political power 
that is imbricated in the Western cultural governance of colonized populations. We can now 
begin to see whether Said has problematically, even incoherently applied the Foucauldian 
notion of discourse correctly. For Said, the process by which the Orient is othered-- that is, 
the dehumanizing binary vision of reality-- is predicated on Western historicism. Said’s claim 
is that the politics of historicism generally denote that the unity of an epistemological epoch 
that governs us is always considered from the perspective of the West.799  He claims the West 
views itself as the “maker of contemporary history”. That is, a theatre with Europe as its 
stage. In Said’s argument, by being the Other of European history, the Orient was not created 
by but also for Europe:  
The idea of representation is a theatrical one: the Orient is the stage on which the whole of the East is 
confined. On this stage will appear figures whose role is to represent the larger whole from which they 
emanate. The Orient seems to be, not an unlimited extension beyond the familiar European world, but 
rather a closed field, a theatrical field fixed to Europe.800 
We have reached not only one of the central issues in Orientalism, the a-historical 
essentialization of the Orient in relation to the West’s progress, but one of the major problems 
that many theorists in the history of the post-colonial theory have raised: the essentializing 
dehumanization of the colonized Other. The Orient is the essentialized object of the discourse 
of Orientalism. To conceptualize the Orient in terms of a philosophy of representation, Said 
infuses Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics with Foucauldian discursive theory. In 
Saussure’s structural studies of semiology, he argued that what we traditionally distinguish as 
phenomena manifest to sensory perception (our senses) as “linguistic signs”.801 Saussure’s 
structural semiology challenged the dominance of phenomenological theory that grounded 
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epistemological certainty on an abstract consciousness.802 He conceived of a linguistic sign as 
an inextricable combination between a sound image and a concept,803 which “imprints itself 
psychologically on our senses”.804 With this massive claim, Saussure is suggesting that a 
linguistic sign imposes itself psychologically in the sense that the meaning or concept 
(signified) is understood cognitively at the same time that the sound is heard, or the image is 
seen (signifier) as “united by means of an associative bond in the brain”.805  To not cause any 
confusion, let me simplify.  
A signifier can refer to any image, picture, graph, text, etc. It is most importantly a written 
symbol.806 But it also refers to any sound that can be heard. Saussure’s theory of semiotics 
constitutes an analysis of social communication, which he calls the “social crystallization of 
language”.807 The signified is the meaning that is attached is the signifier. For Saussure, the 
association between the sensory input and meaning is made by the brain. Physiologically 
speaking, for that imprint to get to the brain, the sign must first enter sensory perception. For 
Saussure, the mental act of understanding significatory meaning is a “receptive process in 
everything that goes from the ear of the listener to his associative centre is passive”.808 
Saussure’s revolutionary move at the time was to claim that as communicative agents, we 
don’t simply react to noises or sounds, but tacitly respond to the sounds of doors closing, 
people talking to us, and the whistle of the nearing train. Saussure’s conception of not only 
language and meaning, but of sociality is grounded in a cognitivist standpoint. The 
associative faculty of the brain, that which assures the sensory impressions of sound and 
images and a cognitive grasp of meaning, is what constitutes the organization of language as 
a system, “a social fact.”809 In Orientalism, although Said universalizes representation as the 
function of the sign, he only takes up Saussure’s theory of language to a point. For Saussure, 
language is conceived as: 
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A self-contained whole and a principle of classification. As soon as we give language first place among 
the facts of speech, we introduce a natural order into a mass that lends itself to no other 
classification.810 
Language (langue) is an important element of “human speech (language)”.811 For Saussure, 
the study of human speech is immensely complicated.  It lacks a principle of systemic unity 
because speech is both individual and social.812  The actual act of speaking is executive 
(parole), in the sense that the individual executes an act of speech813 that is never totally 
reducible to language (langue). Language (langue)  as a classificatory system could then be 
said to be the rules that govern all speech acts, but may only come into play in concrete 
situations, where real speech occurs.814  Thus, the only manner in which those rules could 
come about, for Saussure, is through the positive or the quality of speech that can instantiate 
those rules, which further structure social relations.  Speech, in Saussure’s argument is first 
and foremost a wilful act,815 a form of cognitive activity that induces the evolution of 
language (langue).816  It is this active and perhaps subtle quality of speech in Saussure’s 
thinking that represents a danger to Said’s universalizing portrayal of Orientalism as a closed 
European discursive power –system. Keeping in mind that Orientalism as a form of 
intellectual and hegemonic power is first and foremost a textual tradition. Foucault’s notion 
of the object of a discursive formation is what allows Said to overcome the problems that 
speech might cause with regard to the evolution of the discourse in Orientalism’ In The 
Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault defined a discursive formation in a manner more 
suitable to Said’s aims:  
The rules of formation operate not only in the mind or consciousness of individuals, but in discourse 
itself; they operate therefore, according to a sort of uniform anonymity, on all individuals who 
undertake to speak in this discursive field.817  
The rules that are immanent to a discursive formation,818 that is; the statements that are a part 
of it are also the rules or laws that govern it.819 The rules of a discursive formation, Foucault 
pointed out; operate on the phenomena,820 the objects of discourse:  
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The least statement — the most discreet or the most banal — puts into operation a whole set of rules in 
accordance with which its object, its modality, the concepts that it employs, and the strategy of which it 
is a part, are formed.821 
Thus, while phenomena exist, our experiences of such phenomena as subjects are ordered by 
the discursive identity that a phenomenon is given as an object within a formation.822In 
Orientalism, Said argues that the manner in which the object Orient has been represented in 
the textual tradition of Orientalism provides it with a “discursive identity” that acts a set of 
perceptual rules for the experience of the Orient by the European Occident:  
The Orient, in short, existed as a set of values attached, not to its modern realities, but a series of 
valorized contacts it had had with a distant European past. This is a pure example of the textual 
schematic attitude I have been referring to.823   
The Orient and Occident: The Essence of the power Knowledge Relation  
We are now at a point to examine the Orient and why Said’s account of it made such an 
impact on post-colonial thought. After I have explained the power and knowledge and its 
historical relation that has tied Said to Foucault, we can move on by looking at Said’s 
concerns as a genealogist, which forms the second part of my diagnosis. Before Said’s 
sources for theorizing about language, I pointed out that in opposing colonialism; Said drew 
attention to the Western politics of historicism. According to Said, modern Europe considered 
itself to be the “theatrical stage of history”,824 the central constituting force behind 
civilizational and of course, epistemological progress.825 Said points out that a crucial 
element in Europe’s perception of itself was the centrality it drew to its own rationality, 
responsible for advances made in the Newtonian science,826 and the philological 
decipherment of ancient languages.827 It is important to note that the notion of rationality is 
not only fundamental to the distinction of the Orient, but the manner in which Europe created 
its own identity in relation to racial Others:  
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The rational, hence autonomous and equal subjects of the Enlightenment project turn out, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, to be exclusively white, male, European828…This defining of humanity in relation to 
rationality clearly prefaces modernity's emphasis on rational capacity as a crucial differentia of racial 
groups.829 
The Others of the European subjects, were the objects of colonial and Orientalist discourse. 
In opposition to the European, the Orient is denied “the very possibility of development, 
transformation, [and] human movement”830 portrayed as primitive, mystical and “sexually 
licentious”.831  
Drawing on Foucault’s notion of the textual creation of reality, in Orientalism, Said argues 
the discursive creation of the fictional object, the Orient as an idea,832 engenders a politicized 
geographical reality.833 It is an essential part of Said’s argument that a vision of reality that is 
not only bound to Orientals (people) but includes geography of the Orient as a political site. 
“Geography was essential to the material underpinning for knowledge about the Orient”.834 
For Said, it is the “imaginary geography” of European Orientalist discourse that separates the 
European Occident (us), from the Asian Orient (them).835 The power of Orientalist discourse 
generates an idea or vision of reality in the form of a politicized racial geography. The Orient 
does not only refer to living beings, but an imaginative geography in which the Orient is a 
stage that represents all the people of the East, from the Arabs to the Japanese. This is what 
Deleuze means when he claims that Foucault’s revolutionary move was to turn epistemology 
in ontology, so that one doesn’t know what one sees, but rather sees what one knows. For 
Said, the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism inculcates an entire vision of reality, in which 
the Orient is of central importance: 
An Oriental man was first an Orient and only second a man. Such a radical typing was naturally 
reinforced by sciences (or discourses as I prefer to call them) that took a backward and downward 
direction towards the species category, which was also supposed to be an ontogenic explanation for 
every member of the species836…Theses of Oriental backwardness degeneracy, inequality with the 
West most associated with ideas about the biological basis of racial inequality.837 
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The Orient comes to be represented by a set of fixed ideas.838 The idea of fixing the Orient on 
the basis of cultural and historically racial difference is not something distinct to Orientalism, 
but part of all colonial discursive constructions of Otherness.839 Homi Bhabha refers to the 
creation of the colonized in terms of this “fixity”, to explain what Said distinguishes as the 
stereotypical representation of the Orient in hegemonic discourse:  
Fixity, as the sign of cultural/historical/racial difference in the discourse of colonialism, is a 
paradoxical mode of representation: it connotes rigidity and an unchanging order as well as disorder, 
degeneracy and daemonic repetition. Likewise the stereotype, which is its major discursive strategy, is 
a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates between what is always 'in place', already 
known, and something that must be anxiously repeated.840 
In Orientalism, the Western, colonial power, or knowledge nexus that creates the Orient, 
fixes the relation between the signifier and signified.841Said is a huge figure in the critical 
rebuttal to, and critique of essentialism, by means of his notion of the Orient as a 
stereotype.842 In post-colonial critiques of colonial discourse, stereotyping is premised on 
naturalizing racial difference on the basis of opposition to the Western subjective as the 
essence of human civilization and progress. 843 The practice of racial othering in colonial 
discourse was meant to split human groups into racial types that were considered naturally 
different from the European self, the subject of history.844 The essence in essentialism in 
colonial discourse conceives non-European races at the species level with a set of 
characteristics that are innate or fixed.845 It is these characteristics which make up a racial 
essence, a set of “natural qualities that are beyond history”.846 
In the first Chapter of Orientalism, “Knowing the ‘Oriental”, Said shows how the colonial 
production of the essentialized or stereotypical image of the Orient augmented the colonial 
relationship between them on the basis of the Orient’s objectification. A vital part of Said’s 
argument is that the Occident does not have an identity prior to the creation of the Orient, but 
attains its identity in relation to this construction. The Occident’s own superior characteristics 
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are not independent to the Orient, but conceived in terms of a dialectical opposition.847  It is 
this relation for Said which characterized the hegemonic intellectual power of Orientalism, 
“that justified colonization in advance’”:848 
If the essence of Orientalism is the ineradicable distinction between Western superiority and Oriental 
inferiority, then we must be prepared to note how in its development and subsequent history 
Orientalism deepened and even hardened the distinction,849… So far as the West was concerned during 
the nineteenth and twentieth century, an assumption has been made that the Orient and everything in it 
was, if not patently inferior to, then in need of corrective study by the West.850  
The racial typology immanent to the discourse of Orientalism, distinguished a set of 
characteristics common to all people from the East on the basis of biological classification.  
In Orientalism, Said clearly invokes the Foucauldian themes of normality, irrationality and 
corrective study that typified Foucault’s analysis of strategies of normalization, to explain 
how the biological relation between colonizing Occident and colonized Orient is perceived.851 
The Orient is not only an “object to be mastered”, but the colonial dehumanizing relationship 
is justified by the portrayal of the Orient as inferior, requiring correction in the form of 
guidance, and civilization. Said’s brutal point is that “the ‘natural’ European drive to conquer 
and enslave the racial Other assumed accordingly the force of a moral imperative”.852 
Therefore, in the course of European colonization of the East, the depiction of an 
essentialized Orient,853 which was characterized in terms of a dehumanizing paternal relation 
to the colonist, served a perceptual model to depict “all Orientals as a phenomenon 
possessing regular characteristics”,854 which Said argues, ultimately proved effective for 
colonial objectives.  
In Foucault’s famous text, the Archaeology of Knowledge, he distinguishes the discursive 
formation of objects in terms of an anonymous set of regulatory rules that impacted on 
subjects,855 which he distinguished at a pre-conceptual level.856 It is these “discursive 
regularities and constraints that have made possible the heterogeneous multiplicity of 
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concepts”.857 In Orientalism, The Orient is an object from which a multiplicity of racial 
concepts, such as Arab, Chinese, Hindu, Muslims, and Semite derive. Said’s important point 
is that while there may be slight differences in the ways these different so-called Orientals are 
perceived, in accordance with the principles of Foucauldian epistemology,  they all still 
possess regular characteristics in accordance with the positivist  constitution of the Orient at 
the pre-conceptual level of a discursive formation. This is how the textual attitude operates in 
Said’s intellectual genealogy of Orientalism in terms of combining the Saussaurian and the 
Foucauldian object. This through the essential singularity designated to the different 
conceptual variants, i.e.; Islam, Chinese, Arab, and Indian that are reducible to the Orient.  
Said’s Anti-Genealogical Structuralism  
Said’s textualism, in terms of his theory of discourse, is profoundly structuralist. This causes 
another tension in Said’s genealogy. Said is again conflating Foucauldian or Nietzschean 
‘anti-science’ with models of scientific accuracy.858 In symbolic structuralism, if one wants to 
look at how shifts of meaning occur, one has to look at the “varying degrees of shifts in the 
relationship between the signified and the signifier”.859  Structuralists who were interested in 
symbolic structures of signification like Said practice a form of scientific enquiry called 
“structural linguistics”. Saussure differentiates between two types of structural linguistics, 
synchronic linguistics and diachronic linguistics.860 While Said’s analysis in Orientalism is a 
history which certainly has diachronic elements, I argue that it should best be conceived as 
synchronic hegemonic discourse. I will explain my position in an examination of Said’s 
history in the next section, but first I want to clarify my point that Orientalism should be 
conceived as synchronic. In symbolic structuralism, synchronic linguistics generally study a 
structure as “an ahistorical time slice”,861 not looking at the processes of change that 
constitute levels of meaning, but rather what Saussure refers to as a “language state”862.  He 
writes,  
A language-state is not a point but rather a certain span of time during which the sum of the 
modifications that have supervened is minimal.863  
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Said has not just written about a certain span of time, but articulated an intellectual genealogy 
of Orientalist discourse that dates back to antiquity.864 His history would therefore be closer 
to what Saussure calls diachronic, or evolutionary linguistics.865 This is because in 
accordance with his Foucauldian reliance on the episteme he would be covering several 
forms of linguistic communication. That is; he explains the genesis of different time slices 
that constitute meaningful linguistic formations, Renaissance, Classical and Modern 
epistemes respectively. However, despite the changing portrayal the West affords itself, we 
must remember that regardless of the span of time that Said describes in Orientalism, what 
would, in a Saussaurian sense, be called the modifications in the representations of the 
Orient, have certainly been absolutely minimal. This Said argued, was due to the textual 
attitude that characterized the Occident’s experience of the Orient, so that the Orient “became 
a phenomenon possessing regular characteristics”.866 This textual attitude is of course what 
distinguishes the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism, as a static structural “system of 
synchronic essentialism”.867  
In Orientalism, Said calls these small transformations in the Western representation of the 
Orient, “manifest Orientalism”.868 This, as I said, is framed as diachronous, an issue I will 
treat in the next section. Now I want to finalize that the reader takes conceptions of the 
structural quality of Orientalist discourse as a synchronic system to be Said’s own. To 
illustrate my point, I first want to point out that in accordance with Said’s Gramscian 
disposition, the formal elements that together characterize  the internal logic of rule of 
transformation  of Orientalism are the four forms of Western power that constitute it as the 
West’s hegemonic discourse and power, “the reciprocal relations that produce Orientalism 
through an uneven exchange.”  I argue that for Said, “Western power political, moral, cultural 
and intellectual” structure the perceptual relations of Occidental superiority and Oriental 
inferiority by the creation Orientalism (power and knowledge) as a hegemonic discourse that 
produces an illusory vision of reality. In French structuralism, a structure is conceived as 
having a central organizing principle.869 It is this organizing principle which Jacques Derrida 
has called the “presence” or “play of the structure”870 its “transcendental signified”.871  Thus 
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far, we have seen that the organizing principle of Orientalism is Western power as conceived 
by Said in Gramscian terms. However, the organizing principle for Said is actually something 
historically prior to the formation of Orientalism as a hegemonic discourse.  For Said, I 
suggest that this organizing principle creates Orientalist discourse, but has the capacity to 
escape the structural power of the hegemonic discourse, Orientalism.872 
In Orientalism, “latent Orientalism” is the transcendental signified, or the organizing 
principle of Orientalist discourse.  The racist condition that infects each Orientalist scholar, 
“latent Orientalism”,873 is what up until now; I have been calling the ‘textual attitude’ by 
which the Occident comes to deal with the Orient that has been ahistorically essentialized. 
Said writes, “It is therefore correct that every European, in what he could say about the 
Orient, was consequently a racist, an imperialist and totally ethnocentric.”874 Said’s claim that 
a European could only say racist things about the Orient (which he of course claimed was 
synonymous with dominating the Orient), of course brought him under severe criticism from 
Western scholars. Nevertheless, Said’s move was backed up by a Foucauldian principle.  His 
argument is that the textual depiction of the Orient as an essentialized primitive stereotype875 
operated as a perceptual rule in the mind of the colonist, when he would encounter any 
Oriental.876 By using this principle Said could hold the claim that the identity of the author of 
the text can never be dissociated from the interests of empire.877 However, within the 
structuralist methodology that Said is using in Orientalism, the central organizing principle 
escapes structuration itself.  Said was no longer claiming that the discursive rules constituting 
Orientalism are the reason why the Orient is portrayed in a racist fashion by the Occident 
(textual attitude).  Instead, Said makes the more nonsensical claim that latent Orientalism 
constitutes an intentional disposition of a free subject.  It is on the basis of this intentionality 
as a structuring principle of the discourse Orientalism that Said breaks with Foucault:  
My contention is that Orientalism is fundamentally a political doctrine willed over the Orient because 
the orient because the Orient was weaker than the West,878…it not only creates but also maintains; it is, 
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rather than expresses, a certain will or intention to understand, in some cases to control, manipulate, 
even to incorporate what is manifestly different (or alternative an novel world.879 
  It is at this point, after a long digression and analysis, that I can claim that in no way does 
Edward Said share the ontological framework of a genealogist. The power of the West in 
Orientalism is intentional. In Nietzsche and Foucault, power is always a relationship between 
forces. In Nietzsche especially, power is exerted as multiplicity of unconscious drives which 
are historically constituted. And I could also ask at this point, if power is a transhistorical 
condition that is structural to the degree that it effectuates an intentional disposition in the 
minds of European scholars, can Said consider the exercise of power as blameworthy?  The 
fact that latent Orientalism is a trans-historical intentional condition which is also the root of 
power means that Said’s notion of power as intentionality does not allow him to trace latent 
Orientalism in the present. It is clear that he presupposes such a distinction prior to analysis, 
and presupposes the fact that the only form of power is the West, a principle that could be 
derived that with no analysis or thought really whatsoever. What Said’s critique really 
amounts to, and offers absolutely no advance from Foucault, as Homi Bhabha points out, is 
simply just a theoretical simplification, in no ways even equal to the erudition of a 
genealogist:  
The division/correlation structure of manifest and latent Orientalism leads to the effectivity of the 
concept of discourse being undermined by what could be called the polarities of intentionality…The 
productivity of Foucault’s concept of power/knowledge lies in its refusal of an epistemology which 
opposes essence appearance, ideology/science… There is always/in Said, the suggestion that colonial 
power and discourse is possessed entirely by the coloniser, which is a historical and theoretical 
simplification.880  
History of a Discourse: Religion, Race  
In Orientalism, the intellectual power of European Orientalism as a hegemonic discourse 
transcends Foucauldian episodic historicism, which Dennis Porter rightly notes, absurdly 
correlates the “intentions of Alexander of Greece with Jimmy Carter”.881  He does however 
narrow his study to the analyses of the British and French with regard to what we will shortly 
see to be an analysis of present reality, American Orientalism.  It is very important to note 
therefore, that even Said’s Orientalism is not a genealogy; it is a history of the present. With 
this covered, we can assess Said’s depiction of “Orientalism as a history of an imperial 
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discourse” with supposedly diachronic elements. 882 Said claims the diachronic elements of 
the history of Orientalism are the slight differences in the representations of the Orient.883 For 
Said, all the representative knowledge of the Orient, in the Western colonial frameworks of 
“languages, literatures, history and sociology”,884 is “manifest Orientalism”.885 For example, 
by “manifest Orientalism”, Said is referring to the changes we see in the depiction of the 
essentialized Orient, from Flaubert’s description of the Egyptian female dancer Kachek 
Hanem in terms of “exotic passive sensuality”,886 that would be the essentialized standard for 
the European male perception of Eastern women,887 to the more recent depiction of the 
prophet Muhammad in the Danish cartoon in 2005. However, in Said’s thinking, these 
differences are simply different manifestations of the same racist idea; Orientalism is latent in 
the sense that depictions of the Orient, while changing to a degree, remain racist and 
essentialist.888 Despite the pressure that the historical relationship, or narrative, between the 
Occident and Orient creates in Orientalist discourse, the manner in which the relation is 
conceived still constitutes an unequal polarity with a single scheme of structuration which 
means the linguistic modifications that have occurred are minimal. Despite the diachronic 
pressures, Said’s history of Orientalist discourse is still synchronic,889 and thus different to 
that of a genealogy.  
Said and Christianity  
Said’s principle of structural organization, latent Orientalism seems at first glance to be based 
on the notion of race.  The Occident is of course, generally portrayed as racially white.890 
However, this historically would be nonsense. According to the famous critical race theorist 
and philosopher, David Theo Goldberg:  
The first thing to notice is that race is a morally irrelevant category in the Greek social formation but on 
empirical grounds not normative ones. There are no exactly racial exclusions in the classical Greek 
social formation, for there is no racial conception of the social subject. And while things are more 
complex, I want to suggest that this is also the case for the medieval experience… While the first 
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recorded reference to the notion of Europe as a collective ‘we’ is in papal letters of the mid-fifteenth 
century, the first recorded English usage of race occurs in 1508.891 
Said’s argument, as I have understood it, doesn’t contradict Goldberg’s. Othering in Said’s 
analysis in Orientalism is not only based on race but more importantly, on religion.892 The 
initial fear of the Orient was based for Said on a religious division between Christianity and 
Islam. While modern Orientalism, or the modern West had secularized its frontiers, and 
European man was seen as a secular creator, “a man who made new worlds as the gods once 
did”,893 Said posits that the modern and present Orientalism is: 
…a set of structures inherited from the past, secularized, redisposed and reformed by structures such as 
philology, which in turn were naturalized, modernized and laicized substitutes for (or versions of) 
Christian supernaturalism..894 
Said has thus stressed a continuity between modern Oriental discourse (science) and Christian 
Orientalism on the basis of European power and a discourse that in the West has the status of 
“‘scientific truth”.895 The truth of the Orient for modern European society, argues Said, is not 
to be found in the Orient, but the dominant representative frameworks of European 
Orientalists.896  To explain the nature of this relation to domination, he invokes Nietzsche‘s 
will to power and will to truth. For Said, the silence of the Orient, and the reason why they 
could not represent themselves,897 was due “to the West’s great cultural strength… The 
domination of reality by vision is no more than a will to power, a will to truth and 
interpretation.”898 In Nietzsche’s thought, what undergirded the relation between Christianity 
and modern science was an ascetic will to truth. Nietzsche emphasised that ascetic will to 
truth of Christianity generated a worldview that may be best described as a reductive and 
totalitarian teleology:   
The ascetic idea has an aim-this goal is, putting it generally, that all other interest of human life should be 
measured by its standards…it believes that nothing powerful exists in the world that has not first got to receive 
from ‘it’ a meaning, a right to exist, a value, as being an instrument in its work, a way and means to its end, one 
end.899 
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I have already mentioned that in Orientalism, Said critiqued the historical West to its present 
heart in the United States of America as portraying itself as the stage of history, and as the 
centre of human civilization; the Orient was something for the Occident. With regard to 
secularisation of Orientalism, Said claims that the old Christian “religious patterns of human 
history and destiny” were far from absent.900 Moreover, for Nietzsche, the reductive teleology 
of the ascetic will to truth was oppositional. In Orientalism, Said carefully exhibits how 
Christianity conceives itself completely relationally to Islam. Said conveyed how for 
Christian Orientalists, Islam or any other part of the Orient for that matter, was never 
conceived in its own terms. Said explains how the European Romantics simply saw the 
Orient as part of their spiritual regeneration.901  Not dissimilarly, for the French Orientalist 
Louis Massignon, “Islam was a systematic rejection of Christian incarnation’”:902  
With regard to Islam and the Islamic territories, for example, Britain felt that it had legitimate interests 
as a Christian power, to safeguard. A complex apparatus for tending these interests developed.903  
For Said, it would clearly not be an overstatement to claim that the relationship between 
Orientalism and colonization is indissociable from a Christian theological standpoint. 
Through Nietzsche, he reads Christianity as a form of moral power that constitutes the 
hegemonic function of Orientalist discourse. According to Said, in a critique that recalls 
Nietzsche’s thought, the idea that the “Christian restructures the experience of the Occident”, 
is premised on the fear that the “Arabs and Islam will take over the world”,904 which dates 
back to the memory of conquering Islamic armies in Europe. Said has clearly been influenced 
by Nietzsche in his critique of Christianity in Orientalism.  He even refers to the Ottoman 
(e.g. Muslim) man as “the sick man of Europe’”905  Islam was not only misrepresented as 
illusory, but also made to seem evil,906 sexually perverted, that is; inherently sinful. The 
Islamic prophet Muhammad was grossly distorted by Christian Orientalists, at times 
derogatorily represented, and at times mistakenly placed as the centrepiece of the Islamic 
tradition.907 While Said’s major focus in Orientalism was to discuss the misrepresentation of 
Islam,908 he exhibited how the same standpoint is inculcated in anti-Semitism.909 It is these 
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two religions, Islam and Judaism, Said is arguing, who have felt the brunt of Christian moral 
violence in the historical west.910  
After tracing the imbrications between the intellectual history of French and British 
Orientalism and colonialism, Said turns to the present state of Orientalism in the United 
States of America in the final part of the book, “Orientalism Now”. In the closing pages of 
the book, Said’s argument really becomes forceful insofar as he can show the detrimental 
consequences of the textual attitude.  He forcefully exhibits to the reader that the synchronic, 
essentialized portrayal of the Orient has not changed in two hundred years. He writes: 
Books and articles are regularly published on Islam and the Arabs that represent absolutely no change 
over the virulent anti-Islamic polemics of the Middle ages and the renaissance…In newsreels or 
newspapers, the Arab is always shown in large numbers. No individuality, no personal characteristics 
or experiences.911 
However, this is where the relationship between Nietzsche and Said truly ends.  While Said is 
comfortable using Nietzsche’s notions of power to disregard European truth claims, he 
doesn’t raise the question of ascetic ideals with regard to the question of the connection 
between Christian theological and Modern scientific Orientalism. When Said does invoke 
Nietzsche’s notion of language as metaphor, he does so instrumentally to discredit the 
scientific status that the discourse of Orientalism has been given in the historical West. 912  
Said instead confesses that Nietzsche’s view of knowledge is “nihilistic for us”.913 What Said 
means is that such a view of knowledge is not valuable for the current political disposition, 
which he later sums up as speaking the truth to power.  
 
 
 
Section 2: The Concern of the Genealogist 
Knowledge of the Present 
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For a book that critiques the Western academy with real force, Said’s Orientalism, has all the 
appearance of a European or Western text.914 This is not a mistake on Said’s part.   
Orientalism, is not a text about the real geographical Orient, but the present reality of 
‘Orients’, like Said who lived in the confines of Western racist hegemony. An essential 
difference between Edward Said’s Orientalism from that of the works of Nietzsche and 
Foucault is that Said changes the Kantian attitude characterizing Nietzschean genealogy from 
a diagnosis of ‘who we are’ in the present moment to the question of ‘who one is’ in terms of 
an identity claim. Said presupposes his identity as a secular scholar and an Oriental in relation 
to the substantive notion of power prior to his genealogical study.  Despite the complexity of 
Said’s analysis, he conceives of himself as a sovereign subject that stands in opposition to 
power. His analysis therefore does not correlate with the structure of a Nietzschean 
genealogy, since Said places himself in intellectual opposition to the nature of power. In 
Nietzschean genealogical method, “in all events the will to power is operating”.915  To oppose 
power with critical consciousness is contrary to the critical methodological principle that 
informs genealogical history. An oppositional logic for Nietzsche was tantamount to the life-
denying power of the ascetic ideal, and thus the totalitarian province of Western onto-
theological metaphysics. Said is not a traditional genealogist, but rather a member of the 
Western scientific ascetic tradition. One of his key concerns which led him to write 
Orientalism “was to be able to distinguish between a pure and political knowledge”.916 
Therefore, the condition that Said is trying to overcome is clearly latent Orientalism. A 
critical consciousness would be one that is not inherently racist, one that has not been tied 
down to hegemonic ideology, and can therefore overcome Orientalist essentialism. I will turn 
to how problematic Said’s notion of pure knowledge is shortly. Said’s problem with regard to 
establishing a pure knowledge of critique is his acceptance that his perspective of his 
surroundings has been affected by Western imperialism and Orientalism:  
My own experiences of these matters are in part what made me write this book. The life of an Arab 
Palestinian in the West, particularly in America is disheartening. There exists here an unanimous 
consensus that politically he does not exist and almost unanimous consensus that politically he does not 
exist, and when he does it is either as a nuisance or as an Oriental. The web of racism, cultural 
stereotypes, political imperialism, dehumanizing ideology holding in the Arab or the Muslim is very 
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strong indeed, and it is this web which every Palestinian has to come to feel as his uniquely punishing 
destiny.917 
The Absence of Subjectification in Said’s Orientalism  
Said’s work in Orientalism is a deeply personal interrogation into how he has been given a 
discursive identity as an Oriental, and to what degree he, like others represented as Orientals 
had been conditioned by such a misrepresentation. The key difference between Said and our 
other two genealogists is that Said seems to have reasoned that by writing Orientalism, he 
would overcome those dominating frameworks, and attain a critical consciousness. In order 
to attain the starting point of  critical elaboration, the scholar first needs to be self-reflexive 
by investigating the historical processes that have so far “deposited an infinity of traces” in 
oneself.918 Said’s anti-Foucauldian and thus anti-Nietzschean position is premised on his 
modernist position regarding a sovereign consciousness as the ground of epistemology, a 
consciousness that would no longer be speculative once it had uncovered the history of 
material relations that informed our ideological present.919 While Foucault would claim that 
there is no consciousness prior to discourse,920 he certainly would not posit that discourse 
reflects things in themselves. Foucault is quite clear that discourse is a “violence we do to 
things”.921 Said’s argument is quite different:  
In many ways my study of Orientalism has been an attempt to inventory the traces upon me, the 
Oriental subject, of the culture whose domination has been so powerful a factor in the life of all 
Orientals.922 
 While he claims that he never “lost hold of the cultural reality of being an Oriental”, in 
investigating the inventory of racist traces that have been imposed on him, Said’s claim is 
always grounded and perhaps even presupposed by a critical consciousness. He admits to 
having this privileged foresight in advance. My disagreement with Said is not about a “real 
ahistorical Oriental essence”.923 I want to point out that even if Said’s focus is not the 
geographical Orient, but his world in his intellectual genealogy, he never provides a principle 
for how he experienced the cultural reality of being an Oriental, or how one comes to feel that 
the destiny he has is that of the Orient.  He does, by virtue of the hegemonic nature of 
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Orientalist discourse, explain the manner in which the intellectual power of Oriental 
discourse comes to exercise itself on the consciousness of the scholar: 
Orientalism’s power and effectiveness which everywhere remind the reader that henceforth in order to 
get at the Orient he must pass through the learned grids and codes of the Orientalist…As a discipline 
representing institutionalized Western knowledge of the Orient, Orientalism thus comes to exert a 
three-way force, on the Orient, on the Orientalist, and the Western consumer of Orientalism…The 
Orient is Orientalized, a process that not only marks the Orient as the province of the Orientalist but 
also forces the initiated Western reader to accept Orientalist codifications (like d’Herbelot’s 
alphabetized Bibliothèque’) as the true Orient. Truth in short, becomes a learned judgement, not of the 
material itself, which in time seems to owe even its existence to the Orientalist. 924 
 Indeed in this very piece of writing, Said is describing what he came up against in the 
process of writing his intellectual genealogy, in terms of his own lived experience. This is 
what Said’s supporters are really emphasizing when they talk about Orientalism being an 
experiential genealogy. Said wrote Orientalism from the perspective of a historically 
produced experience, with the paradox of being of a Western academic, and a racially abused 
Oriental. The paradox of identity that we have seen in Said does not refer completely, I argue, 
to an internal confusion. Said was deeply aware of this tension throughout his writings, yet 
my point is that he never takes it seriously enough. By means of his reading, he knew that 
that joy he took in classical music and Western literature was consecrated through the blood 
spilt during colonization, that of not only his ancestors, but the very people he wrote for.  In 
this very light a few years earlier he writes:  
This European opulence is literally scandalous, for it has been founded on slavery, it has been nourished with 
the blood of slaves and it comes directly from the soil and from the subsoil of that underdeveloped world. The 
wellbeing and progress of Europe have been built been built up with the sweat and the dead bodies of Negroes, 
Arabs, Indians and the yellow races.925 
Said traced the manner in which the Orient has been presented by hegemonic power of 
Orientalist discourse to its uninitiated learners from Western antiquity to the present. The 
paradox of Said’s identity, as a Western academic and an Oriental would mean that in the 
process of his lived experience he would have to come across, work against, and been 
identified via a stereotype that was always perceived as a political or sexual threat, and 
always as inherently inferior. By being an Oriental within the academy, uncovering the 
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present discloses to the reader the manner in which Said, and by implication generations of 
Orientals, had to experience-- being misrepresented in a demeaning and dehumanizing 
essentialism that has its own genealogy. Thus, the point that I am making is that Said’s 
intellectual genealogy of Orientalism constitutes a double-bind of also being a history of the 
infinity of traces (or, representations of the Orient) that have led to who Said is. Thus, the 
torturous condition that follows Said around is the observation effect that is induced by Said’s 
identity paradox, wherein the rational theorist and literary critic comes across Edward Said 
the Oriental. The colonial relationship of corrective domination that the Occident exercises 
on the texts about the Orient would be dramatized within Said’s own experiential life and 
intellectual learning. So in Orientalism, the purpose of overcoming Orientalist discourse is of 
course to move past the essentialist binary framework of West/East racism, but at a deeper 
personal level, it would permit Said to overcome the pain of the cultural reality, by which he 
looked at himself as an Oriental in terms of a Western corrective rationality: 
However painful it may be for me to accept this conclusion, I am obliged to state it: For the black man 
there is only one destiny. And it is white. 926 
 I have quoted Fanon here because Said really does not flesh out the problems that he as a 
subject is grappling with in Orientalism. The real problem with Said’s genealogy is that he 
never deals with experience that is created, or the life of the subject convincingly in terms of 
a condition that a genealogist would normally deal with. What I mean is that Said does not 
take the subjective experience of being orientalized seriously. In that sense, because Fanon 
takes the historical process that leads to colonized experience seriously, I consider Fanon to 
be more of a genealogist of the intersubjective present.  Said, writing Orientalism in 1978 is 
clearly still facing the existential consequences of being taught that one is and will be treated 
like a colonial stereotype. Moreover, like Fanon, the manner in which Said tries to move past 
such a stereotypical image is through the critical methods afforded to him by Western 
rationality. Yet it was precisely on the basis of this, the basis of the copula is,927 in an 
ontological sense that scholars like Fanon and Said were represented as members of 
essentialized races, which were naturally different and inferior. Both the radical criticism of 
Fanon and Said operates in a bind insofar as their historicity928 meant that even the thought of 
liberation as a rational humanism reifies the stereotypical relation between the Enlightenment 
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colonizers who brought reason and civility to the colonized, on the basis that the latter’s 
customs were not only an illusory religion, but primitive and stereotypical. Thus, the problem 
that afflicts the personal, or experiential dimension of Said’s is that even his oppositionality, 
in my reading of him, he operates on the basis of latent, corrective Orientalism (or even 
cultural racism) that will reify a binary vision of reality that he diagnosed in Orientalism.   
In a Foucauldian genealogy, the one that Spanos claims Foucault has taken to its full 
potential, power is not only repressive like it is in Orientalism, but produces reality via the 
creation of the soul. What is vital in the creation of reality in a genealogy-- that is; the 
epistemological principle that establishes the way reality comes is to be perceived, is the 
body. In Discipline and Punish, Foucault wrote the genealogy of the disciplinary or normal 
subject. He exhibited how a “micro-physics”,929 of disciplinary power exercised as punitive 
mechanisms that proliferated through the everyday life of the carceral network mastered the 
forces of the human body, composing the body’s forces in such a manner that it became 
docile (obedient),930and useful (in relation to capitalist and social production). In Foucault’s 
genealogy, the subject that had been normalized does not consciously adhere to the norms of 
society on the basis of an intentionality that is sovereign to material processes. Through its 
genealogical production, the subject’s intentionality is normalized. The subjectivity (reality) 
of the disciplinary subject is distinguished by a ‘self-regulating consciousness’ that tacitly 
polices the possibilities of bodily life in accordance with the normative constraints of 
disciplinary society.931 All Orientalism is really about at the end of the day is, as Homi 
Bhabha correctly posits, a means of overcoming a negative identity or stereotype. This is not 
a genealogical task, but a real post-colonial genealogist would see: 
That the point of intervention should shift from the identification of images as positive or negative, to 
an understanding of the processes of subjectification.932  
It becomes seriously questionable how Orientalism can be a genealogy if there is no concept 
of the body or another receptive vessel that challenges the epistemic force of the intentional 
rational subject.  If there is no body in Orientalism, how can Said in the genealogical sense 
explain how a depository of traces can induce the experiential reality of being an Oriental? 
He may of course, as the immigrant in exile who enjoys so-called high culture, also 
conceptualize his writing of Orientalism as a strategy to distinguish between politics and 
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culture.933 But for a Nietzschean theorist of force and bodily subjectification, such a principle 
that focuses on hegemony or ideology is nonsensical.  When Said talks about a cultural 
reality of political imperialism, surely the experience of being beaten is physical and not that 
of an abstract consciousness?   I cannot comprehend how in a contemporary political analysis 
of colonialism, how the evidence of a fight, a bruising, lashings, torture or rape-- all the scars 
of colonial power relations-- do not manifest in corporeal instances that infect the subject 
relation to itself and others, as Fanon pointed out so poignantly .934 It for this very reason, 
within the post-colonial climate of dealing with how particular subjective experiences are 
generated, that I consider genealogies which focus on the body to be profitable. I am wary of 
explanations that detail the formation of our subjectivities similarly through linguistic 
formations of meaning. Since Marxist critical theory has attempted to focus, in a materialist 
sense, on the life processes of men, and in my opinion genealogy takes this disposition 
further than Hegelian, Marxist or Heideggarian methods by focusing on the plasticity of the 
living body.  Nietzsche, in this very light showed us that the memory is created through 
violence, both corporeal and linguistic.  
Said has told us nothing about what this reality is, and how relations of power have 
constituted those who perceive reality, as well as the inextricable relations between the two. 
Said has provided a description of stereotyping in Orientalist discourse, but has not provided 
an analytic diagnosis of the bodily experience of being stereotyped. Said’s concern was not 
that of a genealogist that seeks a healthier existence for the body, not to decentre a regime of 
truth in order to replace it with another. In Orientalism his concern was not that of a 
genealogical physician but rather that of a secular intellectual overcoming the 
epistemological frameworks that had afflicted not only his cultural reality but also the 
politicized state of intellectualized scholarship. Writing Orientalism would allow Said to 
attain the conscious standpoint of critical elaboration.  The process and the very gesture of 
writing Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient would allow him to decode those 
Orientalist codes that were exercised on him as an Oriental, an Orientalist, and an uninitiated 
Western reader. Since the problem here is only Gramscian consent, he presupposed that 
writing  Orientalism would permit overcoming the hegemony of Orientalist discourse that 
afflicts those living in the Western world.935 
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A Knowledge of history, a recognition of the importance of social circumstance, an analytical capacity 
for making distinctions: these trouble the quasi-religious authority of being comfortably at home 
among one’s people, supported by known powers and acceptable values, protected against the outside 
world.936  
 
Section 3: Social Science and Consciousness  
The Failure of the Secular Intellectual  
Fifteen years after Orientalism was published, Said delivered a lecture that he titled 
“Speaking the Truth to Power”. The lecture was published alongside with his other 1993 
“Reith lectures”, as part of “Representations of the Intellectual”. These lectures mark an 
important moment in Said’s intellectual career because he makes evident in them that power 
is no longer synonymous with the European man:  
I think it is true to say that the critique of objectivity and authority did perform a positive service by 
underlining how, in the secular world, human beings construct their truths, and that for example, the 
so-called objective truth of the white man’s superiority built and maintained by the classical European 
colonial empires, also rested on a violent subjugation of African and Asian peoples, who, it is equally 
true, fought that particularly imposed ‘truth’ in order to provide an independent order of their own. And 
so now everyone comes forward with new and often violently opposed views of the world , one hears 
endless talk about Judeo-Christian values, Afrocentric values, Muslim Truths, Eastern truths, Western 
Truths, each providing a complete program for excluding all others.937  
Said reduces religious truth claims to social constructions that allow a particular authority to 
maintain order, and excludes those other claims that are contrary to their own. For Said, 
religion and colonialism may not follow the same logic, but they share a common ground in 
the social construction of systems of illusory meaning that maintain the authority of a specific 
collectivity. Therefore, despite the change in his position, he still keeps his central position 
that intellectuals have an antithetical relation to power. In opposition to repressive power, the 
intellectual is someone that is set apart from the masses, insofar as it is the intellectual that is 
“able to speak the truth to power’”.938 Power is now reducible to authority or authorities in a 
general sense, that of a tradition or nation. It is still repressive however; not positive in the 
sense of Nietzsche and Foucault.  However, the first sign that Said has not overcome the 
binaries of Orientalism is that he portrays religion as socially constructed and dogmatic and 
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secular criticism as objective and neutral.  “The true intellectual is the secular being’”.939The 
criticism of the secular intellectual, for Said is a universal and rational set of principles that 
supersede the values of “one’s race, or people, or religion”.940 In the thought of Said, secular 
criticism is one and the same thing as speaking the truth to power.  
 For Said, these universal values are premised by “peace, reconciliation, [and] abatement of 
suffering”.941  His critique of religion on the basis of moral principles that are both secular 
and universal is hard to correlate with his defence of Islam. In fact, by invoking secularism’s 
moral universality in terms of its orientation towards the removal of suffering, Said has made 
a moral and epistemological distinction between secularism and religion, true and false, ‘us’ 
and ‘them’, ‘moral’ and ‘immoral’.  This problem is exacerbated when Said claims that “One 
of the main intellectual activities of our century has been the questioning, not to say 
undermining of authority.”942  Said’s emphasis on the twentieth century, in terms of advances 
made by secular intellectuals seems to contradict his earlier comment that his work denies the 
form of universal historicism that is driven and unified by the empire of the West.  In his 
defence, he could of course be including himself in a group of post-colonial intellectuals that 
have questioned authority. But isn’t it the empire that drives the historicity of this 
epistemological framework from which universal secular criticism the same Western empire 
that Said critiqued in Orientalism Reconsidered? Indeed, Said does invoke a thinker that is 
not European to make his claim; Salman Rushdie.  First, Said defends Rushdie’s novel, The 
Satanic Verses because to ban it would be damning to rights of writers everywhere.943 
Rushdie’s novel, as is well known, caused outrage due to the derogatory portrayal of the 
Muslim prophet, Muhammad. Yet, Said’s defence of the novel is not based on free speech. 
For Said, the secular individual has a responsibility:   
Indeed I would go so far as to say that the intellectual must be involved in a lifelong dispute with all 
guardians of sacred vision or text…The intellectual only has secular means to work with; revelation 
and inspiration, while perfectly feasible as modes for understanding in private life, are even disasters 
and even barbaric when put to use by theoretically minded men and women.944 
Said has claimed that the values he proposes are those of a liberal humanism for all, yet this 
statement is difficult to swallow, sixteen years earlier in his seminal text, Orientalism, he 
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critiqued European scholars for equating political change with modernization, and for 
distinguishing a dehumanizing binary division of reality between Western rationality and 
Eastern primitive mysticism on the basis of an epistemological historicism. I want to make it 
clear that Said has not reified this definition on the basis of essentialist human types at the 
biological level. That the secular intellectual’s universal duty, and task, Said says, is to fight 
the exclusionary guardians every step of the way,945 is for me incredibly problematic, because 
he is reifying what he claimed earlier were the secular frameworks “given birth to by a 
Christian theological depiction of human history and existence”.946  Is it not  quite clear that 
Said is constrained by the same Christian existential paradigms as those Orientalists that he 
called racist and Eurocentric sixteen years earlier when he invokes the “secular intellectual’s 
universal duty and task”947 to fight against those sacred guardians, whose practices he claims 
as barbaric?  Overcoming this binary division of human reality was a major factor in why 
Said wrote Orientalism, and his supposed success.  However, it is now clear that he has now 
reified the two central elements of essentialism:  
1.  The first was that the modern secular West had centralized itself as the as driving 
force of world history and civilization, on the basis of a racial categorization that 
distinguished it, the self, or the Occident, in binary terms from the Orient.  
2. The second is that despite the fact that he identified the stereotype of Orientalist 
discourse, he seems to reify the same binaries, which as a web of racist stereotypes 
imposed on him the cultural reality of being an Oriental as “his uniquely punishing 
destiny”.948 If this is the case, then Said has not been able to overcome the 
experiential reality of being an Oriental, and therefore his method and work were not 
successful in analysing and overcoming that condition. Said’s project, and so-called 
genealogy on its terms could only be a failure. Clearly, Said’s position in 
Representations of an Intellectual, which he describes as the position of a rational and 
conscious individual, is not an advancement over the dehumanizing frameworks that 
divided human reality into an ‘us’ and ‘them’, since he redeploys it on the basis of a 
secular intellectualism and liberalism towards an inherently repressive and mystical 
religious force. 
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At the end of Orientalism, Said made a very good point that simply ignoring conceptual 
binaries is not reducible to criticism because there are material forces that bring these 
ideological divisions into play.949 My critique acknowledges this, yet I must reiterate: how 
can Said claim to have a critical consciousness when he has continued to reify colonialist 
stereotypes regarding human degeneracy, a practice he called ‘latent Orientalism’ all the way 
back in Orientalism? Robert Young, in his gargantuan creation, White Mythologies, is not so 
uncritical when it comes to Said. Moreover, Young is correct when he claims that the reason 
this is, is because Said presupposed what was to be critiqued, and more importantly 
presupposed his own experience as the grounds of critique. Writing an inventory of who one 
is, as solipsistic venture is clearly an inadequate means to diagnosing and overcoming the 
constraints of a present reality:   
The question, however, is whether the category of experience, together with that of a ‘critical 
consciousness’, both of which derive from traditions that have undergone detailed critical interrogation 
in the twentieth century, can be used in an unproblematical way…Is not ‘experience’ itself always 
experienced, analysed and given meaning through forms of knowledge… It cannot be posited as prior 
to knowledge as such. Said’s difficulty is that his ethical and theoretical values are all so deeply 
involved in the history of the culture that he criticizes, that they undermine his claims.950 
Thus, Said fails to overcome the epistemological frameworks that haunt his genealogy, 
because he cannot overcome his oppositional thinking that constitutes Marxism, not 
genealogical Nietzscheanism. When we see the Saidian tautology, whereby resisting, or 
speaking the truth to power, he reaffirms some of the basic essentialist principles supposedly 
engendered by that form of power itself, it is no longer a question of identification but 
subjectification. Subjectification is clearly important not only to Said, but I can argue now, to 
the future of post-colonial genealogy. This is because, as Young points out, Said’s 
presupposition and connection of a critical consciousness proved not only ideological but 
ineffective. If they are not prior to knowledge as Young points out, then I suggest the position 
that one should take is a genealogical one.  How else could one, with what I have just 
explicated, account for how power and knowledge (savoir) create experiences that Said has 
presupposed?  
We can say that if no original free and savage experience lies behind knowledge, as phenomenology 
would have it, it is because seeing and speaking are always already caught up within power relations 
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which they presuppose and actualize951…This is Foucault’s major achievement, the conversion of 
phenomenology into epistemology. For seeing and speaking means knowing (savoir)…Everything is 
knowledge, and this is the first reason why there is no savage experience, there is nothing beneath of 
prior to knowledge952 
It is the study of subjectification in a Foucauldian sense, or rather a Nietzschean genealogy, to 
use my own term, that Said’s own best critic, Homi Bhabha has deemed essential. Moreover, 
in conclusion, it was Bhabha that pointed out that when Said backtracked from the 
Foucauldian notion of the apparatus; his text lost its pioneering value.953 If Said had not 
backtracked, and his work remained pioneering for post-colonial studies, would that text not 
be a genealogy? Thus,  if we are going to embark on a genealogical study of the post-colonial 
subject in the future to liberate ourselves in what Foucault says is liberation in the truest sense 
of the word, it should be quite clear that Said’s conceptual and ontological commitments not 
should not form the premise for such an important endeavour.  
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Conclusion 
In the first Chapter of this thesis, I provided a descriptive analysis of Nietzsche’s 
genealogical method. After explicating Nietzsche’s self-appointed task as a cultural physician 
of natural values, I elucidated how Nietzsche used the genealogical methodology as a 
historical diagnosis of the present. This constituted a prior interrogation of Nietzsche’s 
ontological metaphysics, in the form of an analysis of the becoming of the will to power, and 
its relation to tragic life affirmative--that is, healthy-- or moral life-denying sick values which 
could be diagnosed in terms of the body, both individual and social. Nietzsche, after tracing a 
history of the will to power to the present, diagnosed the interpretive and evaluative status of 
man as being reciprocally determined by a will to nothingness. For the cultural physician 
Nietzsche, the human body that was the manifestation of the will to nothingness was a 
nihilistic, gregarious and sickly creature.954 Nietzsche’s claim was that this form of man had 
lost its healthy bodily unity, individual and social, which led to him being plagued by the 
decline of the highest values, but without the active strength to create new values. I also 
explained that Nietzsche’s genealogical method, as a tracing of the will to power, was an 
active element of all his mature work. In his genealogy, Nietzsche’s tracing of the will to 
power was also a history of the body. Drawing on Nietzsche’s collection of letters, I argued 
that he wrote On the Genealogy of Morals, as a clarification of his prior work that followed 
the conceptual and communicative schema of an academic essay, because of his elliptical, 
metaphorical,955 and enigmatic aphoristic philosophical style.956  
In the second Chapter, I was concerned with the manner in which Michel Foucault used 
genealogy as a Nietzschean form of historiography. This concern led to me to focus on the 
local and supplementary strategic nature of Foucault’s genealogical histories of the modern 
subject in relation to the transversal, anarchic struggles that afflicted Europe over the course 
of twenty years, of which the central point was May 1968.957 In my analysis of Foucault’s 
work, I pointed out that Foucault interpreted these struggles in terms of a Nietzschean 
framework. Foucault reflected on May of 1968, and the anarchistic struggles around it as the 
second event of epistemological history, that followed the consequence of the death of 
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God.958 Nonetheless, Foucault was concerned with writing genealogies, not as a further 
imposition of truth, but rather as a form of theoretical practice, that formed a relay between 
different forms of resistance as an event.959 In his genealogies, Foucault’s, diagnosis of the 
present attended to two problems for the purpose of furthering anarchic resistance.960 The 
first problem was power relations. In this Chapter I paid attention to the manner in which 
Foucault altered Nietzsche’s foundational concept of power relations. Dropping the 
quantitative and qualitative elements of Nietzsche’s distinction of power, Foucault 
reconceived power relations as a relation of forces, constituted by a rationalistic strategy 
immanent to itself, a strategy that would order to social relations. The second problem, the 
forms of subjectivity that have been produced through the relations of power that characterize 
modern society, was related to the first. In his genealogical work, Foucault combined power 
relations with the Heideggarian notion of the episteme, to create a mechanistic and 
technological framework for the production of various sexualized human individuated 
subjectivities in a neo-Heideggarian carceral world of possibilities.961 By illustrating a set of 
open regions, or Heideggarian clearings, Foucault’s genealogies, as a historical ontology of 
the present, responded to the Kantian question or attitude, of ‘who we are’, as a form of 
written aesthetics, fictions, of anti-science, still holding the function of Heideggarian 
existential truth.962 For Foucault, it was power that had ontologically ordered subjective and 
social relations, and diagnosing of the aims and intentions of power, and the subjects it had 
produced as a set of open possibilities, was the central aim of his genealogies for the purposes 
of resistance against power and the present state of subjectivity.   
Foucault used genealogy, like Nietzsche as a means to critique to linear, teleological version 
of history.963 Unlike Nietzsche however, Foucault’s notion of time does not follow a cyclical 
modality, but rather places emphasis of the discontinuity of all historical processes, which are 
never reducible to a single principle, such as the eternal return.964Additionally, Foucault 
deployed his genealogical methodology, as a diagnosis of an intersubjective present, as a 
means of critiquing the notion of human nature, especially the relationships created in 
modernity between sexuality, normalization and the rational subject’s access to objective 
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truth.965 In my reading, Foucault deployed genealogy effectively in a manner that paid its 
traditional debt to an originary Nietzschean ontological framework, despite a radically 
revised methodology that took into account the historicist existential thought of Martin 
Heidegger.966 
In the second part of this thesis, following an analysis of the creation and correct use of 
genealogy, I delved into the state of the genealogical methodology in the post-colonial 
enclave, as it has been established in the book, Orientalism, by Edward Said. In the third 
Chapter (and the second part of this thesis), “Edward Said’s abuse of Genealogy”, I conveyed 
that Said is not a genealogist in the manner of Friedrich Nietzsche and Michel Foucault, for 
three reasons: 
1. Power as historical framework: First, I pointed out that contrary to appearances, Said 
does not conceive of power in the same manner that Nietzsche and Foucault do. In 
this sense, I argued that because of his conception of power, Said lacks the historical 
framework that would be sufficient for genealogical historiography. In Nietzsche’s 
mature genealogical period, he understood power as an ontology of biological or 
genetic forces that served as an historical framework for the production of the modern 
will that constituted the present moment, and the will to nothingness.967 In Foucault’s 
genealogies, power relations still occupy an ontological role in the production of the 
subject through the mechanistic historical framework of an apparatus.968 In 
Orientalism, although Said claimed that he was deploying Foucault’s notion of power 
and knowledge, i.e. an apparatus, he mistakenly conceived power as a Gramscian 
form of political and intellectual power that had the capacity to engender 
discourses.969 Said mistakenly conceived of power as a structuralist hegemony, where 
latent Orientalism was analytically deployed as both a transcendental signified of a 
synchronic system of hegemonic discourse and a European will to dominate the 
Other, the constructed Orient.970  
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Said’s historiography does not follow a diachronic tracing of systems of discourses, 
constituted by an historical a priori epistemic principle which is always engendered by  
particular relations of power. As Foucault traced the birth of an apparatus from the decline of 
another system of power, he traced two differentially organized systems of human relations 
and meaning via a diachronic history.971 In Orientalism, Said argued in the Gramscian sense 
that this form of political power was consecrated around the intellectual power of Western 
academics that gave birth to a system of discourse, which he called Orientalism. According to 
Said, Orientalism was a universal discourse that divided human history into two polarized 
and essentialized forms of historical and geographical existence.972 The first, following the 
modern invocation of Christian identitarian themes was the construction of and on behalf of 
the Western European human being and Europe as a sphere of rationality and moral civility, 
as well as holding the capacity for technological and political development.973 The second 
sphere was the constructed Orient, or the East, which spanned from the Middle East to Asia, 
which Said argued to be an antithetical and fictional representation on behalf and in relation 
to the West or Occident.974 In contrast to the rational Occident, Said argued the Orient was 
fictionally stereotyped as inferior, sexually barbarous, and populated by mystically-driven 
human beings. While Said suggested that all manifest representations of the Orient, under the 
pressure of history, gained a diachronous aspect, his universalist representation of 
Orientalism does not follow the post-structuralist principle of a diachronic history of power 
and knowledge, consecrated around a moment of discontinuity in the urgent need that the 
apparatus responds to, but a closed synchronic system ordered by a textual attitude which 
gives direction to, and is nonsensically engendered by  European domination and racism, 
which Said seemingly diagnosed as latent Orientalism.975  
 
2. An inadequate response to the Kantian attitude with regard to subjectification. The 
second problem followed from the first. In Nietzsche and Foucault’s genealogies, 
power was conceived as a relation between forces with a positive capacity. In 
Nietzschean genealogical analysis, power is not repressive because it engenders our 
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perspectival apprehension of the real.976 While at first Said seems to conceive of 
power positively, as a means of engendering the discourse on Orientalism, his 
conception of power is repressive.  Moreover, in relation to this problem, Said wrote 
Orientalism as an intellectual genealogy of who one is.977 Said’s Orientalism does not, 
like the Nietzsche and Foucault, use a history of power to trace a present state of 
existence that constitutes a human collective. He changes the focus to a more personal 
and existential dimension, yet his existential focus does not correspond to a positive 
form of subjectification,978 nor does it produce, through reciprocal determination, a 
form of the will that is symptomatic of a particular form of existence. Unlike 
Nietzsche and Foucault, Said does not write a history of the body’s positive 
relationship to power. It is a closer application of this relationship, as being deployed 
in an historical analysis of historical power relations that produced subjective forms of 
experience, which I deem essential to the revision of genealogical method in the post-
colonial academy.  
Said’s Gramscian motivation for writing Orientalism was to write an historical study of the 
illusory traces that constitute the hegemonic nature of the discursive formation of  
Orientalism.979 Through writing this study, Said, following Gramsci’s philosophical insights, 
hoped to attain a critical consciousness that would allow him to gain mastery over the illusory 
quality of the hegemonic discourse of Orientalism.980 For Said, there is therefore a universal 
reality that belies the repressive functions of political power. He therefore believes in the 
ontological status of an ahistorical truth that the genealogists Nietzsche and Foucault do not 
commit to. His intellectual genealogy is therefore incorrectly perceived, by a few post-
colonial scholars, to follow the methodological and historical framework of a post-
structuralist genealogy. He does not use power in accordance with Nietzschean 
methodological historiography, which is most notable in the instance that he does not use 
genealogy to uncover a particular form of experience engendered by a colonial power 
apparatus.981 For a post-colonial genealogy to consecrate itself efficiently as a methodology, 
it will require a closer adherence to a conceptualization of power that is positive, not negative 
in the Gramscian sense.  
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3. If Said’s methodological revisions had produced a work which had been successful, 
and he had attained a critical consciousness, then I would have consequently 
backtracked and claimed that he could still use genealogy effectively because he 
would have used genealogy as an historical method that is transformative.982 
However, when Said claimed to speak under the premise of a critical consciousness, 
he did not surpass the illusory binary vision of reality which he so detested, and wrote 
Orientalism to overcome this.983  By rejecting the original Nietzschean foundations of 
the power and the body, he failed to produce a method that has the capacity to 
transform a historically produced subjectivity. In Chapter Three, I conveyed this 
problem in Said’s work. Faced with the dilemma that followed the reception of 
Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses, Said enunciated a statement which, especially 
when his criticism is taken into account, fits neatly into the discourse of Orientalism. 
William Hart, a great reader of Said, who even mistakenly went as far as to postulate 
that Said is a better genealogist than Foucault, was forced to pull the trigger over 
Said’s very apparent latent Orientalism.984 
 
Said Orientalizes religion at the very point that he rescues Islam from Orientalism. The Orientalist-inspired 
othering that Said criticizes looks much like his religious–secular distinction, which resembles if not mimes 
the East–West distinction…The religious–secular distinction is Said’s Orientalism, the way he produces 
otherness for his own uses. My point is that, in arguing against binary, dualistic, and Manichaean thinking 
where East and West are concerned, he reproduces such thinking elsewhere. Religion and secularism are 
East and West in Said’s imaginative geography. It is from the perspective of an enlightened, rational, 
nondogmatic, secular (European!) consciousness that Said looks down and judges religious consciousness 
as constitutively and irremediably lacking.985  
 Said had never conceived in Orientalism that the Orient was a form of experience that been 
produced through colonial relations.986 He has been critiqued for never dealing with an 
analysis of subjectification, which the great post-colonial scholar Homi Bhabha has always 
deemed necessary.987 Said’s recapitulation of the Orientalist binary with regard to the 
religious and secular divide robs his prior methodological work of real critical import. Said’s 
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reformulation of genealogy on Gramscian grounds, that is-- social science methods-- does not 
provide him with a transformative alternative to, or a way of overcoming the colonial 
consciousness that his project sought to overcome.988 As Robert Young has suggested, it is 
Said’s experience itself, one that assumes critical neutrality, which needs to be 
investigated.989  I have argued, in a fashion similar to Young, in agreement with Bhabha that 
this is the case precisely because he omitted an analysis of subjectification. That is, a 
genealogical analysis of the historical process whereby an apparatus engenders subjective 
forms of experience through its relationship with the body for the purpose of effectively 
transforming that relationship.990  In this thesis, I have provided a descriptive analysis of the 
manner in which Nietzsche and Foucault have used genealogy, so as to show the inadequacy 
of Said’s methodological revisions, and suggest to theorists working in the post-colonial 
academy that a post-colonial genealogy requires a closer application of Nietzsche and 
Foucault’s work on power and the body.  
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